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date. Labour has now adopted such a device, principally with a view to safeguarding Trade Union funds. But Labour is not always dishonourable or unreasonable in this matter; witness the following authentic story. The workers in a shop forming part of a large factory demanded the provision of a bomb-proof dug-out; their Shop Steward laid their demand before the Manager, who met the request fairly, pointing out first that compliance was not possible in the situation, since any dugout would immediately be flooded, and next that the request was scarcely reasonable, the shop being already splinter-proof, therefore as well protected as other shops and the average dwelling-house. The Steward, whether convinced or no, became abusive. There the matter would no doubt have been allowed to rest but for the intervention of the workers in the shop, who wrote to the Manager expressing their thanks and their regrets, dissociating themselves from the attitude of their Steward.

6. The general tendency to break away from Trade Unionism is less easy to explain. In spite of a lengthy newspaper wrangle, psychologists have not yet determined the reason which induces a child to crawl up a staircase-presumably because there is no one reason which can be deemed all-sufficing as an explanation of the phenomenon. Similarly, no general tendency or movement on the part of a large body of adults can ever be attributed to one simple cause. The vain effort to sum up the situation in very few words, and as the outcome of but one cause, invariably results in a formula needing much expansion. For example, a bald assertion that trade unionists generally are seceding from unionism because they are not satisfied with its achievements will not help us much.

Trade Unionism, as we know it to-day, is losing grip on its members because its internal policy was never sound, and because its external policy, which had perforce to be left largely in the hands of leaders, has been to a great extent abandoned by those leaders. So great is the weakness of internal policy that it might almost be asserted of this policy that it does not exist. The man whose language or behaviour is objectionable may be deemed a courageous being or a humorist by the worst type of his fellow unionists, but there are others

who know that he is doing more harm to the movement than any blacklegs could accomplish in so short a time. It is deplorable that under existing conditions such a man may be deemed a good unionist. The man who drinks to excess is unfortunately apt to be lionised by the majority of his mates, though there are others who can see no great future for the system which is satisfied merely to bundle him out of sight on the occasion of a strike parade. No Government concerning itself only with foreign policy could be deemed a good Government. Such hollowness goes far to explain restiveness among unionists, as well as the fact that the best minds among them are dissatisfied, though the imperative need of unity is not lost sight of. If Trade Unions are to continue as a power, they must insist upon a certain standard of decency among their members. The man who is deliberately offensive to total strangers is probably robbing his wife and children. He cannot reasonably claim to be on an equality with the average citizen. When men of this unpleasant type are called out' by their Union, they respond readily enough and may show fortitude under privation. But this should not be deemed their whole duty. The value of public opinion has been demonstrated again and again in connexion with strikes. It is for the ill-behaved to reflect that their conduct has been alienating that opinion and giving colour to the worst kind of misrepresentation in the Capitalist Press. Let Trade Unionists realise that the evil done by 'Blue noses' is at least as great as that accomplished by 'Black legs.'

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Trade Unionism in the past has concentrated its efforts on external or fighting policy. There is now a tendency among leaders to abandon that policy. So bad were the manners of most masters a short time back that to-day we find a very little courtesy having a wonderful effect on the men. Small wonder that the men's leaders, suddenly in touch with their social superiors, now think, or believe they think, that the interest of Capital and Labour are not very far apart, indeed almost identical. Yet Capital and Labour' is often only another expression for Buyer and Seller.' When the Labour leader realises that capitalists are 'not such bad chaps after all,' he has made a distinct advance. But he is apt

to outrun the truth implied. Capital, like Labour, is human; each is striving to gain its own end. Competition and combativeness may be interchangeable terms. The competition between Capital and Labour means simply this, that Labour is making a determined bid to wrest from Capital something more like an adequate share of the pleasanter necessaries of life, practically the whole of which are now in the hands of Capital. Other things being equal, it is probable that in any such strife the more aggressive will win. But other things are by no means equal. Capital is in possession; it has the power of the purse and the power of the Press; while on the other hand, paradox though it seem, Labour's greatest asset is its reasonable need.

It has been demonstrated in many ways that strong Trade Unions are of benefit to the entire community. Therefore it is to be hoped that the present restiveness among Trade Unionists will soon adjust itself. Remedy for the internal weakness is entirely a matter for the men; for the external troubles Government aid must be sought. The Law which grants redress to the individual who has been slandered must be so amended that sections of the community which have been maligned shall be provided with constitutional means of righting themselves in the eyes of the Public. The Public arbitrates justly on facts laid before it, but does not yet realise that, when Capital and Labour are disputing, it is only Capital which in present conditions can freely address the Court. If Labour cannot make its voice heard in the columns of the Capitalist Daily Press, its first aim should be to start and to circulate an adequate Press of its own. Such a Press will be worth more, in the long run, than many Labour Members at Westminster.



SINCE the irruption of the German armies into France, there has been no event so momentous, or so pregnant with possibilities, as Russia's desertion of the Allied cause. Its immediate results are now plainly visible in France, where, at the time of writing, our gallant troops are at death-grips with an adversary more formidable, by virtue of long experience both of offensive and defensive war, than he was in 1914. But, while its effect on the military situation is apparent at a glance, a closer consideration suggests that it may lead to consequences more permanent and far-reaching than seem, at present, to be generally supposed. It not only affects the present aspect of the war, but it appears likely to exercise a profound influence on the potential military situation after the war-in other words, on the balance of power in Europe, and throughout the world.

The immediate consequence of Russia's secession has been the reversal of the balance of forces on the western front by the transfer of a large number of hostile troops from Russia and Rumania. The German armies in France and Belgium, which, in September 1917, comprised 147 divisions, were reinforced during the winter by 35 divisions from the eastern, and 4 divisions from the Italian front. The arrival of Austrian troops in Belgium was rumoured as far back as January last; and, though it may be doubted whether the German General Staff would venture to pit Austrian divisions against French or British troops in battle, they would serve to relieve Germans in garrisons, on the lines of communication, and, perhaps, in sequestered sectors of the front. It has been remarked that the German divisions brought from Russia are of inferior quality. It is true that the pick of the troops which had taken part in last year's winter campaign had been transferred to France at the close of the operations; and that, since the disintegration of the Russian army, the eastern front has been used as a sanatorium, to which worn-out divisions were sent to recuperate, and as a training-ground for new levies. It would be a mistake, however, to depreciate the value of these reinforcements. Rest, change of scene, and the

infusion of new blood, soon restore the efficiency of warworn units; and those not considered fit for battle would be of use to replace troops of better quality in sectors outside the battle-zone. Nor should too much be made of the reduction of the German divisional establishment from four to three regiments, this expedient not having been confined to the German army. In the exodus from Russia, guns are an item not less important than men; for there is no further use for heavy artillery on the eastern front. Moreover, the German resources have been augmented by practically the whole of the Russian artillery, as well as by a large number of guns taken from the Italians, and by a vast quantity of ammunition and other material of war, the acquisition of which will have relieved the strain on the German munition-factories, releasing labour for employment in other directions, such as the building of submarines and aeroplanes, and the repair of railways and rolling-stock.

With these advantages at their command, the Germans have seized the opportunity to strike what is evidently intended to be a decisive blow before the American armies can take the field in force. It seems to be generally supposed that this is a last desperate effort, and that, in the event of failure, their losses will be so heavy as to oblige them to acknowledge defeat. The Germans are, perhaps, equally justified in expecting that, if they should fail, the Allies will be incapacitated from taking the offensive this year; and it would be quite in accordance with their methods to draw the Americans into action in detachments, with the object of impairing their value as a complete and organised force. Hitherto they have confessedly been counting on the economic factor and the political offensive against the home fronts, rather than on force of arms, to compel the Allies to accept peace, as the Russians have done, on German terms. These influences have not fulfilled their expectations; and it is probably for this reason that they have embarked on a supreme effort to destroy the Allied Armies, which, if it should not succeed, might result in a renewal of the deadlock on the fighting front. In short, they hope either to win a decisive victory, or to bring about a period of stagnation, during which they would exploit the resources of the occupied

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