intruder being thus delivered from all fear of the allied armies, joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. While Venegas was deliberating, his position was reconnoitred, and on the morning of the day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked by an army of little less than double the force at which he had computed it. The Spaniards, how ever, were not taken by surprise. The right wing, under Brigadier D. Gaspar Vigodet, extended to some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid; the centre, consisting of two divisions, under Camp-Marshal Castegon, were in the plain before the village. Lacy commanded the left wing, which was supported by a height, detached from the range of hills that run north and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was stationed, with three battalions, as a reserve, behind the centre; the rest of his division was posted, part on the heights to the left, part at an advanced battery, and the remainder upon the Castle hill, behind the village. The cavalry, under CampMarshals the Marquis of Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain, and the Viscount de Zolina, was placed in two bodies, one on each wing.

The intruder was in the field; but Joseph Buonaparte is equally a puppet in the field and in the cabinet, and Sebastiani was the real commander. That general perceived that the event of the day depended upon the possession of the hill on the patriots' left, and he ordered General Laval to attack it with his two divisions. Laval formed in close columns, by divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill both in front and on the right at once. The French suffered considerably in this attack. Count Sobolesky and another chief of bat

talion were killed, several of equal rank wounded; but they had the advantages of very superior numbers as well as discipline. The colonel who commanded on the hill was wounded, and before Giron could reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions which were posted there gave way. Now the imperfect state of the patriots' discipline was mournfully displayed: these battalions, instead of rallying when they found themselves supported, confused the troops who came to support them. Thus the height, upon which the fate of the day depended, was lost; and the enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards in flank. Lacy upon this wheeled to face the enemy, and for a while withstood them: 200 cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged one of their columns, which, forming itself into a square, withstood the attack, and Chacon, having his horse shot under him, and some of his best officers and soldiers killed, was compelled to withdraw. In the centre the enemy were equally successful, and at length the Spaniards fell back along the whole of their line. Nevertheless the ground was well contested, and Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, supported by the Castle hill. Here he was presently attacked at all points; his cavalry made another charge, which failed for lack of numbers, not of spirit, and the general perceived that there was no hope of recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered Vigodet, whose division, was at this time the least exposed, to bring up and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness and intrepidity, recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and began at

length to fall back himself in perfect order. At this time some ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands, frightened the horses of the little cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage of their dispersion, charged him vigorously. The second in command of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, distinguished himself greatly on this occasion; he checked the pursuers, while Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000, under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and Solana. As far as Herencia the retreat was effected in good order, only a few soldiers, who were unable longer to endure their thirst, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry arose among the cavalry that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepinas, to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment all subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had been gained in the action, by dispersing.

Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000 prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons, and

35 pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and baggage was cer tainly lost; but the number of prisoners must have been grossly exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had accom plished their retreat from the field; and the French themselves, with that inconsistency which so often betray the falsehood of their official accounts, admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000,-an exaggera tion certainly as great as that of the French general; but that the French suffered severely is evident, because they were for a long time crippled for any farther operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men as sembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again at the head of a respectable army. The French had now effected every thing which they proposed; they had dri ven Cuesta and the British beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession of La Mancha; and the intruder, re joicing in the issue of a campaign, which opened under such inauspi cious aspects, returned triumphantly to Madrid. The disgrace of Tala vera sate easy upon the Frenchwith their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the victory, and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.

THE Spanish government expressed its sense of the services of Sir Arthur Wellesley, by nominating him one of the captain-generals of the army, (a rank nearly equivalent to that of our field-marshal,) and presenting him at the same time, in the name of Ferdinand, with some horses selected from the best breeds of Andalusia. "This tribute," they said, "was of small value in comparison with the eminent services which his excellency had rendered to Spain, and still more so in proportion to the wishes of those who offered it: but, for hearts elevated like his, the satisfaction resulting from great atchievements was their greatest recompence; nor was it in the power of man to bestow any reward which could equal the glory of being distinguished in the world as one of the principal deliverers of a great and generous people, of listening to their blessings, and of deserving their gratitude; that gratitude would be eternal in the Spanish nation." Sir Arthur accepted the horses, and the appointment also, provided he recei

ved permission from his own sovereign; but he declined the pay attached to it, not thinking it becoming that he should burthen the finances of Spain during such a contest.

In England, also, he was recompenced with new honours. As soon as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised to the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington in the county of Somerset. His conduct, however, both in Portugal and Spain, was severely scrutinized; and he was condemned with all the asperity of party-malice and all the insolence of presumptuous ignorance. Soult, it was asserted, could not have escaped out of Portugal had it not been for the neglect of the British general to secure the bridge of Amarante, and to act upon the flank and the rear of the enemy. Now to act upon the rear of the enemy was impossible, unless Soult had remained still till Sir Arthur could get there. Marshal Beresford had acted upon his flauk,

and had recovered the bridge of Amarante, over which, in consequence, Soult did not escape, but took a different road, where he was obliged to abandon his artillery and baggage. With equal injustice he was accused of falsehood in describing the state to which the fugitive army was reduced; that very army, it was said, having risen in judgement against him, endangered him after the battle of Talavera, and compelled him to make a precipitate retreat, abandoning his wounded. True, indeed, Soult was at the head of that army, to march against which Sir Arthur left Talavera, but two other corps under Ney and Mortier had been added to it. He was blamed also for neglecting to secure the Puerto de Banos; but this was Cuesta's fault; the British army was not strong enough to spare a detachment, and the service upon which Sir Robert Wilson was employed was judged of more immediate importance. The Duke del Parque, who, from his situation at Ciudad Rodrigo, had the earliest opportunities of discovering the plans of Soult, wished Marshal Beresford with the Portugueze army to take up the position of Tamames, or of the Sierra de Francia, as circumstances should require, and thus impede the march of the enemy upon Bejar and the Puerte de Banos. But Beresford had the same reasons for not advancing into Spain which had prevented Sir Arthur Wellesley from proceeding farther in it, want of supplies and means of transport, and there were other reasons peculiar to his army; it was the only disposable corps of Portugueze troops which at that time existed, the only body on which Portugal had to depend for its defence; it was without cavalry, and the men being newly rai

sed, were as yet but imperfectly trained and disciplined. The object in collecting it upon the frontier, was to discipline it, to protect the country, and to give a support to Sir Ar thur's left flank on his advance. Sir Arthur doubted whether the Portu gueze government would consent, and whether he ought to recommend that an army so circumstanced should give up the defence of their own frontier, and commence operations in Castille, their own frontier being at the same time threatened,-for Soult's intercepted letter contained information that he designed to menace Portugal, and should make an incursion towards Braganza.

Sir Arthur's only error seems to have been in under-rating the force which could be brought against him from Old Castile; yet if Cuesta could have kept his ground at Talavera, the consequence of this error would probably have been, that he would have attacked Mortier before the other corps had joined him, and have defeated the French in detail. The failure of the campaign is attributable to the misconduct of Cuesta, particu. larly in postponing the attack upon Victor; to the error of Venegas in blindly obeying the instructions of the junta, after the victory of Tala vera had so completely altered the circumstances which occasioned those instructions, and to the wretched mis management or imbecillity of the Spanish government, which took no effectual means for supplying its own armies, and suffered its allies to be absolutely in want of food.

On the fourth morning af ter the battle, while the bells Aug. 1. of Cadiz were ringing, the cannon firing, and the people rejoicing with higher hopes than had been felt since the surrender of Dupont, Mar

quis Wellesley landed in that harbour to supersede Mr Frere as ambassador to the existing government of Spain. An immense concourse assembled to see him land, and as he set foot on shore, a French flag was spread before him, that he might tread upon it in honour of his brother's victory. The people drew his carriage, a mark of respect rather unusual in that country. The Marquis gave one of them a purse of gold to distribute among his comrades; the man, who was a shoemaker, by name Justo Lobato, immediately returned the purse to his excellency, and, in the name of the people, assured him they desired no reward, being happy that they had this opportunity of expressing the genuine sentiments of the whole Spanish nation. Both at Cadiz and at Seville the Marquis was received with every mark of public honour, and with the most cordial and enthusiastic expressions of attachment, respect, and gratitude to the British government and British nation. But the first dispatches which he received from Sir Arthur opened upon him a more disheartening prospect than he had reason to expect. The combined armies, amounting to not less than 60,000 men, and 16 or 18,000 horse, were at that time depending entire ly for their daily supply upon the country, which did not contain a population in many square miles equal to the number of the army, and could not of course produce a sufficiency for its sustenance. Estremadura indeed is notoriously the worst peopled and least cultivated province of the whole peninsula. It was necessary therefore to send to a great distance for supplies, and supplies, scanty as they were, could not be procured regularly, nor without great difficulty. The troops were ill fed, and frequent

ly received no food at all. Better and effectual measures Sir Arthur said must be taken, and that speedily, as equally indispensable for both armies. No army could serve to any good purpose unless it were properly fed; it was absurd to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man, or an animal of any country, could make exertions without a due supply of food, and in fact the Spaniards were more clamorous for their food, and more exhausted if they did not receive it regularly, than the English. The English, however, were in a state of great distress; from the 3d till the 7th they had had no bread, then about 4000 pounds of biscuit were divided among 30,000 mouths, and the whole supply was exhausted. "The army,"

Aug. 8.

said Sir Arthur, " will be useless to Spain, and will be entirely lost, if this treatment is to continue. If any efficient measures of relief had been adopted by the government when they first received the account of the distress of the British troops, the benefit of those measures must ere this have been experienced. There had been no neglect or omission on the part of Mr Frere: the evil was owing to the poverty and exhausted state of the country, to the inactivity of the magistrates and people, to their disinclination to taking any trouble, except that of packing up their property, and removing when they heard of the approach of a French patrole, to their habits of insubordination and disobedience, and to the want of power in the government and their officers."

The impracticable and unaccommodating temper of General Cuesta aggravated this evil. He was applied to after the battle for 90 mules to draw the British artillery in place of those lost in the action; there were