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ed, would not disgrace the character of its country. He then adverted to the state of trade: Great, he said, thould be our exultation, to hear that i had not diminished. The export of certain manufactures had decreased for a time, but not very considerably, nor by any means so much as was upposed. Buonaparte threatened to subdue us, by ruining our commerce. We might thank him for having made theexperiment; it had relieved us from all apprehensions on that head; for it was now proved, that neither decrees nor embargoes could materially affect us, and that the flourishing state of our finances enabled us to carry on this expensive war without any considerable loan or new taxes.

Earl St Vincent rose to oppose the address. That part of it," he said, "which declared a determined hostility to the common enemy, all must approve; but when he adverted to the manner in which our opposition to bim had been conducted on the Spanish peninsula, it was wholly impossible not to perceive that it was the greatest disgrace which had befallen Great Britain since the revolution. The convention of Cintra could not be contemplated without feeling alarm, as well as astonishment and indignation; the more especially, upon observing that cold-blooded treaty, which gave up a contest with the ships of an enemy, upon a compromise so unworthy the character of England. There was a time when such old-fashioned words as sink, burn, and destroy, were understood and exercised; but now we were to negociate to be ships' husbands,-to take possession by bargain and barter, instead of by battles, by bravery, and by balls, -to hold ships in trust by contract, and not in right by conquest. Great merit, it seemed, was to be attributed

to ministers for the speed with which they had provided transports for conveying our army to Portugal. There was not a tittle of merit in the case: It was only going to market, and offering a little more than the market price, and transports were to be obtained in abundance." Earl St Vincent might here have represented the wasteful improvidence of employing transports, instead of embarking troops in our ships of war; a mode of conveying them infinitely preferable in every respect, and which would save lives, as well as expence to the nation. "And what," he continued, "was the important service to which these transports were eventually applied? Why, truly, it was to convey the rascally ruffians whom Junot commanded, to that part of France which was nearest the boundary of Spain, that they might as speedily as possible be again brought into action, with more effect against our own soldiers; so that, said he, they are at this moment harassing the rear of our retreating army. Meantime there had been a disgraceful delay before we sent a man of our own troops towards Spain. In fact, it appeared as if ministers had not even a geographical knowledge of the country through which they were to pass, insomuch that they ought to go again to school, to make themselves masters of it :They had sent an army to traverse a wild and inhospitable country, at the very commencement of the rainy season, to drink new wines, and to be overwhelmed with disease, as well as fatigue."

Öne part of Earl St Vincent's speech was singularly remarkable. "We had princes of the blood," he said, “all of whom were bred to arms :-For what purpose, if they were not to be employed? Why

were not some of these illustrious personages, who had made the science of war their study from their childhood, appointed to lead our armies?"-The ministry past over this question without reply: in fact, it was not worthy of reply. Earl St Vincent must have known, as every man in England knew, what the general feeling had been, when it was reported that the Duke of York was to have the command in Spain; he must have known that such an appointment would have been not less unpopular than improper ;—and, dis. ciplinarian as he is, he ought to have known that no man should be entrusted with command, who may not be called to a strict account for misconduct in it. He asked also, why Earl Moira had not been employed; a person who possessed the confidence of the people, the love of the soldiery, and the esteem of the king. The reason, said he, was evident: it was because management prevented it. But was it to be supposed, that because a court of inquiry had deemed no farther investigation necessary into the conduct of those generals who had been employed, that therefore there ought to be no investigation? Whenever he heard of councils of war being called, he always considered them as cloaks for cowardice. So said the brave Boscawen, and from him he had imbibed the opinion, which time and experience had completely confirmed. We gained a victory at Vimiera; and in the moment when our soldiers were flushed with conquest, recourse was had to a council of war. Such a measure could only be necessary, or indeed apologized for, in the moment of defeat and upon what principle it was resorted to on this occasion, he, for one, accustomed to other me

thods, could not account:-the only who acted in it could explain Just the same opinion he entertaine of the court of inquiry :-it was shield to ward off investigation from the ministers themselves; but he trust ed that the House would not be pre vented from making a scrupulous in vestigation of it in their own way He knew the character of the Por tugueze well: excepting the rabbl of Lisbon, they were as brave a peo ple as any upon the continent o Europe, and, under British officers would have presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Why had no these people been called into action Ministers ought to have known thei value; and if they did not, their ig norance was inexcusable. If that House did its duty, they would im mediately proceed to the foot of the throne, and there tell the sovereign the bold truth, that if he did not remove them, he would lose the coun try. These were the sentiments of his heart, and he delivered them as a solemn duty, which he found him self bound to discharge. It was probably the last time he should trouble that assembly; " and with that," said he, "I wish your lord. ships a good night." At these words he walked out of the house.

Lord Sidmouth's speech was in a lower tone, but in that spirit of can dour which has obtained for him the good opinion and the confidence of the people, beyond all other public men. At no period, he said, withir his memory, was there so much spi rit, so much loyalty and zeal in the country, and yet at the same time sc much dissatisfaction. It was a dis satisfaction not arising from a tur bulent disposition in the people, nor from any marked reverses, nor from the pressure of the public burdens;

32

but it was produced by a feeling
most honourable to them, and it was
proportioned to their zeal and their
expectations. It was not content
either with the extent of the exer-
tions which had been made to aid the
Spaniards, nor with the manner in
which they had been directed. Some
statement, he trusted, would be made
to allay this very laudable feeling.
Without committing himself to the
full extent of the address, he should
give his assent to it, as concurring in
that part which recommended a vi-
gorous prosecution of the war, and
which expressed a determination to
assist Spain, so long as Spain should
prove true to herself.

This language was consistent with
the uniform tenour of Lord Sid-
mouth's conduct; a man who in no
instance has suffered party feelings
to prevail over the natural fairness of
his mind. Lord Grenville spoke more
in the spirit of a party leader. He
said, it had been the constant prac-
tice, till the present administration
came into office, to refrain, both in
the speech and the address, from
calling upon Parliament to deliver
any decided opinion in approving of
past measures, the documents rela-
ting to which were not in the pos-
session of the House; or expressing
a determination" to support any
future system, the details of which
had not been communicated."
ving thus objected to the general cha-
racter of the address, he proceeded to
scrutinize all the points upon which,
it touched, and first the affairs of
Spain. Of the base and treach-
erous, the atrocious and cruel inva-
sion of the Spaniards," he said, "there
was but one opinion in the coun-
try, but one opinion as to the cause
in which they were fighting against
the tyrant who unjustly and cruelly

Ha

attacked them; but there had been. no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages, which may be of essential service. I confine myself to the policy of sending a British army into the interior of Spain; and I contend, that there was not that prospect which ought to have induced reasonable men to have so sent an army. Nor were there any circumstances which could justify the sending a British army, large, it is true, as a British army, but small, as an army acting on the continent, to meet the whole disposable force of France, without having any of the great powers of Europe as our auxiliaries. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing which could justify our sending into the interior of Spain 30 or 40,000 British men, to meet an army of 500,000. I can only compare such a measure to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and ab. surdity."

It was not a little curious to hear Lord Grenville thus sneering at the projects with which the anti-jacobine war commenced. He pursued, "it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and without that spirit among them, no army that we could send would be of any avail. The junta of Seville had arranged a plau

of defence adapted to the country, and calculated to wear down an invading enemy, by a continued system of partial attack, without the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with veteran soldiers. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending a British army into the interior of Spain: It then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; and thus they were compelled to engage in pitched battles, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority brought against it by France, can only retreat. In this way, the sending a British army into Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the patriots.-It may be said that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees. Allowing it to be so, how had this been taken advantage of? One might have supposed that to make the proper use of so favourable a conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched in the shortest time to the spot where their services were most wanted. But instead of the nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They were there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal; who could not have held it if Buonaparte could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they march to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking

advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops: and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in motion. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; our army, compelled to make a long march over land, is too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the capital of Spain. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to engage in the dangerous warfare of pitched battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves, and more harassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired.' Shame that such a reproach should truly attach to us!"

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Lord Grenville then proceeded to those disgraceful treaties by which the campaign in Portugal had been terminated. "The speech," he said, "had touched upon the convention of Cintra and the armistice which preceded it, an armistice of which the House knows nothing, a convention of which the House knows nothing. It was with no small surprise I heard moved, as part of the address, an expression of our regret that such an armistice and convention should have been entered into. What! my lords, pronounce judgment be. fore investigation! condemn a transaction before we are made acquainted with the details of it! I have now heard, for the first time, 'that his

Majesty has found it necessary to express his disapprobation of some of the articles of that armistice and convention, and from that circumstance it will of course form a future subject of discussion in this house, but at present they are not regularly before us. It is true that the public have had those transactions before them, and have pronounced their condemnation: the people of England have complained of those transactions at the foot of the throne; and I cannot applaud the tone of the answer which was returned to the address of the city of London. It being, however, contrary to the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment without investigation, what must we expect, after unequivocally condemning the armistice and convention, of which we know nothing, neither the documents, nor any details respecting the transaction being before us;-what must we expect, upon going to the foot of the throne with an address containing such an unequivocal condemnation without examination, or the means of examination? We must expect to be told, You, the parliament, have forgotten the first principles of British justice, in pronouncing judgment without investigation, in condemning a transaction with the details of which you are unacquainted.'

"The armistice and convention have, it is known, been referred to a Board of Military Officers, who have reported that no blame attaches to any of the generals employed on that occasion. That Board has abstained from giving any opinion respecting the conduct of ministers; but from the displeasure expressed by his Majesty, it is evident that they alone were to blame; for the Board having declared its opinion that no blame

attaches to the generals, and his Majesty having subsequently expressed his displeasure at the armistice and convention, that displeasure must needs apply to the conduct of ministers. The generals may allege the want of cavalry, they may allege the want of artillery,-all which must arise from the neglect of ministers. This must of course form a part of the inquiry, when the subject comes regularly before the House.

"The Board has also very properly abstained from giving an opinion upon the naval part of the transac tion. I do not mean to convey any censure upon the admiral who agreed to the convention, or to insinuate that he stands in any other situation than that of the generals, to whom it is decided that no blame attaches ; but when, instead of that phraseology to which we have been accustomed in the transactions of our navy, that of sunk, burnt, and destroyed,— when, instead of taking prisoners of war, a convention is entered into, by which the fleet of an enemy comes into our ports with a stipulation that it shall be delivered up at the conclusion of peace, it becomes a subject which demands inquiry and investigation. That investigation will, I trust, take place, and then our decision will follow regularly and formally; but to applaud or to condemn without investigation, conveys neither approbation nor censure.

There is one most important topic which I think it my duty to press upon the attention of your lordships, though no notice is taken of it, either in the speech or the address; I mean the present state of our relations with the United States of America. In the month of July last, it was proposed by the government of the United States, that the embargo, in

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