THE

HE commencement of the Austrian war was regarded by men in England with widely different feelings; each party foretelling the result in conformity to its own system of politics. Those journalists who taught, as the first political commandment, that Buonaparte was lord and master, and Europe should have no other lord but he, had, from the commence-, ment of the Spanish revolution, re presented the cause of Spain as hopeless, and they predicted that this resistless conqueror was only recalled from his career of conquest in that country to atchieve new victories on the Danube; after which he was to return to the Guadalquivir and the Tagus, and bear down every thing before him. Others, who had too sanguinely expected immediate success from the patriots, with equal but less excusable credulity rested their hopes now upon Austria ;— there, they said, the battle was to be

fought, and the fate of Spain, as well as of Germany, depended upon the fortunes of the Archduke Charles. The wiser few, expecting nothing from the governments of the continent, knew that much was possible from the people, and higher hopes were excited in them by Schill and Hofer than by the archduke, even after the battle of Aspern. From the begin ning of the contest, the conduct of the court of Vienna appeared important to them, chiefly because it effected a diversion in favour of the peninsula, and gave the Spaniards time to make a vigorous effort for expelling their brutal invaders. Especially they hoped that England would seize the golden opportunity, and, by meeting the enemy upon that ground with equal numbers, secure a certain and decisive victory.

The plans of our ministry for the conduct of the war in Spain had been completely disarranged by the

manner of Sir J. Moore's retreat, and the consequent wreck of his army. That army, instead of sailing for the south or for Lisbon, was compelled to return to England, there to be reequipped, and the total evacuation of Portugal, (such was the panic of the moment,) was prepared for at Lisbon and expected at home. Great praise is due to the ministry for their conduct on this occasion; had their opponents at this time been in place, the Portugueze would have been abandoned without an effort on our part to support them; thus basely would these politicians have sacrificed our oldest and most faithful allies, and the honour of England would have been irretrievably lost. But the ministry acted upon braver and wiser principles, and whatever errors they committed in the management of the war, to the latest ages it will be remembered to their honour, that they never in the worst times despaired of the good cause. Preparations were immediately made for sending out another army. At the close of February, Sir A. Wellesley resigned his seat in parliament and his office in Ireland to take the command; in March, the expedition sailed for Lisbon. His instructions were, in case that city should have been evacuated by Sir John Craddock, to proceed to Cadiz, and land there, if the government would consent to the admission of British troops into the garrison. Mr Canning stated in his advices to Mr Frere upon the subject, that the delicacy of the point was felt and acknowledged, and the answer of the supreme junta had been received with out the smallest resentment or surprise. But since that answer was given, the circumstances on which it was founded had materially changed, and as the security of Cadiz would

be impaired by the possession of Portugal by the French, it was thought adviseable to give the junta one more opportunity of reconsidering the question. These instructions were fortunately not needed. Sir John Craddock, after the first alarm subsided, provided for defence instead of flight. One entrance into Portugal was ably defended by Sir Robert Wilson. Soult was not in sufficient strength to advance from Porto, and, by the exertions of the government and the great military talents of the Duke of Albuquerque, Victor was rendered unable to execute his part of the combined operations, notwithstanding the battle of Medellin.

When it was resolved that Sir A. Wellesley should have the command in Portugal, Sir John Craddock, who was a much older officer, was appointed governor of Gibraltar. Upon this oc- April 14. casion, the Earl of Buckinghamshire appealed to the House of Lords upon the unpleasant situation in which that general was placed, being thus removed from the head of the army at a moment the most critical for the feelings and fame of their commander. To his exertions in collecting the British force, and disposing it so as to prepare a decided resistance against the enemy, it was owing that the resolution of abandon ing the country was given up. Af ter all these efforts on his part, and at a time when such a prospect of adding to his military fame was opened to him, could any thing be conceived more cruel to an honourable man than to be superseded under such circumstances by an officer so much his junior? What were the reasons for the preference? Insinuations had gone abroad that imprudent measures had been taken by him respecting the

native troops, but he took upon himself to say, that in no one respect had Sir J. Craddock acted in a manner repugnant to their feelings, or contrary to their customs. There were documents which he might bring forward to prove these assertions, and he was prepared to take every step for vindicating the character of an honourable officer, which was to him, on many accounts, extremely dear. In thus acting, he said, no disrespect to Sir A. Wellesley was implied; no man could feel more admiration and esteem than he did for that gallant and distinguished general. His expression of surprise and regret was wrung from him by friendship for Sir J. Craddock; if any blame could attach to him from thus giving vent to his feelings, his crime was only his attachment to a friend, who, in every respect, was entitled to every exertion he could make in his behalf. Lord Liverpool replied, he could not help considering the observations and questions of the noble earl as an attack upon the prerogative of the crown, and a refutation of the notion of the responsibility of ministers. The king had the command of the army, and to say that for certain services he should not appoint certain officers recommended to him for those services by his confidential advisers, would be to take the command of the army out of his hands. Ministers were responsible for the advice which they gave on such occasions, but there would be an end to that responsibility were they to be questioned upon any particular occasion why they preferred one officer to another. He never should answer such questions, neither should he ever silently suffer them to be put. With regard to Sir J. Craddock, he had the highest opinion of his military character,

and he believed the rest of his majesty's ministers entertained the same opinion of his services and merits; and he was happy on this occasion of bearing the fullest testimony to his desert. The Earl of Buckinghamshire replied, he had no intention of putting improper questions; his only wish was to draw forth such an acknowledgment of Sir John's merit as had now been made. Upon this, Lord Liverpool protested against such questions, lest the present instance should be drawn as a precedent; occasions, he said, might occur when it might not be in the pow er of ministers to speak of a commander as he was able to speak of the character and conduct of Sir J. Craddock.

The Earl of Buckinghamshire brought another part of our conduct towards Portugal before the House of Lords. He moved for the instructions to March 16. Sir Hew Dalrymple for forming the regency, saying, that it was of considerable importance that the nature of those instructions should be known, and the motives which influenced them. One of his majesty's ministers had said that Portugal must follow the fate of Spain; but surely much might have been done in Por tugal to influence the fate of Spain, if measures had been adopted in that country satisfactory to the people, and calculated to rouse their patriotism and their military ardour. He wished also to have the correspondence with the Portugueze ministers produced, that it might be ascertained whether the measures adopted were with his consent, or contrary to his wish and opinion. To this the Earl of Liverpool replied, that he would not consent to produce the dispatch in question, because it ne

cessarily contained allusions to the conduct of individuals, and particular instructions founded thereon, which it would be improper to make public. There was also another ground of objection: Having reconquered Portugal for our ancient ally, it was the object of the British government to re-establish, as far as possible, the government which had been appointed there by the legitimate authority of the sovereign. The regency had, therefore, been formed as a provisionary government, till the decision of the prince regent upon the subject should be known, information of what had been done having been sent to Rio Janeiro. No determination had yet been received, and upon this ground, as well as the former, he objected to the production of the paper. Earls Rosslyn and Grey, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Erskine, still pressed for the publication; the latter noble lord advancing the preposterous argument, that the unfitness of the paper to be produced was matter of opinion and not matter of fact, and forgetting that he and his party were opposing their own mere opinion upon the subject to the knowledge of ministers.

The motion was negatived; but Lord Buckinghamshire again brought it forward, and took this opportunity of speaking at some length upon the state of Portugal. "The state of that country," he said, "was a subject so important, not only May 1. with reference to the arduous contest in which the people of the peninsula were engaged against the French, but to the essential and permanent interests of Great Britain, that he should neglect what he deemed an act of indispensable duty, were he not to bring it under their lordships' consideration. The

geographical situation of Portugal was such as to afford the readiest means of assistance to the Spaniards, either in the centre, the north, or the south of Spain; an advantage, in the present contest, the most momentous that could be conceived. The suc cess of the patriots might from thence be improved, and any reverse: the French might meet with render ed fatal by a sudden and judicious movement of the British troopsThe strength of Portugal, as a military position, was not only known to the professional men who had served in that country, but must be obvious to every one who had referred to the maps. Its defiles, its mountains, and its rivers, were most conspicuous features; which, added to the sterili ty of the soil in most of the provin ces, were circumstances of infinite weight in a defensive campaign. A country that does not furnish subsis tence to its inhabitants for seven months in the year, may easily be placed in a situation that would leave nothing for an invading army to live upon. Without going further back into the history of Portugal than the seven years war, the campaign us der the Comte de la Lippe afforded ample information as to the natural means of defence afforded by Portugal. That able general found the Portu gueze army without discipline, and without any officers of experience to form or conduct it; but the spirit of the people was roused, the confidence placed in him by the government was unlimited, the resolution to exertion most decided, and although he never was able to bring into the field an army of 17,000 men, 3,000 of whom were British, he contrived to baffle all the efforts, and defeat the plans of a combined force of 42,000 men, 6,000 of whom were French. In

testimony of the hardihood, obedience, and bravery of the Portu. gueze soldiers, Lord Townsend might be cited: Notwithstanding all the fatigues and difficulties of the campaign,' said that general, the Portugueze soldier obeyed with the greatest cheerfulness; and I ought to add to his praise, that if he was ill-clothed and ill-disciplined, he was at the same time contented and subordinate beyond any thing I had ever seen in any part of the world. What advantages might not one expect from such a disposition improved by military art?' Count de la Lippe, in his memoirs, speaking of a march made by Lord Townsend, says: This march was executed by the skill of General Townsend, and by the admirable perseverance of the Portugueze troops, who supported the greatest misery. The larger proportion of them having worn out their shoes, marched gaily over steep rocks, leaving on their route the traces of their bleeding feet.”

Lord Buckinghamshire said, he had adverted to these authorities for the purpose of shewing what might have been done, had the proper measures been resorted to, for calling into action the resources which Portugal was capable of affording, and, whilst he contemplated with satisfaction the steps which the government were then taking, he had only to express his hope, that they might not be too late. He would not leave this part of the subject without stating that he had seen a most able plan of an attack upon Portugal from Spain, written by a Frenchman in the year 1767; when calculating the Portugueze army at 30,000 men, the writer allots a force of 75,000 for the attack, judiciously tracing the whole progress of the campaigu, the prepa

rations for which, he says, must be made before the breaking out of war, as it would be indispensably neces sary to collect provisions for the whole army; and he urges as a consideration nearly conclusive upon the success of the undertaking, that it should be executed with a rapidity that did not admit of the arrival of British succours. If such was the opinion of a person whose work no man could read without the most thorough conviction of his capacity to form a correct opinion upon the subject-if an attack upon Portugal, in order to be effectual, required such preparation, and such means, and that at a time when the Spanish government was undisturbed, when the attacking army was to be aided by a friendly country in its rear, and had consequently no precaution to take for the security of retreat in case of failure, to what degree would not the difficulties be increased by the actual state of Spain at the present moment? This, the earl continued, he stated, in order to justify an opinion he had long entertained, that if the resources of Portugal had been wisely applied, the spirit of the people encouraged, a government established that was calculated to inspire their confidence, and an army, such as Sir John Moore had commanded, sent for their protection, not only would that country have been rendered impregnable against any efforts the French could have made under the present circumstances, but the foundation laid of affording the most effectual support to the Spaniards which could be derived from external co-ope ration. If, in the month of August, a blow could have been struck at the French army upon the Ebro, much might have been done to have prevented the disasters of the last cam