WHILE the question of admitting English troops into Cadiz was discussed at Seville, Cadiz itself became the scene of an insurrection, in which the popular feeling in favour of the English was unequivocally expressed. The people of this great city were dissatisfied with the conduct of the central junta; they complained that, instead of informing them of the true state of affairs, their government affected to keep them in ignorance; and having been so villainously deceived by Morla, the slightest circumstance sufficed to make them suspect any one who had the means of betraying them. A corps of foreign troops had enlisted into the Spanish service from the prisoners taken at Baylen; they consisted chiefly of Poles and Germans, men who in general would assuredly fight with a better heart against Buonaparte than for him, but who in this instance were more suspicious than if they had deserted from the French armies, because they had enlisted to escape confinement. This corps was now ordered to do garrison duty at Cadiz ; while, at the same time, the volunteers of that city and of Port St Mary's were to be drafted to other parts. But the people, thinking that if Cadiz

wanted defenders, it could by none be so faithfully defended as by its own children, determined to oppose both these measures by force of arms, and on the morning of the 22d of Febru ary they broke out in insurrection. Their first act of violence was to seize a courier charged with dispatches from the junta to the Marquis of Villel, a member of that body, and its representative in this important fortress. The marquis had rendered himself suspected by setting many persons at liberty who were confined on account of their supposed attachment to the French, and by imposing some injudicious restrictions upon the public amusements, which, by allusions to the existing state of things, and by calling forth popular applause and acclamation at patriotic sentiments, contributed to keep up the public spirit. The Spanish government dreaded these ebullitions of generous feeling; their hatred of the French was counteracted by their fear of jacobinism, and rather than permit the outward and visible signs of liberty, it seemed as if they would more willingly have extinguished the inward and spiritual grace. Acting upon this system, the Marquis of Villel had proceeded, it is said, with

and patriotism of the inhabitants at all times, but particularly under the present circumstances, and the good and signal services which they had done and daily were doing, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes, in support of the good cause, he dismissed from their office four persons whose discharge had been loudly demanded; and declared also, that if the people wished to have the junta of Cadiz suppressed, their desire should immediately be fulfilled. He assured them that no foreign troops should be admitted; but that officers of their intimate and faithful ally the British nation were invited to examine the posts and works of the city and its dependencies, and that every thing necessary for its defence should be concerted with them. He promised also that the papers of the Marquis de Villel should be regularly examined without delay; that there should be no longer any cause of complaint respecting the ignorance in which the people were kept of public affairs, for that whatever decurred should punctually and faithfully be made public; that the enlistment of the inhabitants for the provincial regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo should cease till further consideration; and that no part of the volunteers, the light troops, and companies of artillery should be ordered away." Notwithstanding the popularity of Don Felix Jones, it was thought advisable that this proclamation should be countersigned by the guardian of the capuchins.

Still the tumult continued. It is said, and the thing itself is every way probable, that the French had emissaries in the town ready to excite insurrection, for the purpose of overthrowing the existing government, to aggravate the people, and instigate

them on to excesses which might be represented as a disgrace to the pa triotic cause. General Caraffa, who had been second in command of the Spanish troops in Portugal, was confined in the castle of Catalina, under a charge of misconduct or treachery, with the viceroy of Mexico and other prisoners, who had been sent home from New Spain. The mob proceeded there, and demanded the pri soners, that they might put them to death. Colonel Roche, who had just arrived from Seville with another Eng. lish officer, interposed, addressed the people, and succeeded in dissuading them from their purpose. But shortly afterwards they fell in with Don Joseph de Heredia, a particular object of their suspicion, who that very day had at their demand been dismissed from his office of collector of the public rents. He was stepping into a boat to make his escape to Port St Mary's: the attempt at flight cost him his life, and he was killed upon the spot. The popular fury seemed now to have spent itself, and the clergy and the friars, who through. out the whole insurrection had indefatigably exerted themselves in en deavouring to pacify the people, and protect the victims who were threatened, succeeded in restoring peace. To have attempted to quell the mob by force would have occasioned great bloodshed, for they had got possession of arms and of the park of ar tillery.

Fifty of the mob, who had been most conspicuous for their violence, were seized by the volunteers of Cadiz, and imprisoned. The central junta addressed a proclamation to the people of that city, reprehending them with dignified severity for the manner in which they had manifested their patriotic zeal. "It was ab

surd," they said, " to apprehend danger in so populous, so loyal, so brave a city from a single battalion of foreigners, even if there could be any reason to doubt the fidelity of Poles and Germans, who had been forcibly dragged into Spain, and were in every quarter deserting from the flag under which they had been compelled to march. Neither had the Marquis de Villel any part in this obnoxious measure, a measure in itself so unobjectionable, that when the people coolly reflected they would blush to have been alarmed at it. As little reason was there for their suspicion of the marquis. His voluminous papers were now before the junta, and nothing was expressed in them but zeal for the welfare of the country, and diligence to promote all means for the security and defence of Cadiz. Let the state of those means before his arrival be compared with the works projected and executed since. True it was, he might have erred in the means which he adopted; the junta was far from ascribing infallibility to its members. But had the people no other way of manifesting their disapprobation than by a popular tumult? No one came to the junta to complain of the marquis's conduct; no one informed them that their commissioners at Cadiz had lost the love and confidence of the people. Some anonymous letters only had reached the government, some on one side, some on the other, but all contemptible in the eye of equity and sound policy. But what was the course which would have become the open and generous character of the Spaniards? To have made their complaint frankly and nobly to the government, and the government would have done them justice. Sedition was a resource as low as it was dangerous and fatal."

The junta then warned them to beware of the insidious arts of the enemy. "It is not," said they, “the traitors who fled with the French and returned with them who do most injury to their country; but it is the obscure agitators, hired by them or by the tyrant, who abuse the confidence and mislead the patriotism of the people. It is they who, deviating from the true point of union, the government, disseminating distrust and suspicion, lead you through crooked and guilty paths to the precipice, and to subjugation; it is they who invert the social order, convert loyalty into rage, and zeal into sedition. The junta have proofs enough of these in. fernal machinations in the intelligence which they receive every day, and in the correspondence which they intercept." But, notwithstanding the government declared its persuasion of the innocence of the Marquis de Villel, it was not thought proper completely to exculpate him without such farther inquiry as might satisfy the people. This proclamation, therefore, announced that a commission would be appointed to examine his conduct, and that it would not be composed of members of the central junta, in order to avoid all shadow of partiality in an affair so serious. "Any person,' said the junta, " shall be heard who desires to accuse him of treachery or malversation, and the sentence will be adjudged according to law. He himself demands in justice of the junta that this may be done; his honour, the estimation of the govern. inent, and the public satisfaction, necessarily prescribe it. If the marquis be culpable, he shall be punished in proportion to his abuse of the high functions and national confidence which he has enjoyed; but if he be declared innocent, it is necessary that

the reparation made to his good name be as solemn and public as the aggression was cruel and scandalous." These proceedings satisfied the people, of whom the better sort were grieved at the excesses which had been committed; and their suspicions against the marquis were in some degree removed when Don Felix Jones, to whom his papers were delivered, declared that no indication of treason was to be discovered in them.

A seasonable supply of Feb. 1. seven millions of dollars arrived at Cadiz early in the year from the colonial possessions of Spain: 600,000 of these were a patriotic contribution from Carthagena, 300,000 from Cuba. This was one main advantage which the legitimate government possessed over that of the intruder: they received the usual revenue from the colonies, while he, when the church-plate had once been melted down, could raise no supplies from the provinces which he devastated. At present, before these provinces were quite exhausted, his armies were contented with free plunder, the hope of ransacking the rich cities of the south, and the confident expectation that they should soon complete the subjugation of Spain. A large proportion of their force became disposeable after the fall of Zaragoza; but even those who formed the army of observation had been so harassed, notwithstanding their superiority, by the indefatigable Spaniards, that it was found necessary to allow them some repose. When they were sufficiently recruited, St Cyr return ed with his division into Catalonia. Reding had made a daring attempt to surprise Barcelona, in which he was frustrated by the treachery of some of his officers. He took up a line of posts from Martorell to Tar

ragona, the head-quarters, under Field Marshal Castro, being at Igualada : before his measures were completed for an intended attack upon the enemy, St Cyr, preventing him, fell, with far superior Feb. 16. forces, upon his left, and compelled it to fall back upon Igua. lada, which Castro then found it necessary to evacuate, retreating towards Cerrara. Reding was at this time in Tarragona. Judging it now necessary to reassemble his troops, and collect them in that fortress, he set out from Feb. 20, thence with 300 horse, a battalion of his Swiss countrymen, and six pieces of flying artillery, to effect this object; the party who were retreating from Coll de Santa Christina joined him, and he sent orders to Brigadier-General Irenzo, who with 1200 men had defended himself for two days in the monastery of Santa Cruz, to force a païsage that night, and effect a junction with him. This that officer accomplished without the loss of a man, or any part of the stores or baggage. Proceeding from thence to Santa Colonia de Queralt, he collected other detachments there, his forces now amounting to 10,000 men ; but there he learned that the French had entered Vals in order to cut off his retreat, and it was in consequence resolved to make a retrograde movement. On the 23d he reached Montblanch. A party of the enemy having appeared in his rear, he held a council the following day, and it was determined that they should make the best of their way in the night. At five in the morning the Feb. 25. advance, under Castro, and half the centre, had passed Vals, leaving the enemy's camp-fires on the left. They were proceeding as silent».