"world is infinite.* This doctrine is contrary to Scrip"ture. The heaven and the earth are not infinite; for "the earth has bounds, and the heaven, whether the "aerial, the starry, or the third heaven, according to its 'position with respect to us, is not infinite, but finite. "That to which infinitude is denied, is wholly finite. "We indeed are unable to measure the universe, and "it surpasses our conception. But God bounds, and "meteth out heaven with the span.'m Extension be

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longs to all these parts of the universe; but the ex"tension of things which are extended, has both a beginning and an end. If it has not, the same thing "will at once have, and not have, a certain number of spaces and parts. It will not have them, because it " is infinite; it will have them, because it has parts beyond parts. The human mind does not admit a num"ber actually infinite; for there is no number, to which something may not be added," &c.

LVII. Let those who contend that the arguments against the existence of a body actually infinite, are mere sophisms, now reply to this reasoning. Or if it seem too obscure, which to men of erudition it ought not to appear, I should be happy to learn what they have to oppose to this single demonstration, which is plain and easy. Every body has a certain quantity. Every thing that has quantity, has parts beyond parts. That which is infinite, cannot have parts beyond parts; and, therefore, it can neither have quantity, nor be a body. That what is infinite cannot have parts beyond parts, is proved thus. Each of the parts supposed, must be either finite or infinite. If they are infinite, each part is equal to the whole; which is contradictory. If

* ̓Απειξον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν.

m Is. xl. 12.

they are finite, they cannot make a whole, actually infinite; for finite parts, to whatever extent they may be multiplied, still remain finite. Besides, it is a maxim of unquestionable certainty, that the whole is not greater than all its parts taken together. If, therefore, finite parts, even when all of them are taken together, still continue finite, the whole which results from them, is also necessarily finite.47

LVIII. As the world is finite with regard to EXTENT, it is also finite with regard to DURATION. The Scripture everywhere teaches, that its existence had a beginning. It is said, "In the beginning God created the "heaven and the earth;""-which intimates that the beginning of time, by which the duration of all created things is circumscribed, coincided with the creation of the world. We read, too, of "the beginning, ere ever the "earth was, (the beginnings of the earth,*) when there "were no depths ;" and our thoughts are elevated to that eternity of God, which preceded "the foundation "of the world."P

LIX. The most shameless sophistry is employed by those followers of Socinus mentioned by Episcopius,t who infer that the mountains and hills existed from eternity, because Jacob calls them "the everlasting "hills." Episcopius justly opposes to them the following passage in the Psalms: "Before the moun"tains were brought forth, ere ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." The Patriarch's " ever

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lasting hills," hills of ages,* are hills that existed from the beginning, and that are coeval with the world; for which reason they are called by Moses "ancient "mountains."s

LX. But, supposing that the creation of the world took place in time, which has now been evinced from Scripture, it is asked, was it not at least possible for the world to have been created from eternity? To this question, Athanasius appears to me to have returned an acute answer in the following words. "That al

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though it may have been possible for God to produce "works from eternity, yet it was impossible that the "works made by him could have existed from eternity, "if they really emerged from things that were not, and “did not exist before they were made. But how could things which had no existence before they were made, "be co-existent with God, who always existed?"

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LXI. This demonstration may be thus elucidated. That all the perfections of God belonged to him from eternity, admits of no doubt. From eternity, therefore, he possessed the power to produce all things, whenever he pleased, by the mere act of his will. Yet as to the things to be produced, it is absurd to allege that they could exist from eternity; for that which is from eternity, exists necessarily, existed always actually, and at no time was merely possible. But with regard to that which God voluntarily effected without himself, so that, had he pleased, he might not have effected it -it implies a contradiction to say that it never was merely possible, and never only to be done, and consequently that it never was without an actual existence.

Since these positions are sufficiently evident, I wish it had not been said by a learned man," that it is diffi"cult to refute those who hold, that the eternity of the "world was possible." See the ingenious and solid reasonings of Cocceius on this topic.*

LXII. It is disputed among chronologers, how many years have now elapsed since the creation of the world; and the matter still remains undecided. We consider this contest as hopeless, and take no part in it at present. Let it suffice to know in general, that the world has not yet reached the age of six thousand years.48

LXIII. It is somewhat easier to decide the question respecting the season of the year, in which the world was made; for those who refer the beginning of the world to the autumnal equinox, appear to support their opinion by the strongest arguments. 1st, It is certain that the civil year of the Israelites began in autumn, the first month of which is called Tisri,† the beginning, an old Chaldean word from the root Sarah, to begin. See Exod. xxiii. 16. xxxiv. 22, on the use of this civil year. Now, according to Eusebius,§ Alexander Polyhistor informs us, that Abraham, having received this account of the year from Enoch, delivered it to his descendants, and introduced it into Egypt. 2dly, The same idea is confirmed by the Sabbatical years which commenced at the autumnal equinox, according to the command of God. For what could be more proper than that the

In Gen. i. Sect. 39. et seq. Itemque Disputat. Select. xxvii. Sect. 29, &c.

beginning of those years should be the same with the beginning of the world, that there might not remain the space of six months, not pertaining to the Sabbatical years. 3dly, The maturity of every sort of fruit adapted to the use of man, serves also to show, that autumn was more probably the time of the creation, than any other season of the year.

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LXIV. Further, though it would have been easy for God to create all things in full perfection," in a single moment, and by a single act and movement," he was pleased to employ six days in this work; as the Mosaic history, which ought by no means to be debased by rash and unnecessary allegories, expressly states. From this circumstance we learn, that we must not be superficial and hasty in our meditations on the works of God; that each of them ought, on the contrary, to be inquired into with attention and diligence; and that the whole period of our life should be devoted to this exercise, till, with an understanding perfect in vigour, we behold all things in a state of the highest perfection, in a most blessed Sabbath of rest.

LXV. A question has lately begun to be agitated with reference to the progress of the works of God on each of the days; to wit, whether each of the works of a day was perfected in a single moment, or in some period of time? This controversy, however, is not of very great moment; nor do the sentiments held on either side seem, hitherto, to be either supported or overthrown, by cogent arguments from Scripture.

LXVI. As to the importance of this question, I rank it amongst those doubtful points, which may be disputed among the reformed, without any prejudice to faith or

* Εν μια καιρό ροπή, μιατε ὁρμῇ και κινήσει.