but doing it in the most exceptionable manner. To fay it is not an overture on our part, if we have received no intimation whatever from the government of France to treat; to fay we shall be glad to treat, is what do man living will contend. Where the overture comes from the Legiflature of the country, it is attended with a degree of publicity which the Right Hon. Gentleman admits is one of the merits of our conftitution. But furely this mode of making overtures of peace is not the most convenient, inafmuch as it makes known the whole terms of peace to the enemy. It leaves no will to minifters to take advantage of any favourable circumstances that may occur. For that reason it is that the Legiflature does not ufually interfere in fuch transactions, as the true ftate of the tranfactions is only fully understood by a few, and therefore it has been wifely committed to the Executive Government. Why has this country, which is fo jealous of its rights and liberties, entrusted such prerogatives to the Crown? Why is the making of peace and war, and other prerogatives which form the happiness of this conftitution, entrusted to the King? Because it has been found, that the power of Parliament was fufficient to prevent the Royal prerogative from being carried beyond its proper limits. I fay the queftion is then, whether you will step forward, and affume this power of the Crown at a crifis of peculiar delicacy?

The Right Hon. Gentleman who fpoke laft was of opinion that the French Convention, from the publicity of its proceedings, bore a nearer resemblance to the British conftitution, than the conftitution of any other country. In this comparison, I truft, it was not meant to be carried any farther, as if the interefts of this country were to be difcuffed in one popular affembly. I hope the Right Hon. Gentleman is not fo much in love with France. I think the Right Hon. Gentleman took up that idea rather haftily. I am by no means certain, nor is it worth while here to examine, whether a defpotic government, or an anarchical republic, like that of France, moft nearly resembles the conftitution of Great Britain, which is removed at an equal distance from both extremes. The publicity of the proceedings of the French Convention has been the fource of outrage, horror, and difguft, to every feeling heart. That publicity has been a faithful recorder, and an accurate witnefs of the enormity of their proceedings. The question is, whether we are to take the first step towards negotiation, or to go on, trufting to the Executive Government to take the opportunity of the first favourable moment for negotiation, and in the mean time ftrengthening the hands

of that government, to persevere with vigour in the contest in which we are engaged. We have been told, that although this question has been feveral times brought forward, it has never been directly difpofed of; it has never been directly negatived. I contend that it has in effect been directly negatived. For when the motion was made fome time ago, an amendment was made to the motion, ftating, that we were refolved to perfevere in the conteft, trusting that his Majesty' would feize the first favourable opportunity that prefented for treating with fecurity. I beg to know, whether that which was done with deliberation, was not negativing the motion. Subfequent to that, this queftion was difcuffed again and again, and this House on those occafions came to a refolu-` tion, that it did not conceive, under the prefent circumstances of the countries, negotiation was a measure expedient to be adopted.

But another queftion here arifes. Have the circumstances and fituation of the country materially altered fince the laft motion on this fubject, or fince my Hon. Friend first found himself an advocate for negotiation? Has the posture of affairs, varied fince that time, fo as to make negotiation more eligible at the prefent moment than it was at any former period? I heard my Learned Friend ftate one fact on this bufinefs, which no evidence can contradict. I heard him with pleasure state, that the fituation of France was now fo weakened and exhausted, as to make peace with that government, though not fecure, yet that weaknefs was a confiderable fecurity. That fomething more of this fecurity exifts at the prefent moment, I not only admit, but contend that the profpect is improving every day, and that this becomes more and more afcertained; as I thall ftate before I fit down. But is this a reason why we fhould negotiate at this moment? I think not. From facts that are notorious, from things known to the world, there is now a general feeling that there is, comparatively fpeaking, a fenfe of fecurity in the country, when compared with the alarming uneafinefs which fome time ago prevailed. The enemy have not been able to avail themselves of their fuccefs and acquifitions, nor have they acquired folid and fubftantial ftrength. The natural anxiety of the people of this country has led them to remark the progrefs of the decay, decline, and ruin of the enemy, as being more rapid than they could have forefeen. When this business was formerly difcuffed, it was used as a very confiderable argument against negotiation, that from our fituation then, we could not hope to treat with France on terms of equality: That our affairs fince the commencement of the

war

war were in fo unfavourable a flate, independent of the power of France, as an independent nation, to treat, that we could not reafonably hope to obtain terms of equality, or any thing fair and honourable. Is not this argument very confiderably frengthened at this moment, when you compare. the ftate of this country and France? Exhausted and wearied with the addition of your own weaknefs, will you give up: the conteft in defpair? We should then, like Holland, have. to confider what indemnity France would expect of us. I ftate this as a practical objection, and wholly independent of any question on the fecurity of negotiation. They confider our fituation as rendered more fit for negotiation in this way. That we have loft our allies, by which we are reduced to fuch a state of weaknefs, that we must listen to peace; and. now that our allies have deferted us, it is unneceffary to ob-> tain their confent. We formerly refused to treat with France. because we were fatisfied fhe was unable to maintain that peace and amity that ought to prevail among neutral nations.. Gentlemen have chofen to forget all the arguments ufed with regard to acknowledging the republic of France. We refufed to treat with M. Chauvelin after the unfortunate murder of Louis XVI. We refused to acknowledge a government that had been reeking with the blood of their Sovereign. Was not that an objection not to acknowledge them at that period? The murder of the King preceded but a very few days the declaration of war against this country.

The next argument is, whether you would difhonour yourfelf by acknowledging a republic that might endanger your own independence, and which made a public profeffion of principles which went to deftroy the independence of every nation of Europe? Ifay, I will not acknowledge fuch a republic. The queftion here is but fimply whether you will acknowledge fo as to treat with it? It is not, nor has it been, fince the commencement of the war, the intereft of England, not from any one circumftance, but from taking all circumstances together, to inftitute a negotiation with the ruling powers now exifting in France.

As to the declaration of the Emperor to the Diet, if it is authentic, that he fhould be happy to enter into a negotiation for peace, I beg leave to fay, this declaration must be fuppofed to bind the Emperor in no other capacity than as head of the Empire; and I am fure they cannot, and will not state that that precludes him, as Duke of Auftria, or King of Bohemia, from performing any agreement he may chufe to enter into, on his own feparate account, in thefe capacities. As the head of the Empire, he might, from the prefent fituation of that

country,

country, think it wife and expedient to go beyond the line le may chalk out to himself as a Sovereign Prince and King, as King of Bohemia and Archduke of Auftria. There may be circumstances to induce him, as the head of the Empire, to wish to open a negotiation with France, rather than run the risk of a feparate negotiation, through the medium of the King of Pruffia, contrary to the conftitution of the Germanic body; and if that negotiation fhould actually be entered into, the feparate troops which the Emperor, as King of Bohemia and Archduke of Auftria, would be equal to thefe, added to the troops of the Empire, if it were neceffary to cover Germany. One of the next points relied upon, and imputed as blame to minifters, was the circumftance of the war in La Vendée and with the Chouans being at an end. I do not fee how that circumftance can attach any blame to Government. It has been ftated, that the inhabitants of La Vendée have fubmitted to the French republic. Whoever has converfed with gentlemen coming from France, has been made acquainted with the fituation of the inhabitants of La Vendée and the Chouans, as well as from the Paris newfpapers. They will do well to confider, whether the French government can have any degree of confidence, that they can reap the leaft advantage from that union. The advantages of the peace in that quarter have been entirely in favour of La Vendée and Britanny, and not of the republic; the inhabitants have gained by the treaty, and loft nothing. The republic has no right to any acceflion of ftrength from this district of the kingdom. Were they subject to requifitions? or did they furnish recruits for the army? or did they increafe the treafure of the country? By the articles of their fubmiflion to the laws of the republic, if they are reported truly, they are in fact an independent government, from which what are called Patriots are excluded. The state of La Vendée was directly the reverfe of that of Holland; and if that country was not an acceffion of strength to the republic; is it not a confeffion of the weaknefs of the government, that they found themfelves under the neceflity, notwithstanding all their fplendid fuccefs, to enter into fuch a treaty as a Sovereign would never have entered into but from neceffity?

There is another circumftance which has been relied upon, and which I must not pafs over in filence. Among other events of the day, we fee that Holland and France have entered into an alliance; and that Holland is to furnish France with twelve fhips of the line, and eighteen frigates. The prefent ftate of Holland makes that circumftance more favourable for VOL. III.

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this

this country than we had reafon to expect it would have been when Holland was over-run by the French.

The question is, whether the ftate of France is not fo weak ; whether the diftractions and difturbances of the country, and the difcontents of the people, are not fo great, as are likely to lead to fome change or new order of things, more favourable than any that has hitherto appeared.

First, as to the weaknefs of France. We have been told by the Right Hon. Gentleman that there was no appearance in France of the relaxation of its efforts; that the reign of terror ended with the month of July laft; and fubfequent to that period they have been as fuccefsful as ever. But furely it is not very wonderful if the operations of that great and extraordinary machine had wound up the whole of that extenfive empire, by all the men who were put in a fate of requifition, and by all the meretricious treafure that was amaffed; if fo many caufes, operating fo long, the effects were not to ceafe as immediately as the caufes. The effects in their operation furvive the caufes; but have the French acquired fresh vigour? Whoever has taken any pains to look at the number and efforts of their armies, and itate of the provifions and magazines, and attends to the manner in which requifitions have been carried on; whoever reads the accounts the Members of the Convention give of themselves; whoever reads their fpeeches; whoever trufts to their own account of themselves'; there all prove that the vigour and exertion of that country have been evidently diminishing.

In the next place, look at the fate of their affignats, which for a long time has been the fubject of a great deal of anxious attention to the Convention. They have been employed almoft in a perpetual contest about two things, to make a conftitution, and to raife their credit, by preventing an unlimited number of affignats entering into circulation. They therefore pafled a decree to withdraw a certain number of them to raife their credit. The nominal value of affignats was only 251. per cent. At prefent they are fomewhat lefs than 1. per cent. Their expenditure is incredible; laft month it amounted to twenty-feven millions feiling, which is more than is wanted by Great Britain in the courfe of a year. This expence amounts to three hundred and twenty-four millions fterling per aunum, which exceeds the whole national debt of Great Britain. The commerce of that country is totally ex tinguified, and a portion of bankruptcy mixes itself with every tranfaction.