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fervation of peace, and not by the breach of it. The party at prefent in power was that which was peculiarly favourable to peace, more fo probably than any which could be fuppofed to fucceed them, and confequently more likely to negotiate on terms that would be at once reasonable and honourable to both countries.

Mr. Wilberforce, having spoken of the confequences of pursuing the war, next turned to thofe which might be expected from making peace. He faid, that wherever we turned our view, the most evident advantages feemed likely to refult from it. In the Weft, in the Eaft, in Ireland, and at home, much was to be expected from it. He particularly noticed, that our markets, which the prolongation of the war might deprive us of, remained ftill open. If then peace was fo defireable, what obftructed it? Would not the people of this coun try be perfuaded to agree to it? If they fhould fee Government treating for peace, did the Houfe think the nation would feel difappointed? He had already noticed their wishes on the fubject, Were the allies unwilling? The chief doubt was, whether, if we purfued the war, and even paid them for it, they would continue to join us. Were the French unwilling? either the French people or the French government? He was firmly perfuaded, that if any fuch pacific language was held out, as that which his motion conveyed, means would be foon taken to try by fome neutral powers the effect of a negotiation. There had been in France a growing fpirit of moderation. In Bourdeaux, British property to a great amount had lately been fuffered to be taken away, though known to be British, and that part of it which the Convention had taken for its own ufe had been reftored in value, upon an appraisement made by the brokers ufually employed by the merchants. He could not help withing for his own part, to hail any thing like a ceffation of frenzy, and to take care left we ourselves, by our high language, fhould again bring on the paroxyfm. Hitherto our language had been, that though we would not refuse to make peace with France, even under the form of a republie, yet we were decidedly against making peace with the prefent men in power, and with the prefent republic; for we have implied that the prefent government is incapable of maintain ing the accustomed relations of peace and amity with other

nations.

The motion which he meant to fubmit to the House, he faid, would not oblige Government to treat; it would merely prepare the way for it. It would do much lefs than the Emperor had done; for the words of it were much weaker than thofe ufed by him in his refcript. He had exprefsly declared France

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France to be capable of maintaining thefe relations, by the whole fpirit, as well as words of that ftate paper. What the Emperor had done thus ftrongly, and at the fame time partially, Mr. Wilberforce wifhed the Houfe to do in a more dignified manner, by declaring itself not unwilling to entertain negotiation, with a view to peace with all the allies. The following was, he said, the motion which he should conclude with before he fat down:

"That it is the opinion of this Houfe, that the prefent circumstances of France ought not to preclude the Government of this country from entertaining proposals for a general pacification; and that it is for the intereft of Great Britain to make peace with France, provided it can be effected on fair terms, and in an honourable manner.”

Mr. Wilberforce proceeded to offer fomething that might ferve as an answer to what probably would be the arguments advanced against the meafure he recommended; particularly adverting to the objections to peace urged by Government in former debates. Many of these he remarked were now turned in a great meafure, through the change of circumstances, against those who ufed them. For instance, it had been urged as a reafon for continuing the war, that if we would not continue it while we had the advantage of fo many allies, we fhould in the end have to make war alone. That argument would not be preffed in the fame degree at prefent: Becaufe that very event was approaching, not through our making peace, but through our too long continuance of the war; and if we wished to fecure a future co-operation of allies, the way would be to diffolve what remains of the confederacy by confent, before it entirely diffolved itfelf, as the only chance of refuming it, if hereafter it fhould be neceffary: He might therefore in this particular inftance retort their own argument on themselves. Another argument, always hitherto used, would not at that time be repeated, viz. that we could not make peace with France without acknowledging the republic; and without acknowledging it as founded on the principles of liberty and equality, and the rights of man. But had the Emperor of Germany, had the King of Pruffia, had the King of Sweden, had the Duke of Tuscany, in this fenfe acknowledg ed the republic? Had they figned, or propofed to fign (as all who acknowledged the republic were faid to do), their own depofition? No; the treaties entered into had been mutually figned as other treaties ufually are, and it had been fhewn that no impediment of this kind had existed.

Again, the fafety of Europe had been declared to be a principal ground of war; but if Europe was determined to take

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care of itself, and to make peace as the best means of confulting its fafety, did it belong to Great Britain to fight her battles for her, and to fight them alone, or almost alone?

The declining refources of France had been stated as another encouragement to go on with the war-but when was the ceffation of them to arrive? Their armies did not want fresh requifitions, and every thing went on ftill much as heretofore.

There was one view of the fubject, which he had not yet taken, which feemed to highly important that he muft here touch upon it. He alluded to the profpect which naturally' prefented itself to fome minds, of a general war in Europe, as likely, ere long, to arife. Ruffia, it might be fuppofed, would take part with us. Turkey, on the other hand, and other powers, with France; and a new fcene of the most extenfive hoftilities might in that cafe follow. Humanity fhuddered at fuch a fcene; but even putting humanity out of the queftion, it seemed to him, in the view of dry policy, that fuch a courfe of events must be highly prejudicial to Great Britain. Who could fay what might be the consequence of ftrengthening Auftria and Ruffia, as their fucceffes might do; or of the irruption of French troops into almost every part of Europe, if the other fide fhould prove fuperior? The very oppofing armies might catch the fpirit of French democracy; and when it was confidered that the French revolution owed its rife to a great preflure on the lower orders of the people in that country, what might not be the confequences on the happiness as well as on the minds of all the lower order of people in Europe, if an expenfive, deftructive, and almost univerfal war fhould prevail? Certainly the effects would be

incalculable.

Mr. Wilberforce here obferved, how important a duty it was to endeavour to stop the flames of war from thus extending themselves over the world, and how ardently he wished to prevent the extermination of fo large a part of the human race. Never did he more strongly feel his obligations to his conftituents, than in fuch a crifis as the prefent; when by fending him to Parliament they enabled him perhaps to be an instrument (however unworthy of it) of leffening the deflruction of mankind, and promoting the attainment of the peace of Europe. And what were the objects to be effected by our parfuing war? To obtain a government in France worthy of trust? Every nation almoft might carry on eternal war on this principle. Might not Turkey fay the fame of Ruffia, who had uniformly broke faith with her; and even Ruffia of

Turkey,

Turkey, of whofe religion it was the profeffed principle never to make peace with infidels?

Mr. Wilberforce concluded, by remarking what would, in his opinion, be the true line of policy for this Court, namely, to cultivate our domeftic refources, to confult the happinefs, the good morals, and the comfort of the lower orders of the, people; and to excite their confidence in Administration:To abstain on the one hand, as much as might be, from continental connexions, on account of the general uncertainty of them, the character of foreign Princes, and the fituation of the affairs of Europe. He ended with obferving, that whathe had faid had been diftinct, as he trufted, and determinate-he hoped that thofe who made objections to his arguments, would treat the fubject in like manner, and not refort to any fubtle distinctions; nor merely advise the House in a general way to go on, hoping that things (though they knew not why) might turn out better. Predictions of the fuccefs of war had feldom anfwered. Predictions of the advantages on the fide of peace had generally been fulfilled. In the cafe of America it had been faid, and by high authority, that if we made peace, and recognised her independence, "the fun of Great Britain would be fet for ever;" but by the operation of the most fimple and common causes, the greatest profperity had followed our pacification with that country. The fame he believed would happen, if they would make peace with France; and the motion which he propofed would hardly fail, if it were carried, to bring about that object.

- Mr. Duncombe rose to second the motion. He adverted to an argument that had often been urged, that it was impoffible to have a permanent peace with the prefent Government of France, and asked whether we had ever had a permanent peace with France, or whether during the laft half century we at any time had a peace that had lafted for more than feven years? The fact was, that we had been continually embroiled in wars for the ambition of that very Monarchy which we were at this time fo anxious to restore. There was only one difference, he obferved, between former wars and the prefent; formerly we were at war with the Kings and minifters of France; at prefent we were at war with the people. He remarked on the ftate of the confederacy against France, and on the abfurdity of any reliance on the proffered affiftance of the Empress of Ruffia. Such an offer on her part, he faid, could only proceed from a flrong prefumption of British credulity. Had Ruffia really wifhed to lend any effectual affiftance to this country in the profecution of the prefent contest, she had opportunities fufficient to have evinced the fincerity of her intentions.

tentions. Far was it from his intention to reflect on the character of the foldiers and officers who had been engaged in action; their conduct was fuch, in his opinion, as added fresh luftre to the military fame of the country; but he could not help thinking that there had been fomething remifs in our naval operations. He quoted the conduct of the fleet which under Lord Hawke in 1759 gained the celebrated battle of La Hoche, and which during almost all the winter had been out at fea, cruizing off Quiberoon Bay and Breft, and preventing any depredations upon our commerce. Mr. Duncombe confidered the prefent motion as a call upon minifters to put a stop to the fcene of mifery and calamity which was going on; to conciliate the public mind by adopting measures to bring about a peace, and to preclude the neceffity of making any addition to thofe burdens, which had already increafed to fuch an extent, that they could not much longer be borne. Amidst the distress created by these burdens, he adverted to a Bill brought in for paying certain debts, which had excited an honeft and a general indignation in the country,-a Bill which, if it was allowed to pafs, muft for ever ftain the character of the Houfe. He obliquely cenfured the recent difmiffion of a gallant officer, and afked, on what particular circumftance minifters built their hopes of fuccefs in the profecution of the present contest, whether on the fituation of the Weft Indies, or the fuperiority of our fleet in the Mediterranean, which had derived fo much advantage from the Spanish co-operation? He concluded with ftating, that he had long been a warm friend to the administration of the Right Hon. Gentleman, and was fo at that moment, but he must confefs that he fhuddered at the profpect before him.

The Secretary at War declared, he was much surprised at the reasons which had been urged, and confidered the motion as extraordinary, not only in itself, but extraordinary when compared with the opinions and late decifion of the Houfe, and till more extraordinary when compared with the former. opinions of the Hon. Mover. He certainly agreed with the Hon. Mover in the general propriety of bringing forwards fuch questions during a war, and particularly a war like the prefent; and he thought with him too, that fuch questions might be brought forward in oppofition to the oftenfible objects adduced against them, although his own objects fhould be drawn out like charges in a bill of indictment, and that the iffue fhould be tried whether they could be attained or were unattainable. The grand fubject for confideration then was, whether the probable evils of carrying on a war were greater than the more certain evils of remaining at peace. X x

VOL. III.

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