it muft on the fame ground be equally defirable for the other poffeffions of the Emperor. The aid of Germany, and even of a quintuple contingent, had been stated by many declarations of this very Emperor to be abfolutely neceffary to the general fuccefs of the war; and now if Germany fails him, Pruffia alfo having withdrawn, his own territory being reduced, and his army fhut out from croffing the Rhine, how could it be hoped that he would be able to make further head against the French? As to our other allies, it was to be obferved that they were not in a better fituation than his Imperial Majefty; Spain likewife was reported to be negotiating, and her known weaknefs was one ground of the report. From Sardinia little was to be expected. An alliance, indeed, with Ruffia was fpoken of, and certainly he felt difpofed to commend and not to blame the endeavours of Government to intereft the Emprefs in the war; provided, however, we fhould not thereby draw down upon us more enemies than would be compenfated for by her affiftance. Mr. Wilberforce added, that even though his understanding fhould dictate approbation of a policy of this fort, ftill his feelings would follow but flowly, for he fhould find it difficult indeed to bring himself to wish fuccefs to fuch a power as Ruffia had fhewn herself to be.

Having defcribed the flate of the allies, Mr. Wilberforce adverted to that of France; and here, he said, fome new, confiderations came in, which the Houfe had never had the full opportunity of deliberating upon before. First, that she had quieted thofe great internal infurrections, which had occupied confiderable armies during all the preceding periods. of the war. Not only the allies were leflened in numbers, and in force; not only the King of Pruflia had withdrawn, and the Empire feemed likely to follow his example; not only the British troops (a circumftance which ought alfo to be confidered) were removed from the continent, while the line of frontier, both by the capture of Holland and the peace with Pruflia, was exceedingly narrowed; but, on the other hand, by the quieting of thefe infurrections, a large acceffion of difpofable force had been gained to the French, which they might bring at once to bear on any new point. The advantage to the French by the above-mentioned defection of, our allies, and the acceffion to their own ftrength, he computed at between two and three hundred thoufand men.

Next, as to the French refources. Their paper-money, as he understood, was much depreciated, and had fallen ftill more lately; nevertheless, every thing went on as before. In America paper-money had been depreciated during the war,

far

far below the prefent depreciation in France, and yet new refources had after that been opened; and the fallacy of fuppofing that a nation's pecuniary means must end with its paper credit, had been evinced. In point of fubliftence, Mr. Wilberforce ftated, that he had received information from various quarters, and from, fome perfons who had arrived from France within thefe two or three days, that, generally fpeaking, they were in no fort of diftrefs; that in Paris indeed bread had been scarce, but it was now grown lefs fo than before; and in many parts, he believed he might say in moft, provifions were at this time cheaper in France than in England. When it was confidered, that peace was made between France and Pruffia, and that a new market for grain was thus opened, and even that the King of Pruffia (if what report faid was true) had fhewn himfelf difpofed to refufecorn to England, until he had fupplied the French neceflities (not to mention the like aids to be got from other new allies), furely the want of food would not be urged as a reasonable ground for fuppofing that France would be exhausted; befides which it fhould be confidered, that the time of harvest was nearly approaching

Such then were the circumstances of our enemies in point of the great article of provifions; next, what were their tem pers, and difpofitions? In the armies there had been no fign whatever of difaffection. A general fatisfaction prevailed in the country, as was natural to expect, on account of the termination of the troubles of La Vendée and of the Chouans, and fome hope of peace was excited by the treaties already made, or entered into; whatever partial or temporary tumults therefore might arife in Parit, the idea of a general riûng in the country was laid afleep, and appeared now to be over. The general circumftances of the war alfo tended to make them think their troubles nearly come to an end, for peace feemed to them (as it did to the people of this country) not far diftant, and any evils which might arife were likely therefore to be fubmitted to, under the idea of their being temporary. The conduct of foreign nations towards them tended alfo to confirm this fentiment. The Duke of Tufcany's treaty with them was a finall matter, when confidered in the light of an additional ftrength gained, but it was very inportant in another view, namely, as a fymptom of the fort of confidence which foreigners placed in them. Hiere was a fhrewd Italian Prince, who fome time ago thought himfelf fafer under the wings of the confederacy, but who now thought it time to commit himfelf rather to the protection of France. The French peace with Pruffa, and Sweden's reVOL. III, cognition

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cognition of the French republic, tended in like manner to increase their strength, by fuftaining their reputation in Europe.

Mr. Wilberforce adverted to a new event in France, which he said he had heard of fince he came into the Houfe. He meant the commotions recently excited in Paris. This, he faid, was a kind of event which he was not particularly furprifed at, and which, if any body meant to make it an argument against a motion for peace, he should wish to exprefs his opinion against fuch an use of it very strongly indeed. We muft not (faid he) allow the happiness of the people of England to be the sport and play of thefe fucceffive events. He had obferved, on many occafions, a difpofition in the House, as well as in fome people without doors, to be on the watch, as it were, for fome new event, and to rest almoft the wholeground of going on with the war on fomething future, the mere operation of chance, which they could not define; and which they had waited for month after month, and year after year. Every little incident was magnified by perfons of this defcription, and was turned into an argument against making peace. He knew not how he could better illuftrate and enforce the mischief of acting upon fo momentous a queftion as that of war and peace, on thefe tranfient and flight grounds, than by putting the Houfe in mind of what would be the confequence, if France were to act on her fide in the fame manner. What if her government were to urge the high price of provifions (which, as he had ftated, were in general higher here than in France) in the fame manner as we urged it, namely, as a proof that we were juft exhausted? What if the vast bounties given to man our navy, or to increase our army, and the feveral new efforts made in thofe refpects, fhould there be urged; and what if the rifings which had taken place in this country, which in one inftance had feemed for a fhort time rather formidable, fhould be magnified; the account of them being conveyed by perfons the leaft favourable to our Government? Would not a very erroneous judgment be formed in France concerning our refources, and concerning the probable period of our terminating the war, if these alone were the grounds on which the French government fhould argue on the fubject? This reflection, then, ought to teach us caution on our part: It should teach us to look out for fome fure footing; not taking up any light circumftance, which made little or nothing to the general argument, and on which a mind that was able to furvey and comprehend the whole of the fubject ought not to reft.

With regard to the probable confequences of pursuing the war, Mr. Wilberforce declared, that he confidered them to be in their nature in a great measure uncertain. We had very extended foreign territories, and our enemies were in a contrary fituation. With refpect to the West Indies, he believed every West Indian would reply, if he were afked, that peace on their account was defireable; and if it fhould continue to be the policy of the French (as it had hitherto been), rather to ruin us, than aflift themselves, it was obvious that acceffion of territory in St. Domingo was hardly to be defired. There were 400,000 flaves in that colony, many of whom had been in actual rebellion, and others had had great conceffions made to them; fo that the reduction of that ifland into an Englifh colony was in his mind far from defireable.-As to Guadaloupe, it should be remembered what venom had been fpread there alfo, where a British fort had been taken by blacks armed against us. Government themselves alfo had admitted it was not in the power of any naval force effectually to fecure our Weft India poffeffions. Much therefore was to be loft by war, but little was to be gained in that quarter.

In the East Indies, we were more out of the reach of the enemy; yet the recent treaty with Holland affected in fome measure our interefts in that quarter; and Indian Princes, as experience has always fhewn, are apt to take occafion of making war when they know us to be involved in hoftilities in Europe. The French, though they fhould give them little help, might at leaft give them promifes of it, and might poffibly blow up a flame; fo that there alfo we had much to lofe, and little, or rather nothing to acquire. There was another quarter, he meant Ireland, on the fubject of which it would be better to hint an allufion, than to fay much. It had been expressly advised the Catholics to push their claims rather in a time of peace than of war. If then many or all of our allies fhould fail us, he would leave it to the imagination of the Houfe to fuppofe the ground for making peace that arofe on this quarter. Laftly then, as to the probable effects of war on this country: Heretofore, indeed, it might juftly be faid to be carried on in order to prevent the progrefs of French principles; but now he believed there was much more danger of their being strengthened by a general difcontent, arising from the continuance of the war, and from the confequences of its continuance, than from any importation of the principles themselves from the foil in which they grew, for the nature of them had now been feen through; the fpirit of jacobinifm and fraternization had fubfided, even in France, and a gradual change in this refpect had taken place. Another bad effect of

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of the war in this country was, the drawing off fo great a part of the people from the peaceable purfuits of honeft induftry to a military life. Government, indeed, deferved praise, and not blame, in his opinion, for this meafure, fo long as the war existed: Still, however, it was a very ferious evil, tending to injure the morals of the people effentially, to detach them from the habits of civil life; and though no prefent confequences might be felt, yet it was probable that very material. ones would follow, though poffibly at fome distance of time.

Nor was the effect of our perfevering in the war, on the minds of the people of America unworthy of confideration. On the arrival of the news of the capture of Holland in the capital of America, he had read in an American paper, that a ftrong expreffion of general joy had been manifefted, and that guns were fired, and the city bells were rung. If, therefore, we should appear to them to push the war to an extreme and unreasonable length, might it not be fuppofed, that fome jealoufy would be excited on that continent, either through the idea of our wanting to poflefs ourselves of the whole of the Weft Indies (a fuppofition which he believed they had already made), or of our having a rooted enmity to all repubJican governments? neither of which could be very pleafing circumstances to their minds.

With regard to the effects of the continuance of the war on France, Mr. Wilberforce declared he was strongly perfuaded that the war tended, under the prefent circumftances, rather to prevent a counter-revolution than to forward one, to retard rather than to accelerate the establishment of a regular form of government. Suppofe the moft fuccefsful events of war to happen: Suppofe Auftria to penetrate into France: Suppofe alfo, fome new Ruflian allies, fresh from the capture of Poland, to be united with them, and to march into that country, would not the people of France unite more than ever against thofe fresh invaders, forget for the time their internal animofities, and be again compreffed into refiftance? Or, fuppofe these animofities to continue, we had feen already that France, though weak and disturbed in her centre, might ftill be terrible in her extremities.

An idea, he faid, had prevailed, that, if peace fhould be made with one party in France, and that party fhould be difpoffeffed, the fucceeding one would, of course, not abide by it. This fuppofition feemed to him extremely ill founded, although at the firft blush of it, it was plaufible. If the people were for peace (which they moft certainly and almoft univerfally were), every new party would court the popular favour by the pre

fervation