A.D. 1854.] DEFICIENCY IN THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 191 were few, the medical stores were scanty, and there was not a singie ship suitably fitted for the reception of the sick. It was a dreadful oversight. The sick were carried to the beach, where, as no arrangements had been made, they lay for hours on the damp sand, and then were packed in one transport. The Kangaroo received 1,500 men in all stages of disorder. All day on the 15th she lay off the shore with this painful freight; and as her captain declined to proceed, at the last moment some were transferred to other ships going to Scutari. This was the first trial and the first failure of the medical department, not from any fault of its own, but because the service was stinted, and the sad contingency of sickness had been overlooked. It was the first, but not the last. There were many more in reserve. the 2nd; while the 4th division, sont to make a demonstration off the mouth of the Katcha, was slowly ascending the coast towards Old Fort, where it arrived the next day. Yet, early in the afternoon, Marshal St. Arnaud, who had just landed, officially informed Lord Raglan that he had "the whole" of his infantry ashore. That was incorrect, as is evident from the official papers issued by the French War Department, on which we have based our statement. By three o'clock, although they began so late, the British had landed three complete divisions-the 1st, 2nd, and Light, two batteries in a state fit to go into action, and a squadron of Hussars. By sunset we had landed 23,700 men, and nineteen guns ready for action. The strength of the three French divisions landed on the 14th was, on the 1st of August, 25,135 men. Six weeks had elapsed; the cholera had been most destructive, especially during the march into the Dobrudscha. Fixing the loss from death and invalid-debarkation. Each day there was work enough to be ing at the low figure of 5,000 men, we shall see that the force landed on the 14th could not have exceeded 20,000. The official report states that they landed fifty-nine guns, all horsed; but the reports at the time stated that the horses for those guns had only been partially landed. In the afternoon the wind began to rise, and the rain to fall. The surf increased, and the operation of landing artillery and horses became first dangerous, and then impracticable. Some horses went overboard in spite of the assiduity of the seamen, and some boats laden with guns were obliged to return to the first ship that would receive them on board. The British army landed without tents; but the space devoted to the French was white with the little tents d'abri which the French soldiers carry wherever they go. Towards sunset the rain fell continuously, and soon the earth was soaked with water, and the hollows filled with it. Lord Raglan landed in the afternoon, and immediately rode forth to inspect the whole position and its outposts on all sides, and he did not return from this duty till eight o'clock. When night fell, the troops lay down upon the deluged ground, and passed their first night with rain streaming on them from above, and mud around them below. Officers were not better sheltered than men, and he thought himself lucky who found a bed under a country cart. It was a severe trial for our troops, and its effects were visible on the sick list next morning. The armies lay four days in position off the points of done in completing the operation of landing. On the 15th the wind blew heavily on shore, and sent a rough surf dashing over the shingle and sand. But, later in the day, the wind went down a little, and the British were enabled to put on shore more guns and the greater part of the cavalry; and the French landed more guns and their 4th division. Lord Raglan also went on shore, and established his head-quarters on a rising ground, and rode round the outposts as before. The men and officers slept once more in the open air. They made beds of fern and lavender; but, although the rain did not descend in steady streams, a heavy dew saturated beds, and blankets, and kits. On the 16th the tents were landed, in the hope that transport for them could be found in the country. It was not found, and all the tents were taken on shipboard before the army marched. And why could not transport be found? When the allies first landed, the country people, simple farmers and shepherds, quiet and inoffensive, came into the camp; and, as they had done at Eupatoria, brought fowls, and eggs, and sheep, and were glad to sell them. They also were willing to let out their carts and bullocks. According to the British system, these men were well treated and well paid. Wellington, even in France, could always secure a well-supplied market, and even transport, by treating the people civilly and paying them well. So it would have been here. But the Indeed, the fatal cholera had not been left behind at French act on a different system. If they do not perVarna. The white sheet and slung shot were seen on the mit, they connive at plundering; not only plundering sides of many a transport during the voyage; and the by marauders for their own individual behoof, but soldier who had come so far to fight and endure, per- plundering by armed and authorised bodies. It is haps to die in battle, met another doom, and swathed in allowed in all countries that stores belonging to the "His heavy-shotted hammock shroud, Government of your enemy are good prize. You may, Dropped in his vast and wandering grave." by the strict rules of war, take private property, if you Some hundreds, as the ships drew up opposite Lake need it. Yet, as a general rule, it is prudent to respect Kamishli, were too ill to be moved from their berths; private property; or, if you take it, to pay for it. The and ere sunset, those who had landed were bearing | French took both alike. On going his rounds on the back to the boats new victims to cholera, or interring corpses on the Crimean sands. We have already seen how defective was the land transport. That deprived the men of their tents. But there was another branch of military service equally uncared for. The medical men evening of the 16th, Lord Raglan learned that a body of Zouaves had entered and plundered the village of Baigaili, within the British lines, and had even abused the villagers, men and women. Of course a speedy end was put to such brutalities. At the same time, Adjutant - General, Estcourt; Captain de Moleyns, with a squadron of Spahis, went Brigadier Tylden. out of the French camp, and returned driving before Quartermaster-General, Airey; Commander-in-Chief, him flocks of sheep and cattle, a few camels, a number Lord Raglan. [Sir John Burgoyne seems to have of arabas, or country carts, and a group of natives, the been a sort of adviser to the Commander-in-Chief.] captives of his spearmen. The effect of these predatory The French preparations were completed by the forays was to reduce to a minimum the supplies of all morning of the 18th. They had far less to land than kinds, animate and inanimate, to be derived from the the British. The weather was no real obstacle to the country. It is true that the Cossacks, now in greater landing of infantry, or even of stores; but it materially force, were hovering around the army, and that by day delayed the debarkation of the horses; and indepenand night the signs of their handiwork were visible in dently of the artillery and baggage animals, and blazing ricks and homesteads; but they could not have chargers for the staff of all the divisions and brigades, prevented the Tartars from coming in, nor did they pre- the English had to land 1,100 troop horses. In spite vent our soldiers from seizing the stores of Government of his knowledge of all these facts, Marshal St. Arnaud grain at Sak. They served, however, to scare the people grew impatient of the delay. He hoped to be able to and cut off our supplies. While these Zouaves and start on the 17th, but his own preparations were not Spahis were ravaging the villages, it was remarked that then complete, and he next fixed on the 18th, regulating the Turks, who had landed on the 15th and 16th, "the his views solely by his ability to move, and taking no much-abused Turks, remained quietly in their well- account of the hindrances necessarily besetting the ordered camp, living contentedly on the slender rations English army. No doubt it was important to hasten supplied from their fleet." Nevertheless, the Commis- onwards, but more important to move in such a consary-General, by aid of military force and money, dition as would preserve both armies from disaster. managed to get together about 350 country wagons, On the 18th, Marshal St. Arnaud took one of the most with bullocks and drivers, for the supply of the British extraordinary steps he had yet taken. He uttered a section of the invading army. threat. He had sailed from Baljik without consulting or waiting for Lord Raglan. On the 18th he says, in a letter to his wife-" I have just written to Lord Raglan to say that I cannot wait any longer, and that I shall issue my orders for marching at seven o'clock to-morrow morning-nothing shall stop me any more.” This was a very arrogant thing to do. Marshal St. Arnaud, if the English had not been ready, could not have fulfilled his threat, as he had no cavalry, and the Russians had numerous squadrons. But it so happened that the English devoted the 18th to preparations for marching the next morning. Lord Raglan had ordered, with reluctance-transport not being forthcoming-the embarkation of the tents, and even of the knapsacks of the infantry. Small portions of the kit of each man were rolled in his great coat and blanket, and strapped on to his back. This was done to lighten his load, as the whole of the troops were sickly and weak. But it may be questioned whether the men did not suffer more from want of their full kits than they would have suffered from the weight of the burden. Had the English not been ready, Marshal St. Arnaud's resolution would have been tested. But they were, and the order was issued. The operation of landing occupied four entire days, and the fifth was spent in terminating the preparations for the march. The 4th British division, under Sir George Cathcart, except two battalions, arrived and were put ashore. The French landed 26,500 men, 72 guns, and a few Spahis. The Turks landed 7,000 men, all infantry, and no mention is made of their field artillery. The British landed 26,800 men, including 2,100 artillerymen, 60 guns, and 1,100 horsemen. The total force was, therefore, in round numbers, 61,000 men and 132 guns. The French force consisted of four divisions, under Canrobert, Bosquet, Prince Napoleon, and Forey. The Turks were under Selim Pasha. The English army was composed as follows: LIGHT DIVISION, SIR GEORGE BROWN.-1st Brigade, 7th, 33rd, 23rd, Brigadier Codrington; 2nd Brigade, 19th, 88th, 77th, Brigadier Buller; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade. 1ST DIVISION, THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE. 1st Brigade, Grenadier, Fusilier, and Coldstream Guards, Brigadier Bentinck; 2nd Brigade, 42nd, 93rd, 79th Highlanders, Brigadier Colin Campbell. 2ND DIVISION, SIR DE LACY EVANS.-1st Brigade, 41st, 47th, 49th, Brigadier Adams; 2nd Brigade, 30th, 55th, 95th, Brigadier J. Pennefather. 3RD DIVISION, SIR R. ENGLAND.-1st Brigade, 4th, 50th, 38th, Brigadier J. Campbell; 2nd Brigade, 1st, 44th, 28th, Brigadier Eyre. The troops arose from their damp beds at an early hour on the 19th, and paraded in marching order. Much time was still spent in accommodating the baggage and stores of so many thousands to the limited number of carts at the disposal of the Commissariat. Everything not indispensable in a military point of view was left behind. There was so much scattered on the beach, that Sir George Cathcart had to part with his only brigadier, Torrens-for Goldie had not arrived-and also part of his division; and Lord Lucan had to detach the 4th Light Dragoons from his weak brigade of cavalry to guard the beach, and see all the stores, and tents, and baggage safely on ship-board. Time wore ENGINEERS,on, the sun was high in the cloudless heavens before the 4TH DIVISION, SIR G. CATHCART.-1st Brigade, 20th, 57th, Rifle Brigade 1st Battalion, 50th, Brigadier Goldie (who, with 57th, had not arrived); 2nd Brigade, 21st, 63rd, 46th, Brigadier Torrens. CAVALRY, THE EARL OF LUCAN. 4th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons, and 17th Lancers, Brigadier the Earl of Cardigan. ARTILLERY, Colonel Strangways. A.D. 1854.] POSITIONS OF THE ALLIES ON THE MARCH. word was given to move. It was about nine o'clock. Marshal St. Arnaud, according to the French writers, had then been two hours on the march. 193 well as moving on the shortest line, the French were able to be first again in position on the Bulganak. The nature of the operation determined the order of The positions taken up by the allies at Old Fort march. In warfare, an army about to act on the determined their positions on the line of march. The offensive selects what is called a base of operations; French, by landing to the south, were of necessity next that is, a fortified or otherwise secure spot, where its to the sea; that is, on the right-the place of honour in magazines of all sorts can be formed, whence it derives the line. It had probably been arranged beforehand its stores, upon which, in case of reverse, it can fall that in the march to Sebastopol they should derive all back. The line from this base to the object aimed at is the protection they could from the sea, because they had called the line of operation. As the army advances no cavalry. Be that as it may, they took up a position from its base, it is usually obliged to guard its comwith their right resting on the sea, and their left on munications with that base, or occupy and subdue so the right of the English army. Lord Raglan's force took the left, or outermost flank, probably because he could dispose of a brigade of light horse. His outposts, as a matter of course, extended far inland, and the front of his division was bent towards the north-east. The limit of the march was the Bulganåk, seven or eight miles distant. But whereas, in order to reach it, the French moved along the inner or shortest line, the English marched on the outer or longest line, having to start from a point not less than a mile in rear of the French left, and having at least a mile in addition at the other extremity to march before they could range up in line. So that, as will be seen, by starting first, as 173.-NEW SERIES. much of the country on each side as leaves the great roads free from molestation. But on landing in the Crimea, the allies had no base except Constantinople, communication with which lay safe and secure across the Black Sea. The shipping formed an intermediate base, and a movable one; so that the generals did not need to create, at this stage of the invasion, a place of arms and supplies in the Crimea. When they left Kamishli, they left it absolutely never to return, unless driven back. The fleet moving parallel with the armies, supplied and supported them, and provided them with means of re-embarking, and retreating over the sea from any point on the coast accessible to boats. This 13th L. D. 11th H. being so, the allies in the march towards their object, the front trickled along the left flank, and brought up the Sebastopol, had no fears for their communications, and rear. had only to move in such an order as gave full security for the time being. They therefore marched in a formation which would have enabled them to fight at any moment. The French adopted a formation derived from Marshal Bugeaud. They name it a lozenge or diamond échelon, somewhat like this sketch: 1st Division. Thus Rifles. 2nd In this order the English army moved on. Spectators Division (and there were some) were filled with admiration as the deep red columns, tipped with a shimmer of light, rellected from the bayonets, swept over the grassy plains. The day was bright and hot, the breeze fresh and soft, and it is recorded that the trampling of tens of thousands on the Crimean steppe so bruised the herbage that a delicious fragrance filled the air. In spite of the piteous sights that haunted the rear-wearied men, and men in the agonies of death, and corpses lying by the way—the spectacle from the little hills was one most grand and imposing. Some there were, among the chiefs, who had of yore seen such a mass of power; but none of the younger generations had ever before beheld upwards of 20,000 bayonets gleaming in the sun, and not collected for parade, but for the actual and dread business of war. So over the undulating steppe, becoming less and less as it moved altogether, but remaining still mighty, the British army closed up to the Bulganâk, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy. The 1st division formed the point, the nd and 3rd the two sides, and the Turks and 4th the rear. The 1st and 4th were in themselves arranged in lozenge shape; the 2nd and 3rd in two parallel columns of brigades. The artillery of each division marched in the space enclosed by the columns, and the large space in the centre of the formation was devoted to the reserve artillery, the baggage, and other impediments. Thus, the warlike machine was complete and self-sustaining, and able to form a front of battle in any direction. Around all marched the skirmishers. In this order the French army, flanked by the fleet, approached the Bulganak. The English array was far simpler. Two regiments of cavalry, the 11th and 13th, under Lord Cardigan, followed by rifle skirmishers and their supports, led the way. Then came the main body in two grand columns, with the guns on the right of the divisions to which they belonged. These columns consisted of the Light and 1st Divisions on the left, and the 2nd and 3rd on the right. They were formed in what is called a double column of companies from the centre of divisions; that is, the left company of the right brigade and the right company of the left brigade formed the head of the column, the other companies taking the same order in succession; so that, as the object was to secure the left or exposed flank of the combined army, by simply wheeling the companies of the left brigade to the left, a line of battle could be instantly formed to that flank. The baggage and reserve ammunition followed the 3rd division, that is in rear of the right column, while the 4th division closed the line of march. One regiment of cavalry rode on the left flank, on a line with the head of the Light Division, and one in rear, on a line with the 4th Division; while the rivulet of skirmishers covering The French, as we have said, were the first to cross the Bulganâk. When our troops came up, the French had halted in position and were at rest. But it was our lot to fire the first gun. The divisions were crossing the river when the Cossacks showed themselves on the slope which ascends from its bank. The cavalry were ordered to look after them; and as they retired over the ridge, Lord Cardigan followed. As he descended into the next valley, he found himself face to face with a tolerably strong force of horsemen. The skirmishers on each side began firing; but, as the Cossacks did not come on, Lord Lucan ordered our squadrons to retire alternately. Suddenly the enemy opened fire from horse-artillery, and kept it up pretty smartly upon the British, now halted-waiting for the guns. They had not to wait long, for over the ridge came bounding Maude's troop of horse-artillery. Famous for rapidity, our gunners instantly came into action, and replied to the enemy with such spirit and accuracy that the Russians quickly ceased firing, and sheered off over the next ridge. By this time the Rifles and part of the leading divisions had crowned the ridge in rear of our cavalry; and our horsemen, with a loss of five wounded, and the guns together with the infantry, returned to the position on the Bulganak, where they rested for the night. The Russians A.D. 1854.] CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE ALLIED COMMANDERS. were a reconnoitring party, strong in infantry, which CHAPTER XVII. The Allies on the Bulganâk-Conference between Marshal St. Arnaud and tured Battery-Colin Campbell's Words-The Guards Re-take the the Bulganâk. What passed at this interview is pain- So. THE allies, when in position on the south bank of the Bulganâk, could not see the heights of the Alma, because a ridge, the same over which the Russian cavalry reconnaissance had come, and which concealed its infantry supports, intervened, and closed the prospect in that direction. It was from the frequent watch kept up by the naval officers of both nations, from the tops of their ships, that the two generals acquired their knowledge of the proximity of the Russian army in position. The Russian advance in the afternoon of the 19th only showed the direction in which to look for them: and as these troops appeared on our left front, and as when they retired the Cossacks hovered at a distance in that direc-objection, General Bosquet, about six o'clock, began to tion; and, moreover, as a measure of wise precaution, Lord Raglan directed his divisions to change their front to the left, that is, to the eastward. The result of this movement was that, while the French still faced towards the position of the Alma, one-half the English army was posted with its front at right angles to the line of march. As a matter of course, picquets were thrown out along the whole front of the line, and on its left flank, the right being protected by the sea-shore. It is also necessary to remark that there was an interval between the left of the French and the right of the English. This disposition of the forces, rendered expedient by the neighbourhood of an enemy so strong in cavalry, exercised a great influence on the proceedings of the next day. During the evening, Marshal St. Arnaud visited Lord Raglan, whose head-quarters were in a post-house on seven. lead forth his division in two columns, followed by four Turkish battalions. He moved on for an hour, and then halted, just as the centre should have moved, to be followed by the English. But the English were not ready. It is said they should. have been in line about Whence arose the delay? Some of it must, no doubt, be set down to the constitutional slowness of the British temperament; some to that imperfect concert which is the bane of a divided command. The remainder was caused, undoubtedly, by the fact that the British, in consequence of the arrangements made over-night, had to effect a great change in their array before they could begin to march. The divisions forming the left, or eastward face, had to move obliquely to their right, the 1st in order to form column in rear of the Light Division, the 3rd in order to regain its place in rear of the 2nd Division, while the 4th had to wheel completely |