A.D. 1852.] ORIGIN OF THE CRIMEAN WAR. the necessities of his position. Moreover, they harmonised with his own character. He had educated himself sedulously for the office to which, by patience and craft, he had attained. He had studied more deeply than any man the career of Napoleon I. He knew its strong and its weak points. He desired nothing more earnestly than the task of recovering some of the ground lost in 1814 and 1815. But he had a delicate game to play, for all the powers suspected him. One of the disadvantages of the First Napoleon was, that he could not conciliate England. The Third Napoleon determined that he would not suffer from a similar misfortune, and with infinite art he contrived to bring about an Anglo-French alliance. Yet, having to please his jealous subjects as well as his suspicious allies, he was bound to pursue an independent policy, and to make it appear that England followed the lead of France. It needed a sure judgment to choose a field of action, one that would bring success of some kind, without alarming other states. The complex Eastern Question was found to afford the opportunity for display, and the ambition of the French Church indicated the part of the Eastern Question on which it would be most convenient to lay hands. The Emperor resolved to re-assert the lapsed supremacy of the Latin Church in the Christian temples and grottoes of Palestine. Now England, as a Protestant power, had no special interest, certainly none worth fighting for, in the squabbles of the rival Churches of Rome and Russia. Turkey, as a Moslem power, had no interest in the matter, save the important one of keeping the peace at those holy seasons when Greek and Roman entered on the sacred spots where Christ preached good-will among men. But both Turkey and England had an interest in preventing a dispute between two churches from becoming a battle for political influence between two powers, both of whom were very much of this world. And Austria, although she could not fail to sympathise with the Latins, looked with alarm upon any quarrel which threatened the integrity of Turkey. It was therefore certain that if the demands of the French ruler led to a severe diplomatic struggle, Austria would be found on the side of England and Turkey; because Austria was vitally interested in preserving her influence in the valley of the Danube, and England was vitally interested in preserving hers in Syria, Egypt, and the Mediterranean. But there was another power whose ambition, if not whose interest, led her counter alike to England, Austria, France, and Turkey. Russia desired to issue from her icy realm. She longed for dominion over sunny lands and seas open to her ships throughout the year. As her people turn their eyes towards Jerusalem, so her rulers turn theirs towards Constantinople. The Russian peasant dreams of a pilgrimage to the holy shrines, the Russian monarch dreams of a march to Byzantium. For a hundred years, without a serious check, successive Czars have pressed on steadily towards a goal once marked on the mile-stones of the steppes. Catherine, Paul, Alexander I., Nicholas, each added provinces or points of vantage to the southern frontiers 131 of the empire; cach attacked Turkey in Europe and in Asia; each vexed, and threatened, and fought her by sea and land. They won the Crimea; they occupied Georgia, and the head of the Euphrates valley; they took post in the delta of the Danube; they covered the Black Sea with ships of war; they dictated peace at Kaniardji, at Bucharest, at Adrianople. Their policy was to obtain the headship over the Christians in Turkey, and to take such positions, and hold them with such forces, as would enable them to seize the coveted prize-Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles-at any moment. Europe had long seen the growing danger, but had done nothing to ward it off. The German and the Western Powers, irritated but helpless, looked on while Diebitch marched to Adrianople in 1828, and connived at the peace he was allowed, by sheer effrontery, to force from the Sultan. Lord Aberdeen, who then would not, or could not, aid the Turks, contented himself by writing a masterly criticism on the peace, showing how fully he saw the peril which he had not the heart to encounter. The only time when Europe seemed to be united in an effort to preserve Turkey, an effort in which Russia joined, was when Mehemet Ali had nearly dismembered the empire; and to that effort France was not a party. Perhaps it was the separate policy pursued by France in 1840 which made the Emperor Nicholas disregard that nation in the calculations he made in 1844 and 1853. For Nicholas had long made light of the power of France. With reluctance he had recognised Louis Philippe, and it seemed as if no power on earth could make him address Louis Napoleon in the style sanctioned by usage. The Czar called him his "good friend," not his " brother," in violation of the usage which makes sovereigns all brothers or sisters. So far as he was concerned, he would not admit Louis Napoleon into the royal circle, but kept him on its verge. There was more of pride than prudence, more of passion than sagacity, in this act of sovereign rudeness, and while France resented the known contempt of the Czar for her voice in Europe, the Emperor was certain to resent the slight put upon him. In 1844, the Czar, believing he had secured the subservience of Austria and Prussia, half disclosed an intention to tempt England with offers of a share in the spoil of the dismembered Turkish empire, and although he met with a plain rebuff from the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, remembering what occurred in 1828, he did not scruple, in 1853, to approach the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen with a distinct offer of specified provinces, intimating that so long as England agreed with him, it was indifferent to him what France thought of the transaction; and while he alleged that he was sure of Austria, he did not even deign to mention Prussia-a sign that he believed he carried her proxy in the pocket of his uniform. Whether the Emperor Napoleon was acquainted with the designs of the Czar upon Turkey or not, it is of little importance. The policy he developed was precisely that which he might have adopted had he known how anxious Nicholas was to secure the concurrence of England in his schemes. He set about thwarting the policy of Russia in the East, and selected a point of attack, which, while it brought him directly into collision with the Czar, did not rouse the hostility of any other power. He aimed at a weak part in the Russian system, the Christian protectorate, founding his claims upon a treaty obtained from the Porte more than a century before, and almost forgotten. The claims were indefeasible; but it was their characteristic that they excited the wrath of Nicholas and stirred him to action, not only because they touched his pride as a pontiff, but because the wound was made by a power which he had contemned. Thus it happened that, while it was the provocative policy of France which lighted the torch, it was the passion and obstinacy of Russia which fanned it into a devouring flame, threatening at one moment to involve the whole of Europe, but finally concentrating in the Crimea, and there consuming the hoarded means of executing the cherished projects of every Russian sovereign since Catherine. "zealous " man, replaced General Aupick as the representative of France at the Porte, and in his hands the business soon began to make progress. During this period the English Minister, Sir Stratford Canning, acting on instructions from home, held quite aloof from the disputes, and contented himself with watching closely the contest between the Porte and the French Minister. He thought that the Porte would not give way unless forced, and the Emperor of Russia was so fully persuaded of the strength of his influence at Constantinople, that he felt convinced that no change in the matter of the holy shrines would occur. But in this respect, as in so many others, he was mistaken. In the autumn of 1851 the English Minister began to see the gravity of the contest going on under his eyes; for the Marquis de Lavalette, growing impatient at the delay of the Porte in according his demands, talked in a menacing tone of the use that France could make of the strong fleet then assembled at Toulon. It was at this moment, November, 1851, that between France and Russia for influence at Constantinople and throughout the East. This is the cardinal fact to be borne in the mind of the reader throughout these transactions. It is the key to what followed; and our narrative will show how the conflict deepened in intensity, until it ended in war. The first movement of France in this Eastern Question was made in 1850. The Latin priests in Jerusalem | the quarrel visibly assumed the character of a struggle were always clamouring against their rivals, and a fresh complaint reaching Paris, the Prince-President directed his ambassador at the Porte, General Aupick, to claim the fulfilment of a treaty in favour of the Latin Church, obtained in 1740. The gist of the grievance was that, by Russian influence, and by degrees, the Greeks had gained possession of certain churches and other holy places, in contravention of this treaty, and by the connivance of the Porte. And it was natural that as, since 1740, Russia had exercised a greater pressure on the Porte than France, so she had brought it to bear to exact concessions in favour of the priests of her faith, and give them a predominance at the holy shrines. For a century France had acquiesced; but in 1850 the country had fallen under a ruler more active in the employment of French power than any ruler since Louis XIV., except Napoleon I., and, for purposes almost personal, he determined that France should acquiesce no longer. At that moment, however, Louis Napoleon had not seated himself on the throne-indeed, he had not seated himself securely in the presidential chair. He was engaged deeply in a plot to seize sovereign power in France, and he had no time to devote to the task of recovering Latin supremacy in Palestine. Moreover, it does not appear that at this period the President had any decided intentions. The clerical party in France were gratified by the mere knowledge that General Aupick had raised the question of the holy shrines at the instance of the President. Throughout the year 1850 nothing was done of a serious character. The French Minister made demands, and the Porte evaded them as best it might. But in the very beginning of 1851, General Aupick imparted new life to the negotiations. M. de Titoff, the Russian Minister, struck into the fray, and warned the Porte that he should insist on the status quo. Then General Aupick grew still warmer in his language, and the Austrian Minister supported him. In the spring, the Marquis de Lavalette, a more energetic, indeed, a The Turks, having no interest in the religious question, proposed various arrangements, which proved agreeable to neither party. When something like the basis of an agreement had been arranged, a strong letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Sultan forced the Porte to retract it. Learning this, M. de Lavalette said that his Government having embarked in the question, could not stop short under the dictation of Russia. The Russian Emperor would not desist from opposition at the dictation of France. Each presented himself to the Sultan, one with the treaty of 1740, the charter of the Latins; the other with documents, antecedent and subsequent to that date, embodying concessions made to the Greeks. The Porte, desirous of satisfying both the powerful complainants, exhausted its ingenuity in devices, yielding now to Russian, now to French menaces, and looking keenly for assurances of support in the event of danger. The Turks consulted Sir Stratford Canning; but he was powerless to aid them, for his Government had determined to take no part. Nevertheless, he did his utmost to prevent precipitate action on all sides, on a question "involving little more than a religious sentiment, and the application of a treaty permitted to be more or less in abeyance for a century." He was only partially successful, for M. de Lavalette continued to talk of breaking off negotiations unless his demands were complied with, and M. de Titoff stood out against any alteration of the status quo. And here it may be proper to state in general terms the exact nature of a dispute so "vexatious and uninteresting," yet so dangerous to the Porte, and so full of trouble for Europe. There are at Jerusalem certain holy places-churches, grottoes, tombs, and gardens. Under A.D. 1852.] ISSUE OF AN IMPERIAL FIRMAN BY THE SULTAN. the vague terms of the treaty of 1740, the French Government claimed at first possession of the greater number of these on behalf of the Latins. Whatever may have been the case in 1740, in 1850 these places were in the hands of the Greeks, whose pilgrims resorted to them in great numbers; whereas, as Count Nesselrode remarked, sarcastically, the Latin pilgrims were represented by "occasional Roman Catholic tourists." The Russian Emperor saw in the demand of France both an attempt to humiliate his co-religionists, and an attempt to diminish his political influence in Turkey. Hence he insisted on the status quo. But while there 133 Holy Places, through the medium, first of a mixed, and finally of a Mussulman commission, and on the basis of their reports arrived at what appeared to be a satisfactory decision. The Latins were to have a key of each of the gates of the great church of Bethlehem, "as of old," and they were to be admitted to officiate once a year at the shrine of the Holy Virgin. They were also to be allowed to replace in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star, bearing the arms of France, similar to one formerly there. At the same time the Greeks were to be admitted to officiate in the Mosque of the Mount of Olives. And on this basis, at the beginning of 1852, by the exertions of M. de Lavalette, the questions at issue seemed to be settled, and the Porte embodied the whole of the arrangements respecting the Holy Places in an "imperial firman invested with a hatti-scherif." Turkish Ministers hoped that both parties would be satisfied by concessions. The was a legal right at the back of the French demand, because it rested on an unabrogated treaty, there was only a moral right on the side of Russian resistance, because, though the Greeks had possession and usage, they had no treaty rights in the French sense. Nevertheless, it was impossible that the Porte could ignore its own acts in favour of the Greeks during a whole cen- This was a delusion. M. de Lavalette took umbrage tury, and consequently it would not admit the French at the firman. To his mind it denied, practically, the claims in their full extent. Indeed, M. de Lavalette, right of France to the Holy Places, and made out to be valueless the musty old treaty of 1740, furbished up for the occasion. Fresh mutterings were heard in the embassies. Sir Stratford Canning had come home, but Very eager for the glorification of France, but not burdened with excessive religious zeal, soon saw the propriety of reducing his demands. The Porte applied itself to the investigation of the whole history of the Colonel Rose warned Lord Malmesbury, then Foreign 168.-NEW SERIES. Minister, of the coming storm. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the part of France, was willing to accept from the Porte a declaration that it was not intended to say anything in the firman at variance with the promises made to M. de Lavalette. But Lord Malmesbury was warned by Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British envoy at St. Petersburg, that serious consequences would follow such a step, as the Russian Government would uphold the firman, and resent any successful attempt on the part of the French Government to modify or explain away that document. The Emperor Nicholas would not | permit his rights to be encroached upon. It was manifest that the strife still preserved its old political character, and that his jealousy of France rendered the Russian Czar as intractable as ever. The Porte did what the French desired, and gave the assurances deemed to be satisfactory; once more the Ministers congratulated each other on the termination of the quarrel, and once more it broke forth again. For the Porte, in its trepidation, gave conflicting pledges to the fighting embassies. In giving the assurance which calmed for a time the abounding zeal of M. de Lavalette, the Porte promised that the firman should not be publicly read, but simply registered. The Russian chargé d'affaires got wind of this, and insisted, with effect, that the firman should be read. M. de Lavalette, hearing probably that the Porte had promised M. de Titoff, months before, that the key of the "great door" of the Church at Bethlehem should not be given to the Latins, became very keen in his instructions to the French Consul to see that it was given up. M. de Lavaletto became very violent. “He more than once," wrote Colonel Rose in November, talked of the appearance of a French fleet off Jaffa (in case the stipulations were not fulfilled), and once he alluded to a French occupation of Jerusalem, 'when,' he said, 'we shall have all the sanctuaries."" Colonel Rose judged correctly the real character of this nominally religious conflict, when he said it was "a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost, in her dominions." And he painted the condition of the Sultan, with great force, when he said, "The Sultan is required to be a judge, and to decide in this dispute; but, so far from having judicial independence and immunity, His Majesty is coerced and humiliated before his subjects by menaces, forced to give contradictory and dishonouring decisions, and then accused of perfidy by those who have driven him into it." Here we have manifestly a true picture of the weakness of the Turk, but we have also a true picture of the insolent ambition of two strong states. The Porte could not serve two masters, each of whom was bent on having his will obeyed, each of whom had fleets and armies, wherewith one could threaten Syria and the whole Levant, but the other could appear off Constantinople itself. Nevertheless, the Turkish Government tried to appease France without offending Russia. In the autumn of 1852 there was a striking spectacle at Jerusalem. Afif Bey had been sent on a special mission to inform the contending Churches of the decisions arrived at in Con- Fuad And here, at the beginning of December, 1852, we find the origin of that now famous demand for a protectorate over all the Greek Christians in Turkey, which, when advanced by Prince Menschikoff, led at once to war. The claim purported to be based on the treaty of Kainardji, but that treaty expressly limited the Russian Protectorate to two chapels-one in the Russian Legation, the other a chapel to be built in Galata. This baseless demand irritated the French, frightened the Turks, and filled the English with apprehension. But it was not then pressed. Another incident occurred, showing the critical temper of the time. The Porte was at war with the tribes who inhabit Montenegro, but A.D. 1853.] RUSSIAN TROOPS ORDERED TO THE TURKISH FRONTIER. who live mainly on plunder. Austria, affecting to see danger to herself in the continuance of a contest so near her frontier, sent Count Leiningen to Constantinople, with a peremptory demand for the cessation of the war. It is not improbable that this was a Russian project; for the Czar felt, or affected to feel, that Austria would do all he desired in the Eastern question; and no sooner was the Austrian demand made, than he supported it. But the Porte, beset by enemies, determined wisely to satisfy Austria, and thus to deprive Russia of any pretext for hostilities on that score. Russia was baffled, but not diverted from her purpose; for the Emperor now began to be impassioned, to feel the sting of French rivalry, and to commit himself almost too deeply to recede. In vague, but menacing terms, he declared that the Porte should be required to fulfil its engagements with him, and to that end he set troops in motion. "It was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force," and he prepared for a violent struggle. Two corps d'armée, above 100,000 men, were ordered to march towards the frontier of the Turkish empire. It was an anxious moment for statesmen; but the attention of the great European public was not turned towards the East. In England, the strife of parties had led to the downfall of the Tories, and to the great joy of the Emperor Nicholas, Lord Aberdeen became the head of a new Cabinet, in which the post of Foreign Minister was filled, not by Lord Palmerston, but by Lord John Russell. The Emperor conceived great hopes of support from the new British Government; the British public looked for social reforms from a composite Cabinet which unquestionably included in itself the ablest servants of the State. If the people thought of danger, it was danger from France, for the Prince President had made himself Emperor; and a desire to see a completion of economical reforms was mingled with a determination to look to the defences of the nation. Mr. Gladstone was meditating a budget which should control the course of our financial and fiscal policy for seven years, and the public shared his anticipations; but side by side with this great peace budget, the causes of a costly war were growing with a rapid growth. Ministers were not, and could not be, blind to the perils which threatened peace; but, as will be seen, they placed an unfounded reliance on the personal honour of the Emperor Nicholas, and they did not appreciate the provocative policy of France. Yet whatever qualms of apprehension they may have felt, they carefully kept to themselves, and even so late as April, 1853, Lord Clarendon assured Parliament that as regarded Turkey there was no danger of the peace of Europe being disturbed. Yet between the 1st of January and the 30th of April the British Government had become possessed of facts which should have clouded their sanguine anticipations-facts which should have revealed to them the intensity of the strife between Russia and France, the insidious conduct of the latter, the fraud and the ambition of the former-the weakness of the Sultan, and the extreme probability that the contending Powers would 135 Whether not rest content without an appeal to arms. the British Government could have prevented the outbreak of war is doubtful, but the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen was justly open to the charge of having failed to comprehend the character of the disputants, and to foresee the consequences of their strife. For the conflict, hitherto confined to Constantinople, was transferred for a time to Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, and did not improve by its extension. Lord Cowley suggested direct negotiations between France and Russia. The suggestion was adopted, but it only served to embitter the relations between the two Courts, and it was open to the objection, that it took out of the hands of the Porte a question which nearly concerned its sovereignty. This was met by the device of requesting the Porte to sanction such an arrangement as the two Courts might recommend in common. had no other result than the exchange of sharp observations between Count Nesselrode and General de Castelbajac. For Russia had determined on a totally different course. The Emperor resolved to treat directly with the Porte, and obtain from the Porte his demands. It The first warning of this line of conduct reached Lord John Russell on the 23rd of January, and the next day Baron Brunnow handed in a despatch, dated January 14, which disclosed the temper of the Russian Government, if not the scope of its designs. In this important document Count Nesselrode pointed out that the question had undergone a total change. The French Ambassador at Constantinople had "triumphed." Not only had "the firman, sanctioned by the Sultan's hatti-scherif, not been executed at Jerusalem," but it had been "treated with derision by his Highness's Ministers. To the indignation of the whole Greek population," continued Count Nesselrode," the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East." This language showed that Russia still resented vehemently the infraction of the status quo. And the subsequent language revealed a determined purpose to exact ample reparation. "The mischief then is done, M. le Baron," the Russian Minister went on, "and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The immunities of the orthodox religion, which have been injured, the promise which the Sultan had solemnly given to the Emperor, and which has been violated, require somo reparation. We must labour to obtain it." And then come fierce attacks on the violent conduct of the French Government-which used the cannon as its first argument, which risked the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor of Russia would not take that course. desired to maintain the independence of the Sultan against foreign dictation. He would make "one further, one last conciliatory endeavour;" but in order to guard against a Government which presented its least demands at the cannon's mouth-"a Government accustomed to act by surprises"-he would take precautionary measures, that is, he would move his troops up to the frontier. England was advised to dispel the panic fear of the He |