CATASTROPHE.

IN the foregoing Diary, the march of a Drama is associated with the incidents of a journey. Had it extended but to one day later, the Catastrophe, from fortunate would have changed to unfortunate. All that appeared accomplished on the 2nd of May was reversed on the 3rd. The cry of the people of Syria, about to be articulated, was stifled in its throat, by the sudden revulsion of the Pasha, all whose maleficent powers revived when obeying a foreign and inimical interest. The intimation to me of the change was not in words. No explanation was offered, no wavering exhibited, no reasons of State alleged. A person employed by me, and placed at my disposal by the Pasha himself, was suddenly imprisoned, and by the act and with the velocity of a telegraphic communication, the hearts of all were smitten with terror, their hands fell powerless, and those who had been most active and most zealous dispersed and hid themselves. The Pasha also hid himself; his doors were closed and barricaded against me, as if I had been a foreign invasion. There remained nothing further for me to do than to embark, and endeavour from Constantinople to restore the operation broken in the Lebanon.

Cruising, shortly afterwards, in the Archipelago, I encountered the squadron which bore the Sultan. Receiving an intimation that His Highness would receive me at Scio, I proceeded thither, and being accompanied into his tent by three of the Ministers of the Porte, and being, at the close of the audience, about to withdraw, one of those Ministers said to me, "Now is the moment for the Lebanon." consequently stated the case, and afterwards received an invitation to return with him to Constantinople, in order that continuation should be given to the matters opened at this audience.

I

In communications with the Ministers of the Porte at that capital, I had to listen to no single expression intimating either doubt or irresolution. They were filled with surprise and gladness at the prospect of escape through the dispositions of the people from the dangers which they saw to be impending over the Empire from that quarter. In terms not less ambiguous, and still more energetic, was conveyed their reprobation of the conduct of Vamic Pasha; which conduct was at once attributed to that sole motor of every intrigue, and source of every danger the patronage of Foreign Powers, always ready for a faithless administrator, and the persecution of Foreign Powers, ever suspended over the head of an upright servant of the Sultan.

A council on the affairs of Syria was held, the results of which, it was intimated to me, were in the same sense. I was requested to find some trust

worthy friend to send to Syria, in order to ascertain really the dispositions of the people, and to watch events. I was so fortunate as to meet at Constantinople a gentleman who undertook this office, and whose report will be found subjoined.

Notwithstanding these favourable appearances, I doubted the possibility of the maintenance by the Porte of the resolution it had formed, so long as its action was hampered, and its sense of independence crushed, by the presence of the Russian Army of Occupation in the Danubian Provinces, under the Treaty of the previous year. It was, therefore, to the removal of this army that my attention was, if not exclusively, principally directed. After two months of unceasing efforts by day and night, this was at last effected, and the Porte, in the intoxication of its delight, dared not to look too closely at the terms of the arrangement, so that the door was left ajar for their return in June, 1853, without the countervailing presence of a Turkish force. In this transaction the Lebanon was lost sight of, and I was prevented from resuming it, as upon the settlement for the evacuation of the province, the Porte requested me instantly to leave Constantinople, that they might be relieved from the recriminations entailed upon them by my presence. In fact, the Porte had sacrificed what might have been done in the Lebanon, as against the freedom they expected to obtain on the Danube.

Possessed of the knowledge of these criminal and

dangerous proceedings in the Lebanon, it was incumbent upon me to use every means to expose and counteract them. If the laws require such effort in case of danger to the life of a single individual, how much more is it incumbent, when the property, the liberties, and the lives of millions, as in this case, are involved. To appeal to the European public was useless; it would not listen: if it did listen, it could not comprehend; if it listened and comprehended, what could it do? To appeal to the English Government was useless; it knew but too well what it was about. Indeed, during these operations I had been in the habit of detailed correspondence with two members of the then Cabinet, whose replies evinced a perfect concurrence with me, in that in which I was engaged; this concurrence, not in the slightest degree affecting the operations of that Cabinet in the East.

Shortly afterwards, a new Administration came in. Hope reviving, I made another attempt. The matter was again laid before members of the Administration, and finally the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Malmesbury, afforded me the time and the attention requisite for the exposition of the case, with the Blue Books for confirmation. I feel myself justified in stating, that Lord Malmesbury did not withhold his concurrence from the allegations then made: not only by reason of his not adducing objections, but furthermore by his calling upon me for an explanation of that, which on the

face of it appeared inexplicable. His words were (they have been consigned in a subsequent correspondence), "Can you explain to me the ulterior objects of England, for such acts there must have been an ulterior object?"

Had I had the like opportunity with Lord Aberdeen, when he came into office in 1841, he might probably have put to me a similar question. No Foreign Minister, in coming into office, has the least conception of what the policy of England is; and it is because England's Ministers know nothing of her policy, that it is possible to predict with certainty, what, in any given case, she will do. So far back as the year 1835, in pointing out to the Duke of Wellington, the invariable injury to Great Britain, as the result of a system pursued by Great Britain, His Grace replied, "England has no system, and if it had, and however noxious it might be, it would not matter. Nothing has been well done by England, save by an act of insubordination." The period of insubordination has now passed by; that is to say, insubordination by instruction, takes its place amongst the elements of systematic deception.

Lord Malmesbury requested me to reduce to writing the case I had verbally stated to him. On the fall of that Administration from office, without having done anything for the Lebanon, I printed the Memoir. It will thus be seen that I left no means untried to avert the consequences, and to exonerate myself from criminal connivance.