deprived of comfortable jobs. Among these personal influences the most potent was that of the Náná Sáhib, the adopted heir of Bájí Ráo the last of the Peshwás. The Peshwá died 'in 1851, and Dalhousie refused to renew to his adopted heir the pension with which since 1818 the Peshwá had been consoled. Second only to the Náná in malignant influence was Azimula Khan, a Muhammadan agent employed by the Náná to promote his suit in Europe.

Nevertheless, it is the opinion of Lord Roberts' that despite the accumulation of causes of discontent, personal and general, there would have been no mutiny had the warnings of Dalhousie received the attention they deserved; had the British element in the Indian army been maintained in due proportion to the native;2 above all had the British officers been younger, more alert to observe the signs of disaffection, and more prompt to deal with its manifestations. 3

Outbreak Those manifestations became increasingly frequent in the early of Mutiny months of 1857. On January 24th General Hearsey reported from Dum Dum the existence of an "unpleasant feeling" which he ascribed to rumours as to the preparation of the new cartridges. The 19th Native Infantry was stationed at Berhampur, a military station about 100 miles from Calcutta; the 34th was at Barrackpúr. These regiments were honeycombed with disaffection, and so quickly did the mutinous temper spread that it was thought desirable to disband the 19th on March 30th, and the 34th on May 6th.

It was, however, at Meerut that the first serious outbreak occurred. Eighty-five troopers of the 3rd Native Cavalry having been tried by a court-martial composed of native officers for refusing to touch their cartridges were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, were publicly degraded and marched off to gaol. On the following day, Sunday, May 10th, the whole regiment mutinied,

1Cf. Forty-one Years in India, vol. i. c. xxx., an admirable analysis of the causes of the Mutiny.

2 Lord Roberts gives the figures in 1857 as 36,000 British against 257,000 natives, exclusive of armed police and Lascars.

3"Brigadiers of seventy, Colonels of sixty, and Captains of fifty. It is curious to note how nearly every military officer, who held a command or a high position on the staff in Bengal when the Mutiny broke out, disappeared from the scene in the first few weeks and was never heard of officially again."-Roberts, pp. 456-457.

1858]

OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY

285

broke open the gaol, released their comrades and 1,200 other prisoners, gutted and burnt the European bungalows, and massacred every European, man, woman, and child, on the outskirts of the cantonments. This done, the mutineers made off to Delhi. General Hewitt-one of Lord Roberts' "Generals of Seventy "was in command at Meerut, and neither he nor Archdale Wilson, the Brigadier, made any effort to pursue the mutineers or to warn the garrison at Delhi. It is the opinion of Lord Roberts that "there was unaccountable, if not culpable, want of energy displayed by the Meerut authorities on this disastrous occasion": but that it would have been futile to pursue the mutineers, even had their destination been ascertained, and that no action however prompt on the part of the Meerut authorities could, at this stage, have arrested the mutiny.1 But the Government of India took a serious view of the conduct of affairs at Meerut and General Hewitt was removed from his command.

Meerut is forty miles to the north of Delhi. On the morning Delhi of May 11th the mutineers reached unopposed the ancient capital of India. Their arrival was expected; the native regiments in Delhi joined them; the teeming inhabitants of the great city were on their side. They dragged forth from his retirement the old Mughal Emperor, and proclaimed the restoration of the Muhammadan dynasty to the imperial throne of India. Already a military revolt had developed into a political revolution.

Delhi thus became the centre of the insurrection. The fate of British India depended on its speedy recapture. Towards this end all energies were bent. General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, was at Simla when the bad news reached him on May 12th. He collected what forces he could at Umballa, but found them insufficient for the task of retaking Delhi, and unequipped either with means of transport or with siege guns. He proposed, therefore, to wait until he could march with fair prospect of success. But time was of the essence of the situation. Lord Canning urged the General to immediate action. Sir John Lawrence wrote from the Punjab in the same sense. He admitted that, on military principles, the General's plea for delay was unanswerable. But political considerations should be paramount. "Pray only reflect," he wrote, the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we acted 1 Vol. i. pp. 87-91.

on

The Pun

jab

The Siege

vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels ?" Anson yielded, arranged that two brigades should march from Umballa, and, having united with one from Meerut, should try to carry out their orders and "make short work with Delhi".1 Anson himself started on May 24th, but succumbed to cholera at Kurnal on the 26th, and the command of the field force then devolved upon Sir Henry Barnard.

Meanwhile, in the Punjab, Sir John Lawrence was straining every nerve for the fulfilment of a two-fold task: to secure the Punjab itself, and to provide a force to assist in the recapture of Delhi. Lawrence himself was a tower of strength, and was splendidly served by his lieutenants Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, and Robert Montgomery. There was no panic, but at the same time no misplaced reliance upon the loyalty of native troops. Those troops were not less mutinous in the Punjab than elsewhere. But prompt action rendered them impotent for mischief. The great arsenal at Firozpur was secured, and many of the native regiments were disarmed at Mián Mir, Múltán, and Peshawar. These measures-exhibiting a combination of calm courage and stern repression-deeply impressed the Sikh population as well as those sepoys who were permitted to retain their arms. Thus Lawrence and his lieutenants saved the Punjab, and in saving the Punjab succoured India. On June 22nd Nicholson was despatched in command of a strong force to Delhi, and on August 14th he arrived before the town.

By that time the siege, if siege it may be called, had already of Delhi been in progress for two months. Barnard, succeeding to the command on May 26th, was joined on June 7th by a brigade from Meerut, and with this, and 500 Gúrkhas and a siege train, he marched on Delhi. His total force was now about 3,800 strong. On June 8th he met the mutineers 8,000 strong, six miles outside the town, drove them within the walls, and himself took up his position on the famous ridge to the north of the city. By the end of June the rebel army had swollen to 30,000; the British force, therefore, had its work cut out even to defend the ridge. Barnard succumbed to cholera on July 5th, and on the 17th

1 Lord Roberts vindicates Anson from the charge of vacillation and lack of promptitude. "The advice to march upon Delhi was sound, but had it been rashly followed disaster would have been the inevitable result."-Op. cit. i. 105.

1858]

THE SIEGE OF DELHI

287

By the

General Reed, who had succeeded to the command, was compelled
through illness to give way in turn to Archdale Wilson.
end of August the little force on the ridge had been increased to
8,000 men fit for service, besides 3,000 men in hospital. No re-
inforcements could be looked for from the south, and Lawrence
told Wilson that he had sent the last man he could spare from the
Punjab. It was decided, therefore, to deliver an assault without
delay. The breaching batteries opened fire on September 11th,
and in the early dawn of September 14th the assault was delivered.
The Kashmir gate was blown in and two other breaches were
effected. Immediately the ramparts were stormed and taken, but
for six days the British troops had to fight every inch of ground
within the city. Nicholson, who had led the assault with splendid
gallantry, was mortally wounded, but still the troops fought on.
The magazine was taken after two days' hard fighting on the 16th
and the imperial palace on the 21st. The old Mughal Emperor
who thus fell into our hands was ultimately sent as a State prisoner
to Rangoon where he died in 1862. His three sons, who had sur-
rendered themselves, were shot down without a trial or any forms
of arraignment by Hodson, the intrepid leader of the irregular horse.
At last Delhi was ours.1

With the recapture of Delhi-"the scene of the essentially Cawnpúr vital struggle" 2—the curtain falls upon the first act of the drama of the Mutiny. But there were two other theatres of revolt where the tragedies enacted were even more grim. Grimmest was that at Cawnpúr. Cawnpúr is on the great trunk road between Delhi and Calcutta, 270 miles from the former and 684 from the latter. It contained a great native garrison, commanded in 1857 by Sir Hugh Wheeler, a very aged officer. Early in May, Wheeler, anticipating mutiny, hastily fortified some buildings, and the British residents took refuge within the rough entrenchments. Near to Cawnpúr is Bithúr where the Náná Sáhib lived in state. The native troops mutinied on June 6th, fled from Cawnpúr to Bithúr, and the Náná, putting himself at their head, was proclaimed Peshwá of the Maráthás. The troops demanded to be led to Delhi, but the Náná persuaded them first to exterminate the vermin in Cawnpúr.

The story of the assault is graphically told by Lord Roberts, op. cit., i. c. xvii.-xix.

2 McLeod Innes, Lucknow and Oude in the Mutiny, p. 25.

Lucknow

Within the entrenchments were 870 non-combatants, and to defend them Wheeler had only 240 European soldiers and six guns. Without were 4,000 rebels led by the treacherous Náná. Unspeakable were the sufferings of the little garrison, huddled together under the burning June sun with scant provisions, little water, and constantly exposed to the enemy's fire. For three weeks they held the enemy at bay, but on June 24th they surrendered on the sworn promise of the Náná that he would guarantee them safe escort by the Ganges to Allahábád. On the 27th they marched out, a miserable company of 450, fever-stricken, wounded, and starving. Just as they were embarking the full measure of the Nána's treachery was revealed. A murderous fire was opened upon them; the men were shot down or hacked to pieces before the eyes of their wives and children; four only, the survivors of the single boat-load which actually got afloat, managed to escape; the women and children, some 150 in number, were dragged back and thrust into captivity in Cawnpúr. General Havelock, hastily collecting a force of 1,000 men at Benares, advanced and defeated the rebels at Fathpúr on July 12th, and three days later inflicted upon them a second crushing defeat at Aoung. On that same day the Náná had every woman and child at Cawnpúr butchered in cold blood, and flung dead or dying into a well. With a force of 6,000 men the Náná then tried to stop the advance of Havelock. Once more, but too late to save the wretched captives, Havelock routed the Náná, and on July 17th the English were again masters of Cawnpúr. Havelock blew up the palace and magazines at Bithúr, and leaving Neill to occupy Cawnpúr, he started on July 25th for the relief of Lucknow.

Next to Delhi, Lucknow was the most important centre of the Mutiny. It was indeed natural that the capital of Oudh should be the focus of unrest. In March, Sir Henry Lawrence had been appointed Resident. He clearly foresaw the coming storm, and did all he could to put Lucknow in a condition of defence, but the task was not easy. He had 700 British soldiers under his command, and 16,000 native troops. On May 30th the storm burst; five of the native regiments broke out, set fire to the cantonments, and murdered their officers, under circumstances of exceptional treachery. The outbreak at Lucknow gave the signal for revolt to every station throughout the old kingdom of Oudh. By the