1841] TREATY OF UNKIER SKELESSI 153 Mehemet Ali, the Albanian adventurer who ruled Egypt avowedly in the name of the Sultan, would have made short work of the Greeks. As it was he got his reward, ostensibly in the cession of Candia, much more in the improvement of his general position in the Ottoman Empire. Not content with this, Mehemet Ali in 1831 demanded for his son Ibrahim the Pashalik of Damascus. The Porte refused, and in 1832 Ibrahim attacked and conquered Syria, which, like Egypt itself, was under vassaldom to Turkey. The Sultan, in alarm, appealed to the Powers. England was preoccupied. France adhered to the Napoleonic view in regard to Egypt. Russia alone was ready to go to the assistance of the Porte. But Russia's friendship was, not unnaturally, suspect at Constantinople. In December, 1832, Ibrahim inflicted a crushing defeat on the Turks at Konieh, and advancing through Asia Minor threatened Constantinople itself. The Sultan turned in terror to his only "friend," and Russian troops were landed on the Northern shore of the Bosphorus. Thereupon the Western Powers intervened, and compelled the Porte, in the Convention of Kiutayeh (May 5th, 1833) to buy off the hostility of Mehemet Ali by the cession of Syria and Adana. Unkiar It was, however, the sequel which revealed the significance of Treaty of the situation. On July 8th, 1833, Turkey concluded with Russia Skelessi, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. This famous treaty virtually placed 1833 the Porte under the military protectorship of Russia, and converted the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Henceforward the Dardanelles were to be closed to all war vessels except those of Russia and Turkey. Palmerston was bitterly chagrined by the success of Russia, and firmly determined that it should not be repeated. Both at St. Petersburg and Constantinople he protested, though in vain, against the terms of the treaty. But the lesson was deeply impressed upon his mind, and the seeds of mistrust then sown were destined to yield a fateful harvest in Persia, Afghanistan, and the Crimea, It was not long before the near Eastern question was reopened. Mehemet On the one hand, the restless ambition of Mehemet Ali had been Ali again scotched, not killed. On the other, the Sultan Mahmoud was bent upon recovering what he had lost both in prestige and territory. His army was reorganized under Moltke; commercial treaties were concluded with Great Britain and other Powers, and an effort, apparently serious, was made to introduce Western civilization into the Turkish Empire. In 1838 Mehemet Ali refused the payment of tribute to the Porte, and proposed to make himself completely independent. The Sultan massed troops on the Euphrates: Ibrahim confronted him at Aleppo. On June 24th, 1839, the Turks were routed at Nissib, and shortly afterwards the Turkish fleet went over to the Egyptian Viceroy. At this supreme crisis in the fate of his Empire the old Sultan Mahmoud died and was succeeded by his son, Abdul Mejdid, a youth of sixteen. The whole Turkish Empire seemed to lie at the mercy of Mehemet. Not for the first time, however, the weakness of Turkey proved to be its strength. The Government of Louis Philippe was putting its money on Mehemet, and encouraging him in his most ambitious designs. But the rest of the Powers had no mind to permit the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and the substitution of the powerful Mehemet for a feeble youth at Constantinople. Palmerston, at once mistrustful and contemptuous of Louis Philippe, determined to take a strong line. He was not at all disposed to see Egypt under the protection of France, and Turkey under that of Russia. His colleagues in the Cabinet were strongly averse to a rupture with France. Palmerston did not desire it, but neither did he fear it. "It is evident," he writes to Bulwer,1 "the French Government will not willingly take the slightest step of coercion against Mehemet Ali . . . anxious as we are to continue to go on with them, we are not at all prepared to stand still with them. They must therefore take their choice between three courses—either to go forward with us and honestly redeem the pledges they have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declaration; or lastly, to go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and employ force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound by every principle of honour and every enlightened consideration of her real interests to assist us in doing, instead of preventing from being done." As to the future of Turkey, Palmerston was far from pessimistic. "All that we hear about the decay of the Turkish Empire and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk and so forth is pure 1 September 1st, 1839. 155 and unadulterated nonsense. Given ten years of peace under European protection, coupled with internal reform, there seemed to him no reason why "it should not become again a respectable Power". For the moment two things were essential: Mehemet must be compelled "to withdraw into his original shell of Egypt, and the protection afforded to Turkey must be European, not exclusively Russian. These were the keynotes of Palmerston's policy in the near East. Several of his most important colleagues, including Lord Melbourne and Lord John Russell, were against him; they had more mistrust of Turkey and less of Mehemet; but a threat of resignation from the Foreign Minister brought them into line with him, and on July 15th, 1840, he had the satisfaction of concluding the Treaty of London. Under this treaty the Sultan agreed to confer upon Mehemet Treaty of the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and, for his life, the administra- London, July 15th, tion of Southern Syria, including the fortress of St. John of Acre, 1840 with the title of Pasha of Acre. Failing Mehemet's acceptance within ten days, the latter part of the offer was to be withdrawn ; failing acceptance within twenty days, the whole offer. The rest of the contracting Powers, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, agreed to force their terms upon Mehemet; to prevent sea-communication between Egypt and Syria; to defend Constantinople, and to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Two questions remained: would Mehemet accept the terms; if not, could he count upon the active assistance of France ? France The Quadruple Treaty aroused the liveliest indignation in England France. The Citizen King and his people had been bowed out of and the European concert by Lord Palmerston. The will of Europe was to be imposed explicitly upon Mehemet; implicitly upon Louis Philippe. Thiers, now at the head of the French Government, was all for defying the will of Europe. Warlike preparations were pushed on apace; the army and fleet were strengthened, the fortification of Paris was begun, and for a moment it seemed probable that a great European conflagration would ensue. Palmerston was quite unmoved. He knew his man. He did not believe that Louis Philippe was "the man to run amuck, especially without any adequate motive". Bulwer, therefore, was instructed to tell Thiers, 1 To Bulwer, July 21st, 1840. The far "in the most friendly and inoffensive manner, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up". His confidence in his own judgment was not misplaced. His diagnosis of the situation was entirely accurate. Louis Philippe knew well enough that a European war would complicate the domestic situation in France, and might imperil his dynasty. The fiery Thiers was permitted to resign and was replaced by Guizot, the pacific Anglophil. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe things were moving fast. Mehemet refused the terms embodied in the Quadruple Treaty, and the Powers, therefore, proceeded to impose their will upon him. An English fleet, supported by some Austrian frigates, bombarded Beyrout and Sidon, and compelled Ibrahim to retire from Syria. The capture by Sir Charles Napier of the great fortress of St. John of Acre, hitherto deemed impregnable, completed his discomfiture. Napier sailed on to Alexandria, and compelled Mehemet to restore the Turkish fleet, and to accept the terms of the Quadruple Treaty. France was invited to come into the general settlement, and on July 13th, 1841, a Second Treaty of London was concluded between England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France. Syria and Arabia were restored to the Porte; Mehemet was confirmed in the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and the Powers agreed that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should be closed to all foreign ships of war so long as the Turkish Empire was at peace. The Treaties of London must be regarded as a conspicuous personal triumph for Palmerston. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was torn up; Turkey was rescued from the hostility of Mehemet Ali and from the friendship of Russia; France was compelled to acquiescence, and the will of Great Britain was imposed upon Europe. It was not only in the near East that Palmerston was susther East picious of Russian ambition and alert in the protection of British interests. For the sequence of events which led up to the first of several tragedies in Afghanistan Palmerston was not primarily responsible, and those events may be more appropriately described elsewhere. It is well, however, to recall the fact that at the moment when Palmerston, in suspicion of Russian designs, was tearing up the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Lord Auckland and the Indian 1 To Bulwer, September 20th, 1840. 2 See Chapter xiv., infra, 1841] THE CHINA WAR 157 Government were, in deference to the same sentiment, deposing Dost Muhammad in Afghanistan, and embarking upon the disastrous policy which, after the murder of Burnes and Macnaghten, culminated in the humiliating retreat from Kábul (1838-1843). The year which witnessed the tragedy of Kábul witnessed also the cession of Hong Kong to England (1841). The Chinese War raises a very difficult and still unsolved pro- The China War, blem in political ethics. "A war more unjust in its origin, a war 1839-1842 more calculated in its progress to cover this country with disgrace, I do not know and I have not read of "-such was the uncompromising opinion of Mr. Gladstone.1 If we find its origin in an attempt on the part of greedy traders to force a noxious drug upon reluctant customers, few will disagree with Mr. Gladstone. There is, however, reason to believe that the opium traffic was an incident in, rather than the essential cause of, the quarrel. The Chinese were implacably hostile not merely to the importation of opium but to all foreign trade, and indeed to intercourse of any kind with foreigners. How far foreigners were bound to acquiesce in exclusion raised a nice question, and it was rendered nicer by the fact that the most valuable portion of the traffic which they desired to force upon the Chinese consisted of opium. Be this as it may, the Chinese determined in 1837 to put a stop to the importation of opium, and despatched to Canton a special Commissioner-Lin-armed with plenary authority to use all necessary means to effect this purpose. Previous to 1833 the trade in opium had been regulated by the East India Company, in whom the monopoly was vested. The Company's Charter lapsed in 1833, and on its reissue the monopoly was abrogated. As a result the trade not only increased with great rapidity, but, being no longer regulated by a responsible corporation, involved many regrettable incidents. The anxiety of the Chinese to stop it was, therefore, perfectly intelligible, though the action of Commissioner Lin was in the highest degree arbitrary and high-handed. He demanded that all the opium in the possession of the English traders in Canton should be surrendered and destroyed, a demand to which Captain Elliot-the English Superintendent in Canton-ordered the merchants to accede. Consequently 20,283 chests of opium, worth |