'Glasgow' and 'Kent,' supported by the auxiliary cruiser Orama,' on March 14 and destroyed.

Sir David Beatty's despatch describing the engagement in the North Sea on Jan. 24 supplies further confirmatory evidence of the high value of the battlecruiser. The brunt of the fighting fell to the 'Lion,' flying the flag of the Vice-Admiral, and the 'Tiger,' owing to the fact that their fast steaming enabled them to get within effective range of the flying battle-cruisers of the enemy after the 'Blücher' had been abandoned to her fate. After the action had been in progress for some time, the 'Lion' had to leave the line owing to 'a lucky shot' on the part of the enemy. By this time the large armoured cruiser Blücher' was doomed, and two of the enemy's three battle-cruisers, the 'Derfflinger' and 'Seydlitz,' had been seriously damaged. The engagement promised to result in the sinking not only of the Blücher,' but of the other two vessels which, in an injured condition, were making for their home ports. In Sir David Beatty's despatch no explanation is given of the reason why the pursuit of the enemy was not continued when it promised such fortunate results. In the first announcement by the Admiralty, however, it was stated that the enemy's ships reached an area where danger from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' In the fuller statement subsequently issued by the Admiralty and based upon a 'preliminary report' from Sir David Beatty, no mention was made of mines, but it was remarked that the presence of the enemy's submarines subsequently necessitated the action being broken off.' In the full and later despatch from Sir David Beatty reference is made to submarines, but it is not suggested that the Admiral considered their presence justified the discontinuance of the action. Judging by the various reports, Sir David Beatty, owing to the injury sustained by the Lion,' had to relinquish his command for about an hour, during which time he was shifting his flag from his injured ship to the 'Princess Royal.' It was presumably during this period that the chase was abandoned.

In the light of the various conflicting statements, the cause of the escape of the two badly damaged German battle-cruisers remains obscure. It is admitted that the enemy's submarines were active; Sir David Beatty refers

to their presence in his despatch. On the other hand, the British cruisers were steaming at 25 or more knots; and the experience of war suggests that submarine attack upon any vessel travelling at 15 knots or more will probably fail. There is no evidence which supports the suggestion that, when the action was broken off, the British ships were in dangerously close proximity to the enemy's mines. Not until the war is at an end and the full official records are available will it be possible to decide whether, in fact, the British success might or might not have been converted into a notable victory. In any event it is unfortunate that an action which offered such good prospect of inflicting grave military loss upon the enemy resulted merely in the sinking of one cruiser, and that the least valuable of the quartette which took part in the attempted coast raid of Jan. 24, and serious damage to two others. Ships which are not sunk or captured are ships which can be repaired and can again do mischief.

At the beginning of February the Germans declared 'the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel,' to be a military area.' It was added that from Feb. 18 every hostile merchant ship will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby the dangers which threaten the crews and passengers.' Neutral ships were at the same time warned that they would incur danger in the military area.' German newspapers, officially inspired, confessed that the attack on merchant shipping would be carried out by mines and submarines. It was pleaded that the frail character of the underwater craft, their want of accommodation for crews of ships attacked, and their inability to provide prize crews, furnished excuse for disregarding not merely the ordinary usages of war but the dictates of humanity. In making this declaration, the enemy, conscious of the inadequate number of his submarines for such a purpose, trusted to the moral effect of his threat upon neutral shipping. Neutral nations, however, were not dismayed; the flow of shipping to and from British ports actually increased.

Thus the policy of destruction which was decided upon with the boasted intention 'to starve England' was revealed from the first as a failure. A relatively small

number of ships, belonging to neutral as well as to British owners, were sunk with some loss of life, but no appreciable effect was produced on the economic condition of the United Kingdom, with arrivals and sailings averaging from 1400 to 1500 weekly. On the other hand, the German Government, by its procedure, not only robbed itself of whatever sympathy on the part of neutrals it may have hitherto enjoyed, but gave the British Government an opportunity of using its seapower with greater effect in order to put increased economic pressure on the enemy. The British Government, in association with France and Russia, determined not to endeavour to adapt to the peculiar geographical situation of Germany the recognised rules governing an effective blockade. Thereby they favoured neutrals, since a blockade involves the confiscation of neutral shipping and cargoes endeavouring to leave or reach the enemy. The course decided upon was to extend the list of contraband and to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. The Order in Council was framed in order to spare neutrals, while at the same time condemning Germany to all the effects of a blockade. On the part of those who realise the close connexion between naval and economic power and who are also conscious of the importance of retaining the sympathy of the neutral world, there will be no inclination to condemn the Allied Governments for showing the utmost consideration to nations not actually engaged in war.