Art. 14.-THE WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICS.

THAT the British genius shuns logical conclusions and loves compromise is a commonplace all the world over. Indeed, as any observer of Canadian politics must realise, it is one of those traits which the British carry with them, modified, it may be, by the presence of other races, but remaining the same in essentials. Seldom, however, has history afforded so striking a contrast of national characteristics as is displayed in the action of the allied French and British nations in the present struggle. For each country the war is a supreme national crisis; and the logical method of meeting a national crisis is a national government. The various members of such a government may continue to entertain their conflicting opinions on matters of domestic policy. They do not compromise about them; they hold them in suspense while they join in pursuing the supreme national interest which is common to all. Such is the course that has been followed in France. Political feeling in that country ran high before the war. In August, however, a Coalition Ministry was formed of the ablest men that all parties could produce. The same appreciation of the national danger combined with the same logical sense led to the law of Dec. 24, 1914, postponing all elections until the war should be over. The contrast in England is striking. Parties still oppose each other. For the most part the surface is unbroken, but underneath it the current of feeling flows almost as strongly as ever. Not only so, but now and again the turmoil breaks out openly. Yet, at the same time, vigorous support is given to the Government both in the legislative and administrative action which it takes to meet the various phases of the crisis.

Thus it would almost appear that the genius of compromise had achieved the impossible, and that the thinlyveiled hostility of political parties did not affect the national conduct of the war. Indeed, if the explicit question were put to well-informed Englishmen, in nine cases out of ten the answer would probably be that the prosecution of the war suffers nothing from the continued division of political parties. Such a conclusion,

however, plausible as it appears, will not bear closer analysis. In any organic body of men, union alone gives to capacity its full efficiency; and union in the present case means cordiality and confidence. Both are lacking in the present relations of the two political parties, though the ill effect of their absence must not, of course, be overestimated. It is not contended that the Government is the less determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, or that the Opposition are the less anxious that this should be done. But the determination is rendered less effective-not greatly so, perhaps, yet perceptibly; and in a crisis like the present every degree is of importance. The Government has acted, and is acting, with great energy, but in all its action it has an eye to party interests. It always has its ear to the ground; and this attitude has affected its action, military, naval, economic, none the less clearly because perhaps unconsciously. So, too, the Opposition claims that it has rendered support such as has been given by no Opposition before. The claim is just. The spirit of its individual members is shown by the fact that one-half of them are on service as compared with one-eighth of the Government bloc.' Yet, while the help of the Opposition has been sincere and in some points most valuable, their general attitude is instinct with distrust and criticism; and these feelings are none the less real because they do not find full expression.

The continued severance of parties operates disadvantageously in yet another way, which is not often noticed but can readily be understood. Robust criticism, at once well-informed, well-intentioned and forcible, is of the very highest importance when a Government is confronted with a crisis like the present; and the Prime Minister has emphatically stated that he would welcome it. But under present conditions it is not and cannot be given. Supporters of the Government will not criticise it in important matters, when their criticisms may serve as a future basis for attack by the Opposition. The Opposition, on the other hand, will not press any criticism sufficiently far to make it really effective. For, where parties are still divided, and party spirit though seldom effervescing is still active, it is felt that criticism pushed strongly home may fairly or unfairly be dubbed factious.

The result is obvious. The chase waxes hot on the scent of a minor matter like a timber contract, and Government supporters join in the cry. But matters of great moment escape searching criticism or may pass entirely without debate.

What has just been said applies almost exclusively to the centre of government. Away from the centre this spirit of mutual party antagonism is not exhibited in nearly so acute a degree. In the country at large there is more of real unity, more of a truce in spirit as well as in act. But, just as the brain directs the limbs, so any cause of weakness at the centre is serious. It should not be overestimated; equally clearly, however, it should be remedied; and this is the more necessary if indeed the heaviest fighting and the severest strain are still to come.

The question is one of the present and future, but is essentially conditioned by the past. Not only so, but much of the trouble has arisen from the inability of each side to see the point of view of the other, and from the absence of any 'honest broker' who could mediate between them. A brief summary of the past, therefore, is necessary. The problem contains four principal factors, distinct yet always interacting-the Irish Question, the Welsh Church Bill, the Plural Voting Bill, and the next General Election. Of these, in July last the Irish Question formed the all-absorbing topic. Gun-runnings, the Ulster Plot,' the Dublin riots, were incidents of the immediate past. The claims of Ulster for exclusion, the demand of Nationalist Ireland for 'the Bill,' were present dangers, both menacing, if not in equal degree. So far back as March 1914 the Prime Minister had stated* that the danger of civil strife was not confined to Ulster, but also existed in Nationalist Ireland; and the danger had subsequently grown more threatening. The appreciation of the danger in Ulster led him to introduce the Amending Bill. It did not please his own stalwarts; it did not satisfy the Opposition. Nor, perhaps, was it likely that it should do so. From the first, however, the Prime Minister treated it as an integral part of his Irish legislation. Only reasons of convenience made the introduction of a separate Amending Bill preferable to

* March 9, 1914, Hansard, col. 906.

*

amending the principal Bill. It was intended to send both for the Royal Assent together, and indeed to proceed with the Amending Bill, even if the Opposition did not endorse it. Such was the situation when the war broke out.

In the case of the Welsh Bill, the position was not complicated by an Amending Bill. The Government, except on one occasion, constantly pressed it forward. That occasion was Lord St Aldwyn's suggestion of a Committee to look into certain points connected with the disendowment proposals, a Committee which the Government countenanced if it did not welcome. It could not, however, be said that they were in any way pledged to delay the Royal Assent to the Bill until the Committee had reported.

From the Home Rule Bill or the Welsh Bill to the Plural Voting Bill is a great transition. Plural Voting is a question over which the political manager waxes eager, but which leaves the average Englishman cold and the average outsider befogged. Yet it was in truth almost the pivot of the whole situation. The essence of the Bill is that by abolishing the Plural Vote the Government calculated to gain anything from 30 to 80 seats, counting twice that number on a division. Clearly, therefore, the Government thought it a most necessary and salutary reform, and were determined to make it law. Equally clearly, the Opposition were convinced that it was inimical to the true interests of the country, and were determined to obstruct it, unless it were coupled with an equitable Redistribution Bill. The only method, therefore, of passing it would be under the Parliament Act with its three years' curriculum. Now if, as was originally intended, it had started on its course in 1912, together with the other two Bills, the Government would have had a simple proposition to face last summer. it did not start in 1912-and for the reason cherchez la femme. Introduced for the first time in 1913, the earliest date on which it could be passed into law under the Parliament Act was in June 1915. It may seem a pettifogging business, this calculation of dates. But in sober

Mr Asquith, May 12, Hansard, col. 955-6.

† Mr John Redmond, May 12, Hansard, 1001. Mr Lloyd George, May 12, Hansard, 1010.

truth it was as vital an element in the Parliamentary strategy as was the delay at Liège to the German armies. It meant that the Government last August had to carry on for another ten months of stormy weather if they wished to get the benefit of the Bill. Could they do so? A cataclysm threatened them in the autumn, which it became more and more clear they could not face. Their manifest course, therefore, was to try to last out till June 1915, but, if they were forced to go to the country earlier, to be able to demonstrate their own conciliatoriness and to throw the onus of any outbreak on the Opposition. By this it is not intended to argue that either the Government or the Opposition was not sincerely anxious to avoid civil war; only to make it clear that to be conciliatory, in appearance at any rate, was politic as well as moral.

With the momentous Fourth of August, all minor issues were overshadowed for the time being by the war. Already, on July 30, the Second Reading of the Irish Amending Bill had been postponed, without prejudice to the domestic and political position of any party.' This phrase, first used by the Leader of the Opposition, was adopted by the Prime Minister and applied to the whole of the domestic situation.† It expressed the spirit and intention of both sides, and was repeated by private members. But the fatal defect in it was the absence of a definite application to existing problems. The war would inevitably work some change in the circumstances of all parties. What was needed was that the position of each in August 1914 should be properly estimated in any temporary settlement, the elements of strength and weakness recognised, and no detriment inflicted in essential matters upon any. Parties, however, failed to appreciate each other's standpoint; and there was no accepted arbiter above fear or favour. To Liberal stalwarts, as to Nationalists, the one accepted proposition was the passage into law, during the current session, of the Home Rule Bill and the Welsh Church Bill. Amending Bills or other modifications were nonessentials-acts of grace, and unwelcome at that. If,

* Mr Bonar Law, July 30, 1914, Hansard, 1602.

† Mr Asquith, Aug. 10, Hansard, 2298, and Aug. 31, Hansard, 436.