reasons, the experience of five months of war makes it doubtful whether this movement will attain success commensurate with the attention which it attracted during September. Up to the present, the substitution of British for German goods has been more successful in the home market than abroad. The finding of new markets overseas is hardly likely to meet the case of producers who formerly sold goods in Central Europe.

The shrinkage of the home market on account of the need for economy on the part of the consuming public naturally affects those goods which are not required for immediate consumption, but are durable or in the nature of luxuries. The shrinkage in the private market for motors and cycles, the slump in furniture and the piano trade, and the depression in the decorating branch of the building trade, are all in this category. In none of these cases was it expected that new markets could be found; and the only alternatives were special Government orders or loans to assist in making for stock on a large scale in anticipation of a recovery in demand at the end of the war. Making for stock, however, under present conditions of industry, is an exceptionally dangerous expedient, for no one can foretell in any particular case what the state of the markets will be, still less what will happen to prices, after the war.

As a third expedient, there was the possibility that the Government would itself provide a market by putting in hand work that otherwise would not have been undertaken-a remedy which is limited in practice to the building of working-class houses and the provision of certain classes of unskilled work-road-making and the like. It was, however, very soon evident that there was not going to be a surplus of unskilled labour unemployed; and the question is reduced to whether encouragement should or should not be given to building operations on the part of local authorities. At the outbreak of war the Government Committee on unemployment and relief of distress encouraged local authorities to prepare such schemes, in case of need; but, before the Municipal Councils had got their plans well under way, Mr Lloyd George administered a cold douche to those enthusiasts who were anxious to make work, and advised local authorities to economise expenditure at a time when all

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financial resources were likely to be taxed to the uttermost. In a few cases, the War Office has endeavoured to make a market by modifying its requirements to meet the conditions of industry. As an example one may quote the use of bandoliers, etc., made of cotton instead of leather.

The fourth method of relief, namely, that of drawing a specially large number of recruits from depressed trades, has not as yet been consciously carried out to any extent, since there exists no means of bringing special pressure on particular classes except by carrying on an unusually vigorous recruiting campaign in particular districts. But, with the exception of agriculture, occupations are not sufficiently localised to make this a practical method of dealing with the question.

The problem will, however, become increasingly important, in view of the need of more recruits. The War Go Office already recognises that in the case of certain firms engaged in the provision of war material, men should d not be enlisted for the forces; but the production of necessaries, ammunition and equipment, ultimately involves many more occupations than those directly concerned. If the army requires another million men, it is quite evident that the existing surplus of labour in depressed trades will hardly go any distance towards supplying the need. Even when all the footballers and out-of-work entertainers have enlisted, it will still be necessary to come upon industry for a large proportion of the new recruits. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the existing surplus of labour in the furniture trade, in London at all events, consists of aliens. In the cotton trade the number of men actually out of work is not very large; and reports from Lancashire indicate that 'piecers,' who comprise most of the men of military age, are already becoming scarce.

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In some industries, and certainly in many commercial Occupations and in shops, there is no doubt at all that women could do a great deal of work that is now done by men. If the war is to be a long one and Lord Kitchener's demand becomes insistent, trade unionists no less than employers will have seriously to reconsider some of their prejudices against the employment of women. There is evidence that the substitution of

female for male labour has already taken place to an appreciable extent in Banking, in the telegraphic departments of the Post Office, and in other employments where men and women have already been doing the same kind of work. Trade Unions will quite rightly scrutinise the conditions under which the substitution takes place; t and the relaxation of factory regulations as to employment of women at night will need to be carefully watched. But with good will on both sides much more could doubtless be done in this direction than at present. According to the Board of Trade, however, the number of unemployed women in the country is not large, and at the most will not release more than 100,000 men. Male domestic service might account for more recruits; but here, in hotel service at all events, there is a very large proportion of aliens.

To get anything like the million men suggested will apparently involve an appreciable curtailment of industry even when adjustments have been made and those who are left are working overtime. The question thus arises, what industries can be curtailed with least harm to the vital industrial needs of the moment. Clearly one of our largest industries, building, could if necessary be practically dispensed with during war time; and this would make available a very large number of serviceable men. It is true that the building trade is one which employs an abnormally large proportion of men over forty; but it would no doubt be possible to get many hundred thousand men from this employment alone. The brewery trade is another industry which some people think could be well dispensed with, while stonequarrying and the manufacture of bricks should also be able to supply a large number of recruits. Whether this question will become a pressing one depends on the further needs of the Army after the recruits now in training are ready for service. So long as no machinery exists for making any kind of selection, it will be impossible to draw recruits on a large scale without causing industrial chaos.

In this connexion the data given in the Report on Employment enable us to get a rough idea as to the sources from which reservists and recruits had been drawn in October. Except in the case of industrial

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occupations, the figures do not cover the whole ground; the commercial percentages, for example, are based only on conditions in London. The report contains very scanty information about the professions and domestic service, but it would appear that enlistment is slightly higher than the average in the former and less than the average in the latter. If the enlistment percentages may be taken at 12 or 8 per cent. respectively, and assuming that the London percentages for commerce and retail trade apply throughout the country, we get the following estimate of the sources of enlistment :

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The application of the industrial percentage to Agriculture is a pure guess. The recruiting campaign was undoubtedly more successful in the early part of the year in the towns than in the rural districts; but, on the other hand, reservists are drawn very largely from agricultural occupations. There should be added some et figure unknown in respect of those who enlisted after losing their employment, but the number cannot be large. The effective strength of the various army and naval reserves before the war was 260,000, and of the Territorials 256,000, on the above figures. This leaves 825,000 as the enlistment figure for new Territorial battalions, for the regular army, for the special naval reserve, and for the New Army-which agrees fairly closely with the figures quoted by the Prime Minister and the Secretary for War early in November.

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There remains the question of the after-effects of the war. Anything that may be said on this subject must

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necessarily be highly speculative; for there are so many uncertain factors-the chief being the duration of the If peace is delayed until 1916, the after effects will clearly be very different from the results if the war ends in the coming spring. But, while it is impossible to make a positive forecast, it is worth while to suggest a few cautions against hasty generalisations.

In the first place we cannot argue directly from previous experience, for, though the wars of the 19th century had certain points in common with the present one, international relations are so much more complex to-day and the area of hostilities is so much more vast that comparisons are likely to be misleading. During the Napoleonic War many industries in this country were stimulated by the opportunity of providing goods for distant markets, which were cut off from the Continent by our command of the sea. Contemporary writers, in fact, frequently speak of our 'monopoly' of extra-European trade. On the other hand, intercourse with the Continent was restricted. In the period leading up to the peace of 1814, when it was clear that Napoleon would soon be beaten by the allied armies, considerable speculative production was entered upon by British manufacturers in the confident expectation that, as soon as peace was declared, there would be a big boom in demand both on the Continent, which had only been able to get our goods under difficulties during the war, and in Asia and America, which it was assumed would flourish in consequence of the general peace. To some extent these expectations were realised, and considerable quantities of goods and particularly of clothing materials, etc., were sold on the Continent. But our manufacturers had overshot the mark; and in a few months the markets were glutted, prices fell, and the restriction of production coinciding with demobilisation (together with other contemporary influences, such as replacement of hand-work by machine-made goods) caused severe unemployment. Continental countries also added to the difficulties of our manufacturers by putting on tariffs to protect the industries which had come into being under the stimulus of Napoleon's Continental System. The boom, in fact, only lasted a few months, and was followed by ten years of depression.