nefs of an action, but all other motives that may be added to it, viz. the hopes and fears of this world, and the hopes and fears of the world to come, are not fufficient, in fact, to reftrain fome men from unreasonable actions.

And, as there is a reafon or rule of action refulting from the natural and effential differences in things; fo this rule is, in common language, called the law of nature. It is alfo called the law of God, as it is that rule by which God governs his behaviour towards his creatures. And it is God's law as he adopts it and makes it his, by giving it as a rule of action to his fubjects, (he being the great governor of the moral world,) all God's laws being founded upon it, and conformed to it. But it is not God's law as founded folely on his will and commandment, because it is, and ought to be a rule of action to all intelligent beings, whether God willed or commanded it, or not. And, this law of nature is in order of nature above and before all other laws, it being the ground and foundation of them; all law and government whether human or divine being originally founded, not in a superiority of power, but in the reafon of things as aforefaid. And, as government itself is founded in the reafon of things; fo all authority, and all laws flowing from it ought to be directed and governed by this original and primary law of nature. It being a manifeft abfurdity

E 2

See my Tract intitled, A Difcourfe concerning Reafon

with regard to Religion and Divine Revelation.

abfurdity to fuppofe that any law-giver can in reafon have a right to command what is not fit nor reasonable to be commanded, and which has not a laudable reafon for it's performance, that of it's being commanded not being fuch. And this is manifeftly the cafe, with refpect to all laws, and all law-givers, whether human or divine. It being equally as unreasonable and unfit that God fhould make an unreasonable law, as that any other lawgiver should act thus; feeing the reason of things is, and ought to be as much a rule of action to him, as to any other intelligent being. God indeed is our creator, and as he called us into being without our confent; fo hereby he became our common parent, and the natural guardian of our happiness, and hereby he has a right to govern us, not by making what law he pleafes, but only to rule us for our good, it being very unequal and unreasonable that he fhould exercife any other authority over us; feeing his calling us into being, or his being poffeffed with fuch power as we are not able to refift, does not alter the nature of things, by making that fit and reafonable which otherwife would not be fo. And,

As this rule of action is founded in the reafon of things;fo our obligation to obedience is founded on the fame principle. That is, we are in reafon obliged to yeild obedience to this law fuppofing no promulged law had ever been given to mankind. Thus, the grateful

acknow

acknowledgment of a favour received, and a grateful return for it, to proper perfons, and under proper circumftances, (when, and where fuch returns can be made,) are duties which every intelligent being is in reason obliged to perform, when confidered abftractedly from, and antecedent to, any promulged law of any kind. For whatever in reafon becomes a law to intelligent beings, thofe beings, will for the Jame reafon be obliged to yeild obedience to that law. And where there is no reason for a command, there can be no reafon for our complying with it, except it be that prudential one of avoiding the evil, which otherwife our difobedience may bring upon us. And this is the cafe of all laws, whether human or divine. That is, our obligation to obedience in any cafe, does not arife from the thing's being commanded, but from it's being fit and reafonable, upon fome account or other, when all things are taken into the cafe, (and when confidered abstractedly from the will of the law-giver,) that we should yeild obedience to that law. For, as the reafon of things is the ground and foundation of all authority and government; fo it must likewise, in the nature of the thing, be the ground and foundation of all obligations to obedience. And,

As there is such a rule of action founded in the nature of things as aforefaid; fo the moral perfections of all intelligent beings arise from, and confift in, their being perfectly subjected

to

to this law. Thus, the moral perfection of the Deity confifts in his being abfolutely and perfectly fubjected to this law of reafon; that is, in his making the reason of things the rule and measure of his affections and actions, in all his dealings with his creatures. And, herein confifts the moral perfection of the human nature, (when fuch perfection is attained,) viz. in being perfectly fubjected both in affections and actions, to this law of reafon; and every approach to it is an approach to the perfection of our nature. And, if our species were univerfally and perfectly fubjected to this law, then there would be no use nor place for any promulged law of any kind; because the use and end of all promulged law and government, whether human or divine, is, (or at least ought to be,) to enforce and lead men on to obedience to this original and primary law of nature again.

* Thirdly, as there is a natural and an effential difference in things, and as there is a rule of action refulting from that difference which is equally obliging to every moral agent; fo Almighty God makes that rule, viz. the reafon of things, the measure of his actions; and this he does in all inftances and cafes in which it is capable of being a rule to him.

And, that this is a true principle, and a proper foundation for argument I prove thus. Almighty God is prefent to, and in, and with, all

*See my Difcourfe intitled, The Sufficiency of Reafon in Matters of Religion farther confidered.

all things, and thereby has the most perfect knowledge of them. And, as he most clearly difcerns the natural and effential difference in things, and the reafon or rule of action refulting from it in every cafe, and, as this is and ought to be as much a rule of action to God as to any other moral agent, and, as he is far above and thereby perfectly free from all temptations which might mislead him and draw him into a wrong choice, fo this affords a moral certainty that he will always chufe to act right, or agreeably to that rule of action, which is founded in the reafon of things as aforefaid. For, tho' we may have different, and fometimes opposite interests in view, and are furrounded with many temptations of various kinds to invite us to a wrong choice, and which too often is the ground and reason of our foolishly and wickedly acting contrary to that rule of action, which is founded in the reafon of things; yet this is by no means the cafe with refpect to God; and therefore, it cannot be a ground or reafon to him to chufe to act wrong in any cafe whatsoever. God has not different and oppofite interests in view, he has no wrong affections within to mislead, no temptations from without to intice and allure him, no pleafing profpect to invite, nor any fuperior power to threaten and awe him; in fine, nature does not afford a motive to excite him to a wrong choice, and therefore, we are fure that he never will act fo; but on the contrary he always will make the

reafon