doing right is better or preferable to doing wrong, as we perceive that right is not the fame thing as wrong; that to do right is commendable and worthy of a rational being, and therefore, ought in reafon to determine his choice in it's favour; and to do wrong is dif reputable and unworthy of a rational being, and therefore, his choice ought always in reafon to be determined against it; and the like. And,

Tho' our reasoning faculty is abfolutely neceffary for the difcovering the natural and effential difference in things, or to enable us to perceive it; yet this faculty does not make or conftitute that difference. Things and actions are really diftinct from, and one preferable to another, when confidered abstractedly from, and independent of any power in us; and our difcerning faculty does only enable us to perceive, but does not conftitute that difference. So that the difference in things does not refult from, nor depend upon, any particular conftitution of the mind, but is founded in nature, and therefore will appear the fame to all minds, in which a capacity of difcernment refides, tho' differently conftituted. Two and four are really distinct and different in nature, and this difference muft and will appear the fame to every mind in which a capacity of difcernment refides, tho' differently conftituted. Thus again, pleafure is in nature better and preferable to pain, and this difference muft and will appear the fame to every mind, (however

(however conftituted) which is capable of perceiving what pleasure and pain is. The cafe is the fame with refpect to right and wrong, kind and unkind, and the like; these are not only different from, but also one preferable to another in nature; and our faculties do not conftitute that difference, but only enable us to perceive it. And, as there is not an univerfal fameness in nature, but a real difference with refpect to things and actions themselves; and, as there is not an univerfal indifference in nature, but a real difference with respect to the valuableness or preferableness of one thing or action to another, when they are brought into a comparison: fo that difference, in all Simple (tho' it be otherwife in complex) cafes is the object of fimple perception only, and as fuch thofe prove themselves; that is, they appear evident to our preceptive faculty, and do not admit of any other kind of proof. If it fhould be asked, how can it be proved that two and two are equal to four? that the whole is equal to all it's parts? that acting right is different from, and preferable to acting wrong? and the like; the answer would be, that these are felf-evident propofitions, that is, they appear evident to our difcerning faculties, and as fuch they prove themselves, and do not admit of any other kind of proof. Again,

Secondly, as there is a natural and an effential difference in things; fo that difference exhibits, if I may so speak, a reafon or rule of action to every moral agent.

That is, as

doing right is in nature better, and therefore, preferable to doing wrong; fo this difference will always be a reafon, (refulting from the nature of things) to every moral agent, why he fhould chufe to do right, and will be a reafon against, or why he should not chufe to do wrong. Again, as pleasure is in nature preferable to pain, the one being a natural good, the other a natural evil; fo that difference af fords a reafon to every moral agent, to chufe to taste pleasure himself, and to chufe to communicate pleasure to others; and it likewife affords a reafon why he fhould chufe to avoid pain himself, and chufe to avoid communicating pain to others, when these are confidered abftractedly from all other confiderations. And, as there is a reason founded in nature for acting right, and a reafon against acting wrong, a reason for communicating pleasure, and a reafon against communicating pain; so to act agreeably to reason, in doing the former is what conftitutes moral good, and to act against the reafon of the thing in doing the latter, is what conftitutes moral evil; moral good and evil, in every inftance being nothing else but the acting agreeably with, or contrary to that reafon or rule of action which is founded in, and refults from the natural and effential difference in things; and all moral obligations are nothing elfe but the reafon refulting from that difference why we fhould chufe to act this way, or that way, rather than their contraries. And, as those reasons for acting one way rather than

another

another are founded in nature, that is, they refult from the natural and effential difference in things; fo they become a rule of action, which is equally obliging, to all intelligent beings capable of difcerning that difference. And confequently, (in this fenfe of the word oblige,) God, as he is a moral agent, is in reafon obliged to govern his actions by this rule. And,

of

As there is a reafon or rule of action which is equally obliging to every moral agent; fo from hence it will follow that the reasonableness of an action ought to determine the will every rational being, to the performance of that action, even tho' there be no other motive to it, and tho' there be a thousand temptations to excite to the contrary. For, whilft, (when all things are taken into the cafe,) it is reafonable that an action fhould be performed, it is impoffible that any, even the strongest temptations, (how many fo ever they be,) fhould make it reasonable to omit that action; because if that were the cafe, then, under these circumstances, it would not be a reasonable, or at least an indifferent, but an unreasonable action, and as fuch it does not come into the prefent question, except we can fuppofe an action to be both reafonable and unreafonable or indifferent at the fame time, and under the fame circumstances, which is a manifeft contradiction. So that to fuppofe fome other motives fhould take place, befides the reafonableness of an action, which may be more

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than

than a ballance to the many, and strong temptations, with which a reasonable creature may be furrounded, in order to engage his will for the choice of that action, and without which motives, the bare reasonableness of an action would not be more than a ballance to those temptations, is exceedingly wrong; because the reasonableness of an action is in itself, when confidered abftractedly from all other motives, more than a ballance to all temptations, for otherwife it would not be a reafonable action. And it is a man's not following his reafon in oppofition to all temptations which renders him justly condemnable to himself, and to every other reasonable being, and confequently, to his Maker as fuch. And, here I beg leave to obferve to my reader, that the prefent question is, what ought in reafon to determine the will of a being endowed with a reasoning faculty to the performance of a reasonable action, and not what is in fact sufficient for that purpose. And here, I fay, that the reasonableness of an action ought in reason to determine the will of every fuch being for the choice of that action, but then it depends upon the pleasure of each individual whether it fhall, in fact, be fufficient for this purpose, or not. And, this is the cafe of all other motives which may be fuperadded, it depends upon the pleasure of each individual whether, in fact, thofe motives fhall be to him the ground or reason of action, or not. And therefore, we fee, not only the unreasonable

nefs