of that power, by the grounds and reafons, and by the ends and purposes upon which legiflature itself is founded, viz. the publick good of those who are fubjected to their jurifdiction. So that law, ftrictly speaking, or that law which is in reafon obliging, is nothing more than that rule of action exemplified, which is founded in the reafon of things; and duty is not the effect or refult, but it is the foundation of law. That is, an action does not become our duty, because it is commanded, but it is commanded, because ir was our duty antecedent to the command. And confequently, a thing or action does not become fit or unfit, by its being commanded or forbidden, but it is commanded or forbidden, because it was fit or unfit, when confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to the promulgation of that law. This, I fay, is, or at leaft ought always to be the cafe. It is true, the word law in its common acceptation fignifies the will of a fuperior: but then, this fuppofes that the will of the fuperior or lawgiver, is not lawlefs will, (if I may fo fpeak) or a will which is exerted without rule or reafon, but a will which is directed by reafon, a will which commands nothing to be done, but what was fit fhould be done antecedent to the command, and which prohibits nothing, but what was fit should be avoided, antecedent to the prohibition: Ifay, this is fuppofed to be the will of the fuperiour

or

or lawgiver, for otherways legislature would be an unnatural, and a monftrous thing. And,

When legislative power is rightly employed, in making laws to anfwer the true ends of government; then, it is in itself right; and then, it conftitutes a legal or just authority. But, when it is employed to answer other and contrary purposes, then, it is in itself wrong, and then, it degenerates into tyranny. When legislative power is employed in marking bad laws, or laws which ferve a bad purpofe; this is manifeftly wrong, and therefore it cannot be deemed juft authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny. Or when it is employed idlely and triflingly, by commanding or forbidding actions which are perfectly indifferent, and which ferve only to exemplify the commanding power of the lawgiver, and to extort fubmiffion from the fubject; this is plainly a proftitution of legislative power, this is what the ends of law and government will not excufe or juftify, and therefore this cannot juftly be deemed legal authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny, tho' in a much lower, and in a much lefs hurtful degree than in the former cafe. The cafe is the fame, whether legislative power be confidered as lodged in a human, or in the divine hand; it be being equally as unfit that God fhould act wrong in his legiflative capacity, as it is that any of his creatures fhould do fo. There is indeed this difference; if

God fhould misapply his legislative power, he is above controul, or correction; whereas, if men abuse their truft, they are liable to be controuled in, and to be punished for that abufe.

To apply this to the cafe of Ifaac, with refpect to his being killed and offered in facrifice by his father ; I obferve, that if it was fit to take away Ifaac's life, that fitness did not arife from, nor was it founded upon the divine command, but upon fuch other circumftances as attended the cafe, when confidered abftractedly from, and antecedent to any divine determination concerning it; and confequently, it would have been equally fit, whether God had interpofed and commanded it or not. Again, if the action was unfit, antecedent to the divine command; then, it was equally unfit after it; because the divine command could not poffibly make teration in the cafe.

any

al

If it fhould be faid, it is not to be fuppofed that God would command an unfit action, which in the prefent cafe the commanding to take away Ifaac's life is fuppofed to be for if the action was unfit, then the command was equally unfit which required the performance of it; and to admit that God may give an unfit command, is to offer an injury to his moral character, and therefore it is not to be fuppofed:

I answer, That in fome cafes the fitness or unfitnefs of commands, as well as actions arifes from the different circumstances which thofe commands ftand related to: fo that it may in fome cafes be fit to command an unfit action. This is exemplified in the cafe of Solomon, when the two harlots came before him, and he was to determine to which of them the dead child did belong, and which the living. When Solomon had heard the cafe, he commanded that the living child fhould be divided, and that one half fhould be given to one harlor, and the other half to the other. Now, the action of dividing, and thereby killing the living child, was (I think) unfit; because there was no circumftance attended the cafe, which rendered it fit that the child fhould die. And, tho' the action was unfit; yet the command was fit which required it. And the reason of this is evident, viz. becaufe the command was not given in order to execution, and with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, but only to try the affections of thofe women, thereby to enable Solomon to give a true judgment in the cafe; and under thefe circumstances it was a fit command. If Solomon had given the command in order to execution, and with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, then, and under these circumstances, the command, as well as the action would have been unfit. But this was was not the cafe, and therefore when Solomon had made tryal as aforefaid,

he

and gave

the

he then recalled the command, and living child to her, to whom it properly belonged. And, here it is to be remembered, that the ground or reafon of Solomon's recalling the command, was not any change of circumftances with refpect to the child, but it was because the end of the command was anfwered, in trying the affections of the two harlots as aforefaid.

The cafe of Ifaac, is exactly parallel to the cafe I have now mention'd. To have taken away Ifaac's life would have been an unfit action, becaufe not any circumstances attended the cafe which rendered it fit that he fhould die; and yet, the command which required it, was a fit command. And the reafon of this is as evident, as in the former cafe, viz. because the command was not given in order to execution, and with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, but only to try the understanding, the faith, and the obedience of Abraham, and under thefe circumftances it was a fit command. And, that the command was given with this view, and to answer this purpose, viz. to try. Abraham, is evident, not only from its being recalled, but alfo from the teftimony of the biftorian. Thus, Genefis xxii. 1, 2. And it came to pas after thefe things, that God did tempt (or try) Abraham, and faid unto him, Abraham; and be faid, behold here I am. And he faid, take now thy fon, thine only fon Ifaac whom thou loveft, and get thee into the land of Moriah,

and