that is, to take a view of that amiable character which fhewed it felf in the mind and life of Chrift. And when men thus behold the beauty and amiableness of a virtuous character in the perfon of another, they are by it naturally invited to chufe to deferve fuch a character themselves; and confèquently to form their minds and lives according to the pattern of that great example. And thus the forementioned chriftian inftitution is made fubfervient, as a means toward the attaining the most valuable end.

If it should be faid, that tho' all pofitive duties of divine appointment are means to fome end; yet that end may be concealed from us, tho' it is well known to God; and therefore it is our duty to practise them, tho' we should not be able to difcern what that end is: and this might poffibly be the cafe with respect to God's forbidding Adam and Eve to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil:

I antwer; as all pofitive duties have not a phyfical, but a moral influence upon those who practice them, therefore it is highly neceffary that the end to which they are directed fhould be known, because otherwise, that end is not likely to be obtained; and confequently it is highly fit and reasonable,, that the end, which every pofitive duty is intended to obtain, fhould be directly expreffed, or else plainly pointed out, in and

by

by the inftitution; and this is manifeftly the cafe of the chriftian inftitutions. The

being required to eat bread, and drink wine, and to remember Chrift in the performance of thofe actions, plainly points out to us the end to which those actions, as means, are intended to lead us, viz. to an imitation in mind and life of that holy person whom we are hereby required to remember. As to our first parents being prohibited to cat the forementioned fruit, if the' eating it had such a physical effect upon their conftitutions, as to be a real injury to them, which feems most likely to be the cafe, (fuppofing it to be a real history) then the prohibition is not a pofitive, but a moral law, as it forbid our firft parents to do injury to themselves: and if fo, then this law is impertinently urged in the prefent cafe. Tho' it looks much more probable from the story it felf, to be a parable rather than a history; in which, like other ancient fables, beafts are represented as fpeaking and reafoning like men. The design of which parable seems to be a representation to us, how cafily our first parents, even when in a state of innocency, were betrayed into fin. And,

As it is thofe pofitive duties which are required of us, as a means to fome wife and good end, which come into the prefent queftion, and not those that are the produce of mere fovereignty, because it is the former only which can be of divine inftitution; fo

thofe

those duties which conftitute a means, are plainly distinct and different from that end, which they, as a means, are proposed to lead to, and therefore they are not to be blended together. The excellency and valuableness of a means, is only what arifes from it, and belongs to it, as a means; and the fame may be said of the end; and we are not to transfer these from one to the other in our eftimation of them, or in our reafoning about them. Thus, to eat bread, and drink wine, and to remember Christ in the performance of thofe actions, is made a duty by the chriftian inftitution. And as thofe actions were intended by the kind inftitutor, to be a means toward the attaining fome farther end, viz. to lead us to an imitation of that holy perfon, both in mind and life, whom we are hereby required to remember; and thereby to conform our affections and actions to that rule of action, founded in the reafon of things, which the mind and life of Chrift were the moft perfect pattern of; fo the means, and the end, are plainly distinct and different from each other. And tho', in the use of the former, we may be led, that is, invited to the practice of the latter, and the practice of the latter may follow upon it; yet ftill they are two different things; one is not the other, and therefore are not fo to be confidered, neither is the excellency or usefulness of the one, to be transferred to the other.

Having fhewn what I understand by moral, and what by pofitive duties, and what are the true grounds of our obligation to obedience in either cafe, I now proceed to confider in what refpects thefe may be compared, that thereby we may form a judgment to which of thefe the preference is due, upon that comparison. And these duties, I think, admit of a threefold comparison. First, as they are more or less valuable in themselves. Secondly, as we become more or less valuable in the performance of them. And, thirdly, as the performing of these render us more or lefs pleafing and acceptable to God. And,

Firft, Moral and pofitive duties admit of a comparison, with refpect to the intrinfick worth and value of the duties themfelves. And, I think, in this view of the cafe, the preference is due and ought to be given to moral duties; becaufe, with refpect to thele, there is a real intrinfick worth and goodneis in the duties themselves: whereas, with respect to pofitive duties, thefe are good and valuable only relatively, as means to an end, and as they are fubfervient to that end; their worth and goodness arifing only from their relation, as aforefaid; fo that if those duties are not performed, as means to an end, or if they do not become fubfervient to that end, then they have not that relative goodnefs in them, and confequently have no goodness in them at all. From which, I

think, it is moft manifeft, that moral duties are vaftly preferable to pofitive duties, with relpect to the intrinfick worth and valuablenels of either. Again,

Secondly, Moral and pofitive duties admit of a comparison, with refpect to our becoming more or less valuable in the practice of them. And here again, I think, the preference is due, and ought to be given to moral duties; becaufe, in the practice of these, we become really valuable and praiseworthy, confidered abftractedly from all other confiderations; whereas, with respect to pofitive duties, thefe do not render us valuable, any otherwife than as they are a means to lead us to the practice of moral duties, as their end. And then our valuablenefs, ftrictly speaking, arifes from the practice of moral duties, and not from the way and means by which we are led on, or invited to the practice of them. Barely to eat bread, and drink wine, and to remember Chrift in the performance of thofe actions, and to do this in obedience to a divine command, does not render a man more valuable than he was, antecedent to his performance of thofe actions; becaufe, in truth, he is not made a better man thereby. But if, in the use of thefe, he is led on to an imitation of the mind and life of Chrift, and confequently to a conformity of his affections and actions to the law of reafon, then he becomes more valuable, because, in reality, he is become

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