by no means follows from this, that our Lord by his sufferings did not satisfy the divine justice he might do this; though he did not, and indeed could not, in any way, satisfy justice in your sense of the word. But, it seems, by justice, in this case, we are not to understand justice as it is an attribute in God, &c. But why, sir, (if I may be allowed to ask the question) must it not be taken in this sense? since it is the sense, in which, if I mistake not, it is at least usually taken by judicious writers on the subject, and can, with no appearance of propriety, be taken in yours. However, as you mean by the word justice something so different from what is, in this case, commonly intended by it; and have endeavoured to shew the absurdity of supposing, that our Lord satisfied it, as so understood; I might be very well excused from considering farther what you have

thing he has said, to the making such a remark as the above but if the text and note referred to be compared together and examined, with any thing of care, I appre hend, it will appear, that there is a foundation for it, and that I could not well avoid making it which, I hope, will be sufficient to screen me from the imputation of saying (which I would not willingly do) what no doubt might otherwise give offence.

offered in this paragraph to that purpose: since it may be still true, that our Lord satisfied the divine justice; though we allow, that he did not, and indeed could not, satisfy justice as explained by you.

ways

However, I judge it not amiss to take some farther notice of what you have said in the paragraph before us. 'Law then, you observe) in its own nature, must alcondemn the criminal.' Very true, provided you mean no more than that he is, as such, declared guilty by the law, and liable to the penalty denounced against his crime : and justice, acting according to 'law, must always precisely inflict the 'penalty.' If by justice here you mean, according to your own definition of it, the acting according to, or the execution of, the law; then the middle clause (acting according to law) must be needless and as to the latter clause; I should think, you would have spoken more consistently with that definition, if you had said; Not that justice must always precisely inflict the penalty, but that it is the very inflicting it upon the criminal: which however would have been saying, just nothing. But if you take justice in any other sense;

as

signifying a particular attribute in the Lawgiver, or his regard to the honour of his law, &c. then, I imagine, this at least will scarcely be found to be true,* that justice, so understood, must always precisely inflict the penalty : as may be gathered from your own words which follow. "But the 'pardoning grace of the Lawgiver is not 'obstructed by any demands of law and 'justice.' Though the word justice here is not, I think, used precisely according to your definition of it; yet I pass that over; as your meaning seems only to be, that the Lawgiver may, if he sees fit, in the case of a transgression, pardon the transgressor; which is undoubtedly true: For ' he can set them aside; and (as you go 'on) whenever he grants a pardon, he must 'necessarily set law and justice aside, or

take the affair out of their hands, and deter'mine it by his own prerogative and wisdom. 'Not law and justice, but wisdom and goodness are the rules, and the only rules, of par

* In whatever sense we understand the word, nothing can be more evident, than that Justice, acting (precisely) according to law, must always precisely inflict 'the penalty.' But what this proves, in regard to the doctrine it is levelled against, it is not easy to see.

inflicts the

doning mercy.' That whenever a lawgiver grants a pardon, he must necessarily set law and justice aside, at least justice, in your sense of the word, is very certain; unless he can grant a pardon to an offender, at the same time that he denounced penalty upon him. But if you mean by what you here say, or intend to infer from it, that whenever he grants a pardon, he must necessarily set law and justice aside, or pay no regard to them, in any other sense of the word justice; it is an inference, which cannot be justly drawn from it because a lawgiver, at the same time that he pardons an offender or offenders, may do something, or appoint something to be done, to shew his regard to the honour of his law and demands of his justice, considered as a righteous governor. I grant indeed, that so far as he grants a pardon to any, he does not act according to the rigorous demands of his law and justice; but, if you please, according to the milder intimations of his mercy and goodness But it by no means follows from thence, that when he grants a pardon upon such a consideration, as is both intended and calculated to demonstrate the

high regard he has to the sanctity of his law, and to the reverence due to his justice, or to him as a just and righteous lawgiver; that, I say, he must then also necessarily set his law and justice aside. It is plain, that in such a case, though he yields to the dictates of his mercy and goodness, he still has his law and justice before him; securing, and by no means neglecting, the reverence due to these, at the same time that, for wise reasons, he gives way, as it were, to the prevailing persuasions of those.

By what he determines the affair, when at any time he grants a pardon, or mitigates the sentence of the law, is an inquiry here, I apprehend, of no great importance. He determines it, if you please, by his own prerogative and wisdom though, it may be, we should speak as properly, if we were to say, that if he is a wise and good lawgiver, he will, when he grants a pardon, grant it in such instances, and in such a manner, as will be most likely to promote the greatest good of the community over which he presides. For, perhaps, it is this, which under such a lawgiver will be, and should be, the rule or measure of pardoning mercy. His goodness indeed will