not indeed profess to be making any quotation, but yet his language seems to me to imply that he is appealing to a doctrine already familiar, and not originating a new theory, especially as the distinction occurs so often in his works. The following are the passages in question, with their contents briefly summarized :— (1) Conv. I. vii. ll. 54 seqq. Particular Nature obeys Universal Nature when she gives man thirty-two teeth, or five fingers on each hand. (The application made of this is very difficult to explain, the passage following being apparently corrupt.) (2) In Conv. III. iv. ll. 98 seqq., Universal Nature is identified with God, as the author of the limits of the human intellect or intelligence. (3) In Conv. IV. ix. Il. 15-33, the operations of Universal Nature are said to be co-extensive with the Universe, but the Universe, i. e. Heaven and Earth, is declared (on the authority of Aristotle) to be, however vast, not infinite or without limit. Thus Universal Nature, and by consequence Particular Nature, has limits, and those limits are imposed by Him who is Himself without limit, viz. God. Thus in this passage a distinction is drawn between Universal Nature and God. (4) Once more, in Conv. IV. xxvi. ll. 18-20, Universal Nature is said to order Particular Nature to its perfection. This statement resembles the passage which was first quoted. Lastly, it is interesting to find the distinction occurring three times in the disputed Quaestio de Aqua et Terra, §§ 18 bis and 20. This appears to me to be one of several similar indications in the way of favourable internal evidence, which have not received sufficient attention from those who have peremptorily rejected this treatise. (5) In the first passage, § 18, ll. 20 seqq., it is declared that Universal Nature can never fail to attain its end, but that Particular Nature may do so, owing to the stubbornness (inobedientiam) of the subject-matter on which it has to work. (6) In the next passage, 1. 55 of the same section, all nature is said to be obedient to the purpose of Universal Nature, and so the sometimes adverse tendencies of what is described as the simplex natura' of an object may be overcome. Thus the 'simplex natura' of earth is to fall downwards, but 'necesse est ... inesse aliam naturam' per quam obediret intentioni universalis naturae;' and this is explained to mean that it is able to rise, or to elevate itself, in response to the attraction of the heavens. Even so in man the appetitive part, which tends to follow the promptings of sense, can be diverted 'a proprio impetu 2' so as to obey Reason. (7) The passage in the next section merely recalls and repeats the sentiment of that last explained. As far as I can make out, the distinction insisted on in all these passages was probably suggested to Dante by Albertus Magnus. That at any rate is in itself a not unlikely source, and I have not so far been able to find any other. In his Physica, Lib. II. Tract i. Chapter V is headed 'digressio declarans quod est esse secundum cursum naturae universalis, et secundum cursum naturae particularis.' First, several senses of the term Universal Nature are distinguished, and then occur such passages as the following, which may be compared with those above noticed in Dante. Dicitur natura universalis quae universaliter continet et regit omnem naturam particularem3. Again the following passage resembles the second of those from the Quaestio, . . . aliquid est cuius principium movendo We are reminded here of the Aristotelian expression ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι. Nic. Eth. I. xiii. 15 (11o2 b. 13). This recalls the language, though the application is different, of Par. i, II. 130-135. Ed. Lugduni, 1651. Vol. ii. p. 61 a, ll. 11. Compare p. 61 b, ll. 11, 12. non est particularis natura, sed est extra cursum suum naturalem: cuius tamen principium et causa est natura universalis et secundum suum cursum naturalem.' (P. 61 b. ll. 22 seqq.) Then follows a very curious illustration of the difference between Universal and Particular Nature, and of a product which is according to the 'natural course' of Universal, but not of Particular Nature. The production of woman was never the purpose of Particular Nature, 'sed causatur ex corruptione alicuius principiorum naturalium, eo quod natura intendit opus perfectum, quod est mas; and in support of this Aristotle is referred to 1... 'tamen foemina non est extra cursum universalis naturae, quae ordinis est causa in inferioribus, . . . quoniam nisi esset necessaria generationi, nunquam natura duceret foeminam.' Again, another illustration is drawn from Death, which is 'praeter cursum particularis naturae,' but is brought about by Universal Nature, which imposes a limit to the duration of the existence of corruptible things. The general idea of the existence of such a distinction, rather than the particular details of it, seem to be reproduced by Dante. It may be noticed that Albertus refutes a doctrine on this subject attributed to Plato and Hermes Trismegistus because (among other grounds) it involves a relation between Universal and Particular Nature, which would be inconsistent with the views of Aristotle. This at any rate seems to imply that the doctrine was thought to be an Aristotelian one. PLATO. DANTE'S knowledge of the actual works of Plato was doubtless limited (as was that of other writers nearly, if not quite, up to his time) to the Timaeus, though from passages in Aristotle, Cicero, and perhaps St. Augustine, he was aware of some of his doctrines beyond the limits of that work. The Timaeus of Plato was translated into Latin and commented on by Chalcidius (probably end of fifth century, al. end of the fourth), many centuries before a similar service was undertaken for Aristotle 2, or indeed for any other works of Plato. Consequently for many centuries, and until the end of the twelfth century at least, if not later, all knowledge of Plato seems to have been limited to this one treatise, and derived entirely from the work of Chalcidius. This applies (auct. 1 Apparently De Gen. Anim. II. iii. (737, a. 28 in the passage intended· τὸ θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον. * Except a fragment of the Organon attributed to Boethius (c. 500). See Rashdall's Universities of Europe, &c., i. p. 37. Also the Phaedo and Meno appear to have been translated (c. 1160), but were not generally known (ib.). Hauréau) even to such a writer as Dun Scotus, who though he could read Greek, does not appear to have had any further knowledge of Plato than his contemporaries who had not that advantage. In the twelfth century the work of Chalcidius was widely known, and a commentary was written upon it1. Ozanam suggests that Dante may have had access to a commentary on the Timaeus written by St. Thomas Aquinas, but now unhappily lost 2. It will be convenient to group the references to Plato according to the subjects treated of. (1) The relation of the soul to the stars. There are three places in which Dante refers to Plato's theories on this subject, viz. :— (1) Par. iv. 22. Ancor di dubitar ti dà cagione, Parer tornarsi l' anime alle stelle, Then 11. 49-60 explain more at length, 'quel che Timeo dell' anime argomenta.' (2) Conv. IV. xxi. 1. 17. Plato e altri vollero che esse (sc. nostre anime) procedessero dalle stelle, e fossero nobili e più e meno, secondo la nobiltà della stella. (3) Conv. II. xiv. 11. 28 seqq. Quanto alla prima perfezione, cioè della generazione sustanziale, tutti li filosofi concordano che i cieli sono cagione; avvegnachè diversamente questo pongano: quali dalli motori, siccome Plato, Avicenna e Algazel; quali da esse stelle (spezialmente l' anime umane), siccome Socrate, e anche Plato, e Dionisio Accademico.' These references are all obviously derived from Timaeus, 41 D and E and 42 B. The passages appear as follows in Chalcidius delegit animas stellarum numero pares, singulasque singulis comparavit, easdemque vehiculis competentibus superimpositas universae rei naturam spectare iussit, legesque These statements are made on the authority of Wrobel, the latest editor of this work of Chalcidius, Leipzig, 1876. Dante et la Philosophie Catholique, p. 197. immutabilis decreti docuit ostendens, quod prima quidem generatio uniformis in omnibus eiusdemque ordinis esset futura, ne cui competens iustum aliqua ex parte a se minueretur. Oportebat porro satas eas certis legitimisque temporum vicibus piae nationis animalium 1, quaeque praeter ceteras animantes deum suspiciant, afferre frugem ...' [Then, after a brief description of the conflict with violent passions, &c., he continues,] Et victricibus quidem ad comparis stellae contubernium sedemque reditum patere, acturis deinceps vitam veram et beatam. Victas porro mutare sexum,' &c. This translation is extremely free and paraphrastic in places. The important word competentibus, near the beginning, has nothing to represent it in the original. Again, ' Oportebat porro satas esse certis legitimisque temporum vicibus,' is meant as a translation of δέοι δὲ σπαρείσας αὐτὰς εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις ἕκαστα ὄργανα χρόνου φῦναι ζῴων τὸ θεοσεβέστατον (where ŏpyava Xpóvov means the 'planets'); and what follows next seems to wander away from the text altogether. There appears to be a difference, intended by Plato, between the partition (voμń) among the fixed stars of 'soulsubstance' (if we may use such a phrase), when prepared and compounded in the manner that has just been described by him, and the subsequent sowing (ópоs) of individual human souls in the several planets (õpyava Xpóvov)2, according to their suitability for each (εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάσταις ἕκαστα). We need not enter into the many difficulties that might be raised here, since we are not concerned with the interpretation of Plato, except in so far as it bears upon Dante's references to him. It may be observed, however, that in Conv. IV. xxi. 1. 17, Dante gives considerable prominence to the correspondence of dignity between the souls and the stars from which they severally proceed. (See the quotation given above.) Now, (1) except that Chalcidius inserts, as I have noted, ' competentibus,' there is even less in his translation than in 1 Chalcidius in his Commentary says that 'piae nationis animal' hominem significat (§ cxci.). * See Mr. Archer-Hind's note on 41 D. the original to justify this definite statement of Dante as to the correspondence between the souls and stars. (2) It does not appear in Plato how the fitness implied in роσýкovтA comes about; and, what is more important, he seems to speak of the suitability of the star to some quality of the soul already developed, whereas, in Dante's representation, it is rather vice versa, the character of the soul is derived from that of the star. This passage of Plato is referred to by St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xiii. c. 19 med., but in the statement that it is the peculiar privilege of the wise and good, ' ut aliquanto diutius in astro sibi congruo quisque requiescat,' he represents more accurately than Dante the doctrine of Plato. The references in Par. iv. 24 and 49 contain nothing but the simple statements that Plato held that souls proceed from the stars, and after death return to them again. This is sufficiently explained by the passage from the Timaeus above quoted. The kindly language in which Dante repudiates the view of Plato as to the return of the soul to the stars is very noticeable, as affording a rare model of a charitable regard for opinions from which one is compelled to differ: E forse sua sentenza è d' altra guisa (Par. iv. 55-57). In Conv. II. xiv. ll. 31 seqq. the same passage of the Timaeus, or some reproduction of it, is evidently in Dante's mind, and here Dante attributes two opinions to Plato : (1) That in common with Avicenna and Algazel he held that the prima perfezione della generazione sustanziale was due to the heavens or more definitely to their prime movers. (2) That the stars themselves were rather the source of this, specially in the case of human souls1. The prima perfezione della generazione sustanziale may be illustrated by Conv. I. xiii. 11. 16 seqq., where man is said to have two perfections, the first, being, the second, being good. 1 Purg. xxx. 109-111 may be thought to combine both of these views. |