the reverse of this. See Prior. Anal. II. ii. init. (53 b. 8-10), ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν [sc. προτάσεων] οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι· ἐκ ψευδῶν δ ̓ ἔστιν ἀληθές, πλὴν οὐ διότι ἀλλ ̓ ὅτι. τοῦ γὰρ διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός. Also again ib. 1. 26, Εκ ψευδῶν δὲ ἀληθές ἐστι συλλογίσασθαι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτά σεων ψευδῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς μιᾶς, κ.τ.λ. But though an error of memory might explain in Dante, as in any writer, an inaccuracy or error in quotation, yet it would not account for Dante giving as an instance of an impossibility a case which any one can see is quite possible, and of common occurrence. I suppose, therefore, some stress must be laid on the word dimostrando, so as to imply something like the limitation made by Aristotle in the words πλὴν οὐ διότι ἀλλ' ὅτι, i. e. the fact might happen to be true, but the reason for it would not be rightly given. The first part of the passage in Aristotle seems to be repeated though not directly quoted by Dante in De Mon. III. ii. 1. 17: Impossibile enim est in necessariis consequentiis falsum esse consequens, antecedente non falso existente.' Conv. II. xiv. 11. 143 seqq. (29) Per che Pittagora, secondochè dice Aristotile nel primo della [Meta] fisica, poneva i principii delle cose naturali lo pari e lo dispari, &c. This reference is to the Metaphysics, A. 5 (986 a. 16-21) Giuliani boldly inserts Metaquite justified in making this evidence, without at any rate but all the MSS. read Fisica. fisica. I do not think we are change in the teeth of MS. indicating (as above) that the change is conjectural. Ordinarily I should not in such a case have interfered with the MS. reading, though erroneous, or have considered such a conjectural correction legitimate at all, because, as I have remarked before, Dante's memory is not infallible. But in this case, (1) his knowledge of these two works of Aristotle was such that he would not be likely to make this mistake; and (2) we can see a reason for a copyist who had no such knowledge making the alterations through a mistaken association of ideas derived from the context, the whole subject of which is scienza naturale' and this would seem prima facie much more appropriate to Physics than to Metaphysics. I will next take a series of passages which show how closely Dante followed Aristotle in his explanation of physical phenomena. Indeed, as we learn from the passage in Conv. III. v. 11. 59 seqq., which has already been quoted (p. 92), Dante would consider it almost presumptuous to differ from him, and, as we might add, something like impertinence even to require proof of his assertions. This, it will be remembered, occurs in reference to the very fundamental fact of Cosmical Physics, that the earth is the centre of the Universe, and that it does not move. But in reference to numerous physical and meteorological phenomena in detail, Dante's language can only be fully understood by a reference to Aristotle, and sometimes in fact it is scarcely even intelligible without it. We cannot, indeed, always be sure that he is quoting direct from Aristotle, since so very much of Aristotle's teaching on these subjects is embodied by later writers, and especially by Albertus Magnus. His work De Meteoris in particular, was familiar to Dante, who borrows from it on occasions both with and without acknowledgement. In any case Aristotle is the ultimate source of Dante's teaching on these subjects, and in many cases certainly the direct source, since he is often explicitly and accurately quoted. (30) Par. i. 139-141. Maraviglia sarebbe . . Come a terra quiete in foco vivo. I have already noticed in Textual Criticism, &c. (p. 440) the interest attaching to this passage, partly from the question of the reading, and partly from the obvious reference (which indeed bears to some extent also on the question of reading) to Aristotle's familiar statement that it is the nature of fire to ascend, as of stones, &c., to descend. This occurs so often in Aristotle, that it will be enough merely to give two refer ences to well-known passages, such as Nic. Eth. II. i. § 2 (1103 a. 20), and Phys. II. i. (192 b. 36). It is curious to note what a very favourite idea this was with Dante. See the list of passages quoted in the Index under Aristotle, Nic. Eth. II. i. 2. Conv. III. c. iii. (31) In this chapter Dante reproduces the teaching, and often almost the language, of Aristotle, as found in several different places. These I will bring together here as affording the explanation of several of Dante's dogmatic statements in this context. Dante first lays it down that the several elements (corpora semplici) have a natural tendency, al loro loco proprio, whence earth gravitates to the centre (comp. Inf. xxxii. 73-4, xxxiv. 111) and fire rises to the sphere of the moon (comp. Par. i. 115). This loco proprio would be illustrated from Aristotle, De Coelo, I. viii. (277 b. 14), τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν σωματικῶν στοιχείων, τρεῖς ἔσονται καὶ οἱ τόποι τῶν στοιχείων; and also from Meteor. II. ii. (355 a. 35), ἄλογον γὰρ εἰ μή τίς ἐστι τόπος ὕδατος ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων. The association of fire with the sphere of the moon occurs in a curious passage of De Gen. Anim. III. xi (761 b. 13-21), where, after connecting plants with the earth, aquatic animals with water, and land animals with air, Aristotle says that we have here no class of creatures associated with fire, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ζητεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης. So, shortly afterwards, when Dante describes plants as prime animate, he seems to be copying Hist. Anim. VIII. i. (588 b. 6), μετὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος τὸ τῶν φυτῶν πρῶτόν ἐστιν. (32) Conv. IV. xxiii. 1. 113. Secondo li quattro combinatori delle contrarie qualitadi che sono nella nostra composizione, &c. Compare Aristotle, De Gen. et Cor. II. ii. (fin.) and iii. (init.) (330 a. 24-b. 7). Though Dante expressly quotes the Meteora (see below) of Albertus Magnus for the application of these statements made = at the end of the paragraph, we can scarcely doubt that here he has in mind the paragraph from Aristotle, De Gen. et Cor., above cited, which is rather too long to quote. In that passage we have four diapopaí, also called oroixéîa, i. e. heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, which Dante's contrarie qualitadi; and the four ovcevels of these σroixela, taken two and two together = the 'quattro combinatori' of this passage (omitting out of the possible six combinations the practically impossible combinations of two contraries), which correspond with the four elements, as we call them (and Aristotle also sometimes calls them στοιχεία). These are here described as ἁπλᾶ σώματα, viz.: fire (dry+hot), air (hot + moist), water (moist +cold), and earth (cold + dry). Then follows in the text of Dante the further application of these results to the four different ages of man which is attributed to Albertus, Meteora, Bk. iv. The passage referred to is really found (as Mr. Paget Toynbee has pointed out) in Albertus, De Juventute et Senectute, Tract i. c. 2 (med.). Dante's memory has played him a little false here, being probably mislead by the fact that Meteor. Bk. iv. contains a good deal about 'humidum,' &c., though not the particular statements here quoted. With this should also be compared Brunetto Latini, Tesoro, ii. c. 31: Come tutte le cose furo fatte del mischiamento delle complessioni. It amounts briefly to this: An was created in the beginning, as a 'grossa materia ... sanza forma e sanza figura.' Out of this An were made four elements, two light (fire and air), and two heavy (earth and water), but all partaking of these two 'qualities' (complessioni) as well as of the other two, viz. moist and dry, in different degrees (i.e. air is light, but some air is lighter and some less light, and so of the others). In c. 32 these 'complessioni' are further discussed, the word 'qualitadi' being sometimes used as an equivalent term. Thus 'complessioni,' or 'qualitadi' (B. Latini) = 'contrarie qualitadi (Dante l. c.)= τέτταρα στοιχεία, also called διαφοραί (Aristotle). Again, elementa (B. Latini)=quattro combinatori delle contrarie qualitadi (Dante)= τέτταρες τῶν στοιχείων συζεύ ξεις, also ἁπλᾶ σώματα, and sometimes also στοιχεία (Aristotle). Brunetto goes on to observe (c. 31 and 32) that in man and other created things the same mixture, in different degrees, both of the ' elementa' and of the 'complessioni' or 'qualitadi' takes place. This statement does not apply to the stars, 'che sono di tutto et in tutto di natura di fuoco.' Dante seems obscurely to imply something like this in the extremely difficult passage in Par. vii. 121 seqq., 139–143, and to infer therefrom the immortality of the human soul (1. 145). See further, Conv. IV. xxi. ll. 36 seqq. (33) Quaestio, § 20, 11. 53 seqq (quoted infra). Compare De Mundo, iii. (392 b. 35-393 a. 4): tévte dǹ πέντε στοιχεῖα ταῦτα ἐν πέντε χώραις σφαιρικῶς ἐγκείμενα, περιεχομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος τῇ μείζονι (λέγῳ δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὕδατι, ὕδατος δὲ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος δὲ ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι) τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συνεστήσατο. This passage seems evidently to have suggested Quaestio, § 20, 1. 52, where having argued that neither earth, water, air, or fire can be the cause of the elevation of different parts of the earth's surface, the author adds-'quum non restet ulterius (so we should probably read for alterius) nisi coelum, reducendus est hic effectus in ipsum, tanquam in causam propriam.' Coelum is evidently used here as equivalent to a¿ðýp, as the fifth element. Indeed Aristotle more than once says that the two terms are interchangeable. See especially the chapter before that quoted above (392 a. 5) οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄστρων οὐσίαν μèv aiðépa kaλoûμev. (See supplementary note infra.) (34) Conv. II. iii. 1. 19 seqq. Aristotile credette, seguitando solamente l'antica grossezza degli astrologi, che fossero pure otto cieli . . . E questa sua sentenza così erronea può vedere chi vuole nel secondo di Cielo e Mondo1. This proved rather a difficult reference to identify. There seems to be no one passage in the De Coelo, Bk. ii, in which 1 The words added in the text, 'che è nel secondo de' Libri naturali,' look like a gloss, since Dante very often refers to the De Coelo without any such addition. But whether or no, they seem to refer to the arrangement of the Aristotelian treatises by Albertus Magnus; see tom. ii. ed. 1651, and also Jourdain, Traductions, &c., p. 32. |