happens in every act of a spiritual faculty which is exercised by alteration of a bodily organ.

Every agent acts for some end. But the end is the good desired and loved by each. Hence it is manifest that every agent, whatever it be, does its every action from some love.

The objection that love is a passion, and that not all things which a man does are done from passion, is valid, touching that love which is a passion existing in the sensitive appetite; but we are speaking now of love in the general sense of the term, including under itself intellectual, rational, animal, and physical love.

Question XXVIII of the "Ethics,» complete.

OF HATRED

OVE is a certain attuning of the appetite to that which is apprehended as suitable, while hatred is a sort of dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as unsuitable and hurtful. But as everything suitable, as such, bears the stamp of good, so everything unsuitable, as such, bears the stamp of evil; and therefore as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.

Being, as being, has nothing in it of variance, but only of concord, because all things agree in being: but being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, is at variance with some other determinate being; and in this way one being is hateful to another, and is evil, not in itself, but in relation to another.

As things are apprehended as good, which are not really good, so things are apprehended as evil which are not really evil; hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.

In every case we should consider what agrees with a thing before we consider what disagrees with it; for to disagree with a thing is to mar or hinder what agrees with it. Hence love must be prior to hatred; and nothing can be hated except what is contrary to some agreeable thing that is loved. And thus all hatred is caused by love.

Love and hatred are contraries when they both turn on the same object; but when they are about contrary objects, they are not contraries, but consequences one of the other: for it is on

one and the same ground that a thing is loved and its contrary hated; and thus the love of one thing is the cause of its contrary being hated.

Is it possible for any one to hate himself?

Properly speaking, it is impossible for any one to hate himself. For naturally everything seeks good, and cannot seek for itself anything except in the light of good. But to love any one is to wish him good. Hence a man needs must love himself, and cannot possibly hate himself, properly speaking. Accidentally, however, it comes about that a man hates himself, and this in two ways: in one way in regard of the good which he wishes for himself, for it happens sometimes that what is sought as being in a certain respect good is simply evil; and in this way one accidentally wishes evil to himself, which is to hate. The same may happen in another way in regard of the being to whom he wishes good, namely, himself. Every being is that especially which is the leading element in its composition: hence the State is said to do what the King does, as though the King were the whole State. It is clear then that man is especially the mind of man. But it happens that some men take themselves to be that especially which they are in their bodily and sensitive nature. Hence they love themselves according to that which they take themselves to be, but hate that which they really are, in that they will things contrary to reason. And in both of these ways "he that loveth iniquity, hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.

From the "Ethics.»

WHAT IS HAPPINESS?

S HAPPINESS Something uncreated? The word end has two meanings. In one meaning it stands for the thing itself which we desire to gain: thus the miser's end is money. In another meaning it stands for the near attainment, or possession, or use, or enjoyment of the thing desired, as if one should say that the possession of money is the miser's end, or the enjoyment of something pleasant the end of the sensualist. In the first meaning of the word, therefore, the end of man is the Uncreated Good, namely God, who alone of his infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy the will of man. But according to the second meaning, the last end of man is something created, existing in himself, which is nothing

else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If therefore the happiness of man is considered in its cause or object, in that way it is something uncreated; but if it is considered in essence, in that way happiness is a created thing.

Happiness is said to be the sovereign good of man, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the sovereign good.

So far as the happiness of man is something created, existing in the man himself, we must say that the happiness of man is an act. For happiness is the last perfection of man. But everything is perfect so far as it is in act; for potentiality without actuality is imperfect. Happiness therefore must consist in the last and crowning act of man. But it is manifest that activity is the last and crowning act of an active being; whence also it is called by the philosopher "the second act." And hence it is that each thing is said to be for the sake of its activity. It needs must be therefore that the happiness of man is a certain activity.

Life has two meanings. One way it means the very being of the living, and in that way happiness is not life; for of God alone can it be said that his own being is his happiness. In another way life is taken to mean the activity on the part of the living thing by which activity the principle of life is reduced to act. Thus we speak of an active or contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure; and in this way the last end is called life everlasting, as is clear from the text: "This is life everlasting, that they know thee, the only true God."

By the definition of Boëtius, that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate sum of all things good," nothing else is meant than that the happy man is in a state of perfect good. But Aristotle has expressed the proper essence of happiness, showing by what it is that man is constituted in such a state, namely, by a certain activity.

Action is twofold. There is one variety that proceeds from the agent to exterior matter, as the action of cutting and burning, and such an activity cannot be happiness, for such activity is not an act and perfection of the agent, but rather of the patient. There is another action immanent, or remaining in the agent himself, as feeling, understanding, and willing. Such action is a perfection and act of the agent, and an activity of this sort may possibly be happiness.

Since happiness means some manner of final perfection, happiness must have different meanings according to the different grades of perfection that there are attainable by different beings capable of happiness. In God is happiness by essence, because his very being is his activity, because he does not enjoy any other thing than himself. In the angels final perfection is by way of a certain activity, whereby they are united to the uncreated good; and this activity is in them one and everlasting. In men, in the state of the present life, final perfection is by way of an activity whereby they are united to God. But this activity cannot be everlasting or continuous, and by consequence it is not one, because an act is multiplied by interruption; and, therefore, in this state of the present life, perfect happiness is not to be had by man. Hence the philosopher, placing the happiness of man in this life, says that it is imperfect, and after much discussion he comes to this conclusion: "We call them happy, so far as happiness can be predicated of men." But we have a promise from God of perfect happiness, when we shall be "like the angels in Heaven." As regards this perfect happiness, the objection drops, because in this state of happiness the mind of man is united to God by one continuous and everlasting activity. But in the present life, so far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of such an activity, so much do we lose of the perfection of happiness. There is, however, granted us a certain participation in happiness, and the more continuous and undivided the activity can be the more will it come up to the idea of happiness. And therefore in the active life, which is busied with many things, there is less of the essence of happiness than in the contemplative life, which is busy with the one occupation of the contemplation of truth.

From the third question of the «Ethics.»

FRANÇOIS JEAN DOMINIQUE ARAGO

(1786-1853)

RAGO, one of the founders of nineteenth-century science, was born near Perpignan, France, February 26th, 1786. His discoveries in magnetism and optics combined with his work as an astronomer to make him one of the most famous men of his day, and he increased his celebrity by his uncompromising republicanism. As a member of the French Chamber of Deputies in 1830, he was one of the leaders of the most advanced section of the Republican party. In 1848, after the fall of Louis Philippe, he became Minister of War and Marine, using his influence in the ministry to secure the abolition of slavery in the French colonies and of flogging in the army and navy. After the coup d'état he refused allegiance to Louis Napoleon, and offered his resignation from a scientific board of which he was a member. With a good taste he could show on occasion, Louis refused to accept it, and when Arago died, October 2d, 1853, decreed him a funeral with the highest possible honors. Besides his numerous scientific works, Arago wrote a volume of studies of the lives of scientific men, which has become a part of popular literature in English as well as in French.

IN

THE CENTRAL FIRES OF THE EARTH

N ALL places of the earth, as soon as we descend to a certain depth, the thermometer no longer experiences either diurnal or annual variation. It marks the same degree, and the same fraction of a degree, from day to day, and from year to year. Such is the fact: what says theory?

Let us suppose, for a moment, that the earth has constantly received all its heat from the sun. Descend into its mass to a sufficient depth, and you will find, with Fourier, by the aid of calculation, a constant temperature for each day of the year. You will recognize further, that this solar temperature of the inferior strata varies from one climate to another; that in each country, finally, it ought to be always the same, so long as we do not descend to depths which are too great relatively to the earth's radius.