the most general in its application of any verb, is that which is used to express the relation of the predicate to the subject. But it is manifest that it is not naturally adequate to express all the relations which are given to us in intuition. In such a proposition as "Roses are red," the substantive verb expresses that the quality, redness, is joined with, or coalesces with, the other qualities of the rose. But when we intuite that the line A is equal to B, a different relation is asserted between the subject and the predicate. And when we make such an assertion as, "Clouds precede rain," it appears impossible to express the relation between the clouds and the rain by the substantive verb. To say "Clouds are a class-of-things-uniformly-preceding-rain," for the sake of bringing the predication into the only form admitted by logicians, is an exceedingly unnatural form of language, and is not a correct expression of the psychological fact. There are many other examples which we might give of strange distortions of language of which logicians are guilty, in order to bring their propositions into what they assume as the only normal logical form. And the very fact that language requires thus to be perverted to bring it into conformity with logic, is surely a very strong reason to suspect that the forms of logicians are not psychologically true. The logician assumes that the subject and predicate of a proposition, after certain changes of quantity or quality, must always be convertible with one another; and in order to make this possible, he refuses to admit any other verb except CHAP. V. SECT. V. CHAP. V. Consistency of predications. the substantive verb as the expression of the relation between them. And from this assumption and refusal there follow these extraordinary distortions of the language in which common people, and poets, and orators, and men of science, naturally and correctly express their thoughts.* § 167. There are certain things connected with the mutual consistency of predications to which we now turn attention. Predications having the same subject may be related to one another in a variety of ways. The subject may be taken in its whole extent or only in part of its extent; the predicate may be affirmed or may be denied of the subject. Combining these different forms we get the contrary, contradictory, and subaltern relations of predications pointed out in works of logic. And it is necessary, in combining predications together in a course of * Since writing the above, the author's attention was called to the following passage in T. Hewitt Key's 'Language: its Origin and Development:' pp. 16, 17.-"The process by which a logician forces (for it is often sheer force) every sentence into his favourite form, so as to exhibit the so-called substantive verb, is altogether artificial and not a little harm has been done to grammar by regarding language too much from the logician's point of view. . . . There is not an idea more difficult of distinct comprehension and definition, even to the most highly educated, than that which is denoted by the term existence . . . . The savage has his various terms for the several concrete forms of existence and of action, but has no occasion for a general term." In vol. iv., p. 99 of the 'Proceedings of the Philological Society,' Mr. Garnet writes: "We may venture to affirm that there is not such a thing as a true verbsubstantive in any one member of the great Polynesian family." Again, in p. 236, he expresses his belief that " a verb-substantive, such as is commonly conceived, vivifying all connected speech and binding together the terms of every logical composition, is much upon a footing with the phlogiston of the chemists of the last generation." reasoning that consistency between the different predications made must be maintained. To be consis tent is to avoid contradiction, and a simple inspection of two simple propositions will show whether they are contradictory or consistent. If we can predicate either of the whole or of some of the class A that they are B, it would be inconsistent to predicate that all are not B. If we can predicate of the whole or of some of the class A that they are not B, it would be inconsistent to predicate that all are B. But we may consistently predicate of some of the class A that they are B, and of others that they are not B, provided that B is not an essential quality. Further, inconsistency may arise from attaching predicates which are in their nature inconsistent with one another to the same subject. As, for example-The figure A is a square: The figure A is a triangle. But there may often be an apparent inconsistency arising from the attachment of incongruous predicates to the same subject which is not real. The incongruous predications may be truly made of different parts of the thing denoted by the subject. Inconsistencies between propositions are usually concealed by placing them wide apart in the discourse, by complicating them with many other propositions not clearly arranged, by the use of ambiguous terms, and in other ways. The avoidance and the detection of inconsistencies cannot be assisted to any great extent by special rules, but depend chiefly upon the clearness of intellectual perception, the correct and unambiguous CHAP. V. SECT. V. CHAP. V. SECT. VI. Law of use of language, and the avoidance of complexities and confusion, both in the individual parts and the general arrangement of the discourse in hand. § 168. With reference to the mutual relations of predications it is frequently of importance to place a doubtful question in such a form that either one or the other of two answers must be accepted as true. This is done by means of contradictory opposition. If " All A is B," it is perfectly certain that the predication "Some A is not B" is false. If the latter is true, the former must be false. And there is no middle predication possible. The principle according to which we affirm that of two contradictory propositions the one must be true and the other false, is called the "Law of Excluded Middle.” the application of this Law we are, as a rule, not supposed to know which of the contradictory extremes is true, because, if we knew, the proposal of the alternative would be useless. The law is frequently very useful in controversial argument, enabling one to place before an opponent two contradictory propositions, the one or the other of which he must admit to be true, and thus involve him in what is called a dilemma. SECTION VI. REASONING SIMULATING INFERENCE. In § 169. It is of great importance to human welfare that the knowledge which men possess should be clearly arranged in their minds, that the different elements of that knowledge which have a natural relation to one another should be brought together, and that ignorance and confusion should give place to systematic science. There may be possessed by a man a great deal of knowledge which can be of no use whatever, in consequence of inability to bring together into one view related facts, to see their significance, and to give them their proper place in the system of knowledge. Thus, the knowledge which many possess, although very extensive, is a perfect chaos, a jumble of confusion, and of no practical use in the guidance of life. To reason with a man frequently means nothing more than to point out the relation between different things which he already knows, and thus bring into order what was before confusion. There are to every man hundreds of "open secrets," facts related in particular ways which relations he cannot see; and it is the function of what is commonly called reasoning to convert this chaos of confused facts into a cosmos of order and harmony, so that men may see clearly what has always been under their eyes, and understand clearly the relations and significance of what they have blindly perceived. This discovery or pointing out of the true relations between things already known is not what we mean by Inference, although it very often assumes the form in which true inference is naturally expressed. It is made, also, still more closely to resemble inference by being frequently forced by logicians into the artificial forms of the syllogism, CHAP. V. Importance of systematic knowledge. |