The rules of both definition and division are given in logical works, and these rules assume that we are always able to test the accuracy of a definition or a division by means of intuition. By intuition-that is, by direct observation-the concept is formed, and the class is determined, and when we attempt to elaborate concepts and classes into systems, it is only by reverting to intuition that we are able from time to time to test the correctness of our systems. The limitation of the sphere of logic, therefore, simply to the exposition of the nature and relations of concepts, without any reference to the truth of those concepts, is, judged from the pyschologist's point of view, a blunder. We are not satisfied with consistency amongst concepts which may be crude, or erroneous, or baseless; we must have our systems of science continually tested by a comparison with the truth of nature, otherwise they are simply castles in the air. Consequently, it is unwise toj separate the sphere of logical thought from that connection with the real world which is afforded to it in the continually possible exercise of intuition.

CHAP. V.

SECT. V.

SECTION V.

PREDICATION AGAIN.

tion de

scribed.

§ 158. We have seen that Predication is the Predica mental assertion, expressed in language, that one object of thought stands, or does not stand, in a certain relation to another object of thought. We

SECT. V.

CHAP. V. have seen the dependence of predication upon intuition, and the part which it plays in the formation of the concept. And before proceeding to consider the more complex processes of thought, it will be desirable to understand more fully the nature and kinds of predication in itself. Predication is founded upon a union in consciousness of the two objects of thought of which the one is predicated of the other. The union in consciousness may correspond to an external objective union, or it may not; but a subjective union there must be, in order to render predication possible. The terms of the. predication, the things between which the relation is affirmed to exist, are called Subject and Predicate respectively. Since a union in consciousness is a necessary condition of predication, it follows that any proposition whose subject and predicate cannot be thus united must be unmeaning or false. If we assert in words, "A circle is a triangle," and attempt to think together in consciousness the subject and predicate, we shall at once see that, although a proposition has been constructed, no intelligible predication has been made. There are, then, what we may unims im- call impossible predications; which are such that the mind is incapable of bringing together the subject and predicate into the relation which is asserted to exist between them.

Some

possible.

Accidental co-exist

ences not joined in

predication.

§ 159. Again, there may be objects of knowledge united together in consciousness, of which the one cannot properly be predicated of the other. For example, we may have in consciousness together the

sweet smell and the red colour of a rose; but it
would be absurd to predicate the latter of the former.
The only way in which we can form a predication is
to make one of these qualities a predicate of which
the whole aggregate of qualities, along with the
name rose, is the subject. Thus, when we speak of
objects of perception, we invariably make the complex
objectified group of qualities the subject, and some
one or other of the qualities the predicate. Now, if
we have in the same moment of consciousness a
sweet smell and a red colour, it might appear just as
reasonable that we should predicate the co-existence
of these two qualities as the co-existence of one
. of them with the aggregate of qualities constituting
the rose.
But this is not so, and the reason appears
to be that the aggregate of qualities has come to
be looked upon as having more than a relation
of co-existence with the single quality which is
predicated of it. The aggregate of qualities is
regarded as an object, a united whole, of which the
single quality is a constituent part. There is a
permament and indissoluble connection between the
qualities, which is not truly expressed when it is
predicated of them merely that they co-exist with
one another. And this permanent objective connec-
tion is the reason why the whole aggregate is usually
made the subject of predication.

§ 160. We have hitherto been considering predication as concerned about individual objects of thought and the relations existing between them. We must now study predication in reference to that

CHAP. V.

SECT. V.

Predica

tions re

garding

concepts.

CHAP. V.
SECT. V.

Definition as a predi

cation.

fictitious object of thought whose formation we have examined the concept as well as to the class, and the class-name. Logicians recognise a kind of predication, connected with the concept, which they call judgment, and which they describe as the combination or comparison of two concepts and the assertion of their congruity, or of their union in some possible object of intuition. But if this description is correct, the judgment of the logicians cannot be the same as predication, as we understand it, even with reference to the concept. There may be predication, made with reference to a concept, in which no other concept is concerned at all; as, for example, when the constituent attributes of the concept are predicated of the concept, as in definition. But the truth is, that when a predication is made, having either a concept or a class-name as its subject, there is invariably a tacit reference to the objects of the class represented by the one or denoted by the other. Let us now, for the sake of clearly understanding our subject, examine different kinds of predications having a concept or class-name for either subject or predicate.

§ 161. We examine first a definition. "A triangle is a three-sided figure." Here the subject is a classname denoting all objects to which the name triangle may be attached, and the predicate is the concept of the class. The meaning of this proposition is that the qualities expressed of the predicate are the essential qualities of the class denoted by the subject. It is very true that the predicate, "three-sided figure,”

may also be used as a class-name; but, as used here to define "triangle," it is not a class-name, but the exposition of a concept. Hence, in this proposition, the subject, "triangle," is before consciousness in its denotative significance; the predicate, "three-sided figure," in its connotative significance. And it is predicated that the attributes of the latter exist in the former. Similar remarks may be made with reference to all proper definitions. The predicate of the definition contains an exposition of the concept of the class of things of which the subject is the class-name. Suppose "Man is a rational animal" to be an accurate definition. When we affirm this proposition, we do not bring together in consciousness the representation of a class of beings called "man," and the representation of a class of beings called "rational animal," and recognise their co-extensiveness; definition is not a comparison of classes. Nor yet does the word "man" suggest the concept of the class which the predicate "rational animal" expresses; definition is not a comparison of concepts. But the word "man" brings before consciousness a representation of a class of living beings, and the predication asserts rationality and animality to constitute the concept of the class. Thus, definition is a kind of predication in which the qualities connoted by the predicate are affirmed to be the essential qualities of the class denoted by the subject.

CHAP. V.

SECT. V.

§ 162. Again, "Swans are white." Does this Attributive predicamean that (1,)" the concept of the class swan either comprehends, or is invariably conjoined with, the

Q

tion.