SECT. V. tative assumed that I. and O. are so utterly different in CHAP. III. nature that the former cannot know the latter, it becomes necessary to interpose between them some intermediate and representative idea. Hence, the Represensensations R. C. H., &c., or the revived sensations r. c. theory h., &c., or some combinations of them, are thought to be representatives of the object O. and its qualities. But after a more careful analysis, it comes to be seen. that some of the qualities, such as C, H, T, S, are really identical with sensations C. H. T. S., and when this discovery is made, there must be a correction of the representative theory. C., colour, is purely subjective, and so are H. T. S.; therefore, there are no qualities C, H, T, S, to be represented, nothing but certain unknown powers, c, h, t, s,; consequently, the Modified, sensations C. &c., which are immediately known, are made to represent these unknown powers. But here another difficulty presents itself. How can you say that something which is in itself utterly unknown is represented by something that you know? And, especially, how can you maintain that ideas of your mind are ideas of an unknown and unknowing matter? These are the questions that Berkeley | Overasks, and by them overturns the representative theory. The sensations R. C., &c., are not representatives at all; they are the real things which exist. They are identical with R, C, &c., the distance and externality being only apparent, not real. Skepticism regarding matter and space, begun in Berkeley, is continued and extended in Hume. All knowledge comes through sensation. But matter is not a sensation, I thrown. CHAP. III. Different meanings of representation. neither is cause, neither is spirit, therefore these things do not exist. There are only the two series of sensations and ideas governed by certain laws. Thus, psychology, beginning with the assumption of practical dualism, is compelled to make use of a theory of representation to explain its difficulties, finds this theory unsatisfactory, and terminates in skepticism. As the representative theory played such an important part in psychology from Descartes to Hume, it may be serviceable to us to give some attention to the nature of representation and the use which has been properly or improperly made of it. § 67. Turning to the diagram in § 65 it is proper to say that c represents C; a revived sensation represents correctly and more or less vividly the original sensation of which it is a revival. But suppose an object of perception, say an orange, lies before us. A certain figured colour is seen, called by Locke and others an idea. This idea represents the object. Now this use of the word represent is utterly confusing and inaccurate. For what does it mean? It means that the sensation C represents C, +r+ t + s; or that the sensation of colour represents the quality of colour plus the other possible and imagined sensations of resistance, smell, taste, &c., which we believe we may experience from the orange. Now it may be quite correct to say that the sensation C calls up before consciousness by the power of association certain other revived sensations which have previously occurred in the same groups with C ; it is quite incorrect to say that C represents them. A third use of the principle of representation makes C represent C-the sensation represents the quality. But the truth is that the sensation is the quality as far as we know it. Sensations associated together, and, by an organic process, projected into space, are the objects which we know. It may be said, in the fourth place, that the sensation C represents the unknown power c, and this is just as inaccurate a use of the word as any of the rest, as has been already shown. Thus in the first and only proper use of the word represent, it means both to stand for and resemble; in the second, it means to be associated with so as to bring into consciousness; in the third, it expresses the result of an organic illusion; and in the fourth, it indicates an inference which we make regarding the cause of our sensations. The impropriety of regarding ideas as representatives in any of these senses except the first was clearly perceived by both Berkeley and Hume; and the errors of these philosophers, if such there are, must be looked for, therefore, in their views of the nature or origin of ideas. The former thought that all ideas-that is, objects of knowledge-must, as being ideas, exist in some mind; the latter maintained that all ideas are copies of some sense-impression. Hence the idealism of the former and skepticism of the latter. CHAP. III. SECT. V. reaction. § 68. The conclusions of Berkeley and Hume may Ground of be regarded as the reductio ad absurdum of representative idealism as found in Descartes and Locke. CHAP. III. But in these conclusions there was something unsatisfying to the human mind. People can scarcely bring themselves to think that the objects which they perceive have, or involve, no reality except the fact of their being perceived. Nor is it easy to think that space, or the externality of objects with reference to our minds, means simply the possibility of being perceived by another mind. It was, therefore, to be expected that there would be a reaction against the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume; and that that reaction would seek to establish, first, the permanent and independent existence of a non-ego other than a mental one, and second, the existence of ideas which are not merely copies. of sensations. By the efforts of Reid and Kant this was attempted. Reid shocked. SECTION VI. REID (1710-1796). § 69. Reid, like many other people of his time, was greatly shocked at the skeptical conclusions drawn by Berkeley and Hume, and he set himself with great ardour to refute the system from which he believed them to follow. The conclusions that there is no matter and no mind, that all the objects in the universe are nothing but floating impressions and ideas, were so utterly repugnant to his practical good sense, and so utterly repugnant to the ordinary beliefs of mankind in general, that he resolved to see whether some foundation for philosophy could not be laid, upon which it would be possible to build more securely the structure of human knowledge and belief. To this task Reid brought a great deal of candour and honesty, a fair amount of learning, and a great deal of good sense. CHAP. III. SECT. VI. But, unfortunately, he did not understand either Berkeley or Hume, and he was not at all clear as to what position he ought to take up in order successfully to refute them. He resolved to appeal from the philosophers to the common sense of mankind, which is a more or less satisfactory appeal according to what is meant to be included in the term common sense. Generally speaking, he appears to mean by it that practical good sense which leads men to trust to the testimony of their senses, and to believe in the existence of the world and a variety of other things. Sometimes, however, he gives it a more scientific meaning, and describes the principles of common sense as those beliefs which result from the constitution of our nature, and which are necessary and universal. Then taking his stand upon Reid these principles, he thought that he was able to defy the most insidious attacks of the skeptic. Like the good knight, Fitz-James, he addressed his foes, the idealistic philosophers : "Come one, come all, this rock shall fly But, unfortunately, it was not long before he went over to the camp of the enemy, cut his connection with his first friends, the men of common sense, and militant. |