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and unsuspected witnesses to the deed of | is wisdom," says a high authority; and even violence, whose testimony frees the case from in the most doubtful case ever submitted to doubt, and leaves no excuse to the most sen- a jury, we should feel more confidence in the sitive juror for refusing to join in a unani- justice of a unanimous verdict, even if come mous verdict. As regards cases where cir- to after three or four hours' consultation and cumstantial evidence only can be brought contention, than in one which had been more against the prisoner, unanimity in the ver- speedily arrived at after the manner of the dict being required, the prisoner is certain to ballot box. have the benefit of any doubtful point; because no man of ordinary humanity, where life and death are at stake, would obstinately persist in regarding such doubtful point unfavourably, and press for the conviction of the prisoner. But if even one or more were so cruelly inclined, we have that confidence in the spirit and love of fair play of our countrymen, that we are sure such overbearing and unmerciful conduct would not be submitted to, even if a "dinner" should be lost by resisting it.

As to civil cases, these, we believe, are generally so involved with legal points, that the decisions of juries are limited within a very narrow range. But where a question of fact has to be decided, every argument previously urged in favour of unanimity applies with equal force. Especially where a question of damages arises, seems to us that unanimity is absolutely necessary. How would the advocates of the "vote" arrange the settlement of such questions? For, on their principles, every juror might give in a different sum as his idea of what would meet the justice of the case.

But "Morfhaich" says, it is impossible but many cases must necessarily arise where jurors must join in verdicts in opposition to their inward convictions, and adds, "Even if one individual only acquiesces in a verdict to which he cannot, in obedience to his conscience and his oath before God, wholly agree, it fully shows an imperfection which condemns the whole system." We entirely differ from him. For, 1st. We have shown that very few cases, indeed, occur where there is any probability of much serious difference of opinion arising; and when that does occur, instead of militating against the prisoner, it will rather tend to a favourable view of his case. And, 2ndly. We do not think that every man has a right to set up his own crotchetty views (which are, but too often, what he means when he talks of conscience) as the perfect standard of truth and right. "In the multitude of counsellors

In questions of liberty, we all agree to give up a portion to secure personal protection by the state; and, surely, it is not unreasonable to ask, that in questions of justice we should sink our individual crotchets, and by mutual forbearance, aid the state in administering the laws to the best of its power.

"Threlkeld" says, the present system cannot be conducive to the attainment of justice, because it allows men, who have previously laid in a stock of provisions, the opportunity of starving their less fortunate fellows into agreement with their own opinions. And he further makes the extraordinary statement that a prisoner can easily communicate with a juror; that he may bribe him; and that there are jurymen so poor and needy as to be ready and willing to forswear themselves for gold; and that such cases of bribery and perjury have been known, and are undoubted facts.

We will not affirm that it is impossible for a prisoner to have communication with a juryman; but we do say, from what we know of courts of law, and from our own personal experience as a juror, it is all but impossible for such communication to take place when the jurors are in the box; and as no juror knows beforehand what case he shall try, it seems to us, that unless a prisoner bribe all the jurors sworn at the assizes, his efforts to evade justice would be vain. We do not say that all men sworn as jurors are incapable of being bribed, but we feel certain the great majority of jurors would treat any attempt to corrupt them with as much scorn and indignation as "Threlkeld" himself. We have a better opinion of human nature, and of the class from which jurors are drawn, than to suppose wholesale bribery possible. Even the cases mentioned by "Threlkeld" do not prove bribery, and the legal authority from whom he received the accounts must be looked at rather suspiciously, for the losing side generally abuses either the judge or the jury.

But "Threlkeld" sees no necessity for retaining juries at all. He looks upon them as an ancient absurdity which ought to be swept away. He is for confiding the power of the laws entirely to the hands of the magistracy, who, he says, would administer justice "much more expeditiously and safely" than do our cumbrous law courts and corrupt and wrong-headed juries.

Now, in reply to this we simply say, that whatever opinion may be held of juries by their most prejudiced enemies, no one can point to any of their decisions, however ab. surd, unreasonable, or unjust, for which a dozen quite as bad may not be counted that have issued from the magisterial bench. We acknowledge that many, very many, able, judicious, and worthy magistrates do honour to the bench and to the country. But, we ask, is not the country continually being amused by the strange and absurd vagaries of some of our magistrates? Have we not read very lately, in the columns of the Times, some precious revelations of their proceedings, not only in the agricultural districts, but even so near the metropolis as Windsor? Are they not notorious for pride, prejudice, and party spirit; bullying and punishing the poor where they flatter and favour the rich and powerful? Talk of substituting the decisions of magistrates for trial by jury! As well go back to the times of the Star Chamber and the infamous Jeffries; for it were far better to have one violent and overbearing judge like Jeffries than a thousand scattered all over the country.

If bribery is now prevalent, or even possible, such a change as "Threlkeld" wishes for would inevitably make it grow into rank luxuriance. We have never heard of any authentic case of jurymen being bribed, but it is well known that judges have been fear

fully corrupt; and every Englishman must blush that his country's history contains so many memorable examples of this crime.

But it appears "Threlkeld" would, by so doing, revert to the practice of the ancient Israelites, and because Moses placed able men over all Israel, he considers our magistrates are the able men required by England. Those able Israelites, however, did not judge all the cases; for in the chapter following it is said, " And they judged the people at all seasons; the hard cases they brought unto Moses, but every small matter they judged themselves." Now, do hard cases never occur amongst us; and if so, who is to judge them? Again, if the administration of the law required by the Israelites is applicable to England in the nineteenth century, the Israelitish code of punishments for crime must be so too. But will "Threlkeld" maintain that the punishment of death in England should apply to such cases as those described in Exod. xxi. 15, 16, 17, and 19; or that our law should take the revenge commanded in verses 24 and 25 of the same chapter? We feel sure he will not.

Having replied to the principal arguments and objections of our respected opponents, we think we may safely leave the question to the consideration of the impartial reader. We believe no valid reason has been offered for departing from the practice so long and successfully followed in this country. The objections to "unanimity," when fairly examined, are trivial, and the advantages to be derived from change are so slight and problematical, that we believe few lovers of their country would venture on any change in the present jury system, even though arguments had been offered stronger than any yet submitted to our notice. Leeds.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

My opening article on this question has been well seconded by the able essay of "Threlkeld." I am happy to see that we both rest our main arguments on facts"stubborn facts"—which are, by him, supported by lucid arguments and weighty authorities. Our opponents, on the contrary, content themselves with appeals to our "respect for that institution which is the glory of the English law;" to our veneration for this " most transcendant privilege;" and to

BETA.

our reverence for this "best preservation of English liberty." Now we, as heartily as either of them, concur in their eulogiums of the principle of the jury system, and should be as unwilling to see its privileges contracted, or its rights infringed; but, as before observed, we have to appeal to facts rather than to principles-to the working of the machine rather than to its ingenious construction.

The evils often produced by the rule of

unanimity are too well known to require proof; yet the case of the Dublin jury (p. 391) and the instances adduced by "Threlkeld" are a host in themselves to condemn a system of which they are truly the effects and the samples. Such cases are not rare. It is with regret we state that they can be quoted in abundance. How, then, can the parent of such evils be conducive to the attainment of justice? "Beta" and T. W. R. have both attempted to prove the affirmative, yet they have met these facts without denial or explanation. The truth is, they are unanswerable; and it is more convincing to present such cases than whole pages of theory.

Our duty is done; our arguments rest on solid facts, which have not been impugned. But as it would be uncourteous to leave our opponents without any reply, and it is, besides, curious to examine the arguments which they see fit to bring forward, we will devote a few lines to this purpose.

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Both "Beta" and T. W. R. shudder at the thought of unhallowed hands being laid upon our jury system; and the latter calls our attention to some observations of Blackstone, deprecating any change therein. What is it that Blackstone says? It is a duty which every man owes to his country, &c., to maintain this valuable institution in all its rights, to restore it to its ancient dignity, if at all impaired by the different value of property, or if it have OTHERWISE deviated from its first institution; and, above all, to guard with the most zealous circumspection against the introduction of new arbitrary methods of trial." Now, what improvement is it that we wish to see effected in the English jury system? It is, “to restore it to its ancient dignity," and to remove that new and arbitrary method of trial which has crept in among our institutions, through some deviation from the ancient practice. If T. W. R. will refer to our opening article, he will see that the ancient rule was not that of unanimity, but that, whatever the number of the jury, twelve at least should concur in a verdiet of guilty. A grand jury may consist of any number, from twelve to twenty-three. When there is a full complement, the ancient rule required only a bare majority. The absurd result that a petty jury must always be unanimous, has been a deviation from the ancient rule of majority, effected probably in this manner. With a view to convenience,

the whole number of the common jury has been fixed at twelve, while the ancient rule, which requires twelve for a conviction, remains unaltered. Hence, the present absurd practice is neither sanctioned by legislative enactment nor immemorial rule, but remains as a corruption on the purity of the ancient system. This disposes of the legal and historical objection to the improvement of the jury law; and if T. W. R. be earnest in his commendation of the advice of Blackstone, he will at once take part with us, and strive to have the rule of unanimity altered to "the ancient dignity" of a rule of majority.

There are a series of objections brought against the working of the proposed rule of majority! yet they are all disproved by the fact of its harmonious and useful working in Scotland. We make the assertion that it is impossible for twelve men unanimously to concur in a verdict on all evidence placed before them. In support of that assertion we could cite a thousand instances, similar to those adduced by "Threlkeld." What, then, must be the inevitable result of an attempt to coerce the jury into unanimity? The very opposite of that respect and veneration which "Beta" and T. W. R. demand for "this transcendant privilege." It is notorious that it is only a respect for the noble principle of a jury which has so long retained in existence an institution, so absurd in practice and so glorious in theory!

The advantages said to follow the rule of unanimity, according to "Beta," are, 1. That a unanimous verdict carries more weight, and is less liable to dispute, than a verdict decided by a small majority. But the fact is otherwise. So well is it known amongst lawyers that the obstinacy, prejudice, or dishonesty of one individual may, and often does, corrupt the verdict of the eleven, that applications for rules for a new trial are greatly more numerous in England than are, in proportion, appeals in Scotland. The very fact of an application for a new trial being allowed at all, shows that, in the minds of our judges and lawyers, the verdict of a jury is not always regarded with respect; and we would remind "Beta," that a new trial can be demanded on the ground of a verdict being given contrary to the evidence. I formerly said

that it is impossible but that some (jurymen) must perjure themselves, in assenting to verdicts in which they do not

conscientiously concur." Hereupon follows a reproof from T. W. R., because (as he seems to have understood) I have attacked the integrity of all jurymen! If I deserve blame, much more does the judge who refuses to receive the verdict of his jury, because their decision is contrary to the evidence placed before them. Such cases have been: and while the rule of unanimity obtains, will be again.

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The three other advantages adduced by "Beta" pertain as much to courts where juries decide by the rule of majority. No one can say that cases are more carefully got up"-that "verdicts are more justly decided"-in England than in Scotland, nor that a Scottish jury submits to be browbeaten by insolent advocates or venal judges more than an English one. Nay, the fact is otherwise, because the Scottish advocates appeal more to the reason than to the passions of the jury. As the majority will decide the verdict, it is not necessary nor useful, to defeat the ends of justice, to make a partisan of one. In England, let the feelings of one member of the jury be roused in favour of the accused, in opposition to the convictions of the eleven, and what is the result? If the one is firm and unyielding (or has had the foresight to come with his pockets stuffed with food), the eleven come to his opinion;

or, if they are as firm as himself, the jury is discharged. In either case, the ends of justice are defeated or delayed, while under the rule of a majority conviction or acquittal would follow, without the promptings of the stomach to hasten its decision.

In conclusion, our opponents seem to think that in countries where the rule of majority prevails-Scotland, France, and others—all verdicts are decided by vote. But it is only in those doubtful cases which, under the English system, render justice a mockery and law a lottery, that the voices of the majority decide a verdict. Such is our answer to the articles of "Beta" and T. W. R. Written in well-conceived language, and the latter in that gentlemanly and amiable style which ought to pervade all debates in the Controversialist, they have afforded us pleasure to peruse. Yet we hope we have, even to their perception, shown the fallacy of the arguments brought against the rule of majority, and the special advantages said to belong to the rule of unanimity. But, if by our want of power to lead this debate properly, we were unable to accomplish this, we fall back upon our strong reserve of facts"stubborn facts"-which will one day sweep away the rule of unanimity, along with other corruptions fostered on the pure simplicity of the English law. MORFHAICH.

Literature.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Dawn of History. By T. G. Darton. Lon-
don: Longmans. Price Is.

The Age we Live in; or, a Glimpse at Men and
Manners. By George Fordham. London:
Kent and Co. Price 6d.

We place the titles of these two tractates together, as they are of common origin, though of opposite character. They both are the substance of essays read before societies for mutual improvement; both, we presume, have been published "by request; " and both, we can honestly aver, are worthy of the honour thus put upon them. The author of the former discourses in a learned and intelligent manner on the grey "dawn of history," while the writer of the latter cleverly and sarcastically dilates on the faults and foibles of" the age we live in." The essays are valuable in themselves, and interesting as specimens of the superior productions which are now frequently presented to members of mutual improvement

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An Essay on the Art of Writing, with a Course of Lessons on Penmanship, and a Series of Progressive Exercises for Self-Improvement. London: Houlston and Stoneman. Price 1s. 6d. This is a book for self-educators. It brings the writing master, as a private tutor, to the fireside. It contains the Essay which appeared in our columns in April, with nearly a hundred specimens of writing, and minute directions how to form the letters they contain. The instructions are plain, the style of writing good, and the plan simple and sure. Patient industry need not now despair of acquiring, even in the most disadvantageous circumstances, the power of representing thought. We dare not farther praise this workdelicacy prohibits. Our readers will see to it that it gains its meed, not only of applause, but of circulation.

London: J. & W. RIDER, Printers, 14, Bartholomew Close.

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