14th, 1853,' is this:The projet de note transmitted from Vienna was laid before the council to-day by Reschid Pacha. All the ministers were present, to the number of seventeen, including the Sheik ul Islam. The majority of the council declared it to be their firm intention to reject the new proposal, even if amendments were introduced' (p. 71)."

་

One more extract on this point, and we have done with evidence. On the 26th of September, Lord Stratford 'represents himself as ' imploring' Reschid Pacha, at least to suspend (p. 149) the declaration of war for a short time; and on the 1st of October, this same Reschid Pacha, after declaring that the Turkish government had, in spite of the 'imploring' entreaty of our ambassador, ' determined upon going to war,' instructs the Turkish ambassador in London in these cool words: The Imperial government, under existing circumstances, reckons upon the moral and material support of England and France; and it is to that object that the language which you have to hold at London should be directed' (p. 151)."

This determined spirit for war is explained by Colonel Calvert, who says: "The Mahomedans feel no hesitation in expressing a desire for hostilities; for, according to them, continual war in Turkey is requisite to keep alive the spirit of Islamism."

In bringing these quotations* from parliamentary blue books to a close, we beg to express our regret at the great length of this paper, but an imperative sense of duty impelled us to deal honourably and disinterestedly with it. We have not been actuated or influenced by any partial feeling, either for Russia or ourselves, but simply to state the facts of the case. "Facts are stubborn things," and we can scarcely conceive any case more conclusively affirming the truth of this adage than the one before

can hardly wonder at the continuance of France in the war, for, whenever that terminates, she will be a gainer. She originated the quarrel, and fanned the flame. Turkey played a double part, and, whilst robbing Russia of its rights, gave her advantages which it had no right to bestow. Subsequently negotiations placed the matter in a favourable light; but the thought of having powerful allies appears to have deprived Turkey of reason, for war she would have, in spite of the remonstrances of, and in opposition to the united efforts of, the Four Powers. When she allowed those feelings, which a disposition for war ever invite, to entangle us in its meshes, on what principles of international law, justice, and common sense did our cabinet, press, and people (whose enthusiastic ardour for war never appears to be swayed by discretion and intelligence) consent to participate in a contest, by recourse to arms, when reason had ceased to sway the councils of the Turk? Were we as weak as the tottering power we are supporting, pro tem., that we should be unconsciously and irresistibly impelled to second an attack on a power which had shown every disposition to conciliate a people so unworthy of protection?

How are we affected at the present moment? Futurity is ominous. The eyes of other nations are upon us and our diplomacy. How will they act when a critical moment arrives favourable to their own agrandizement? Who can say what Austria and Prussia will do? They have been comparatively spectators of the contest. Austria, it is true, has some hundreds of thousands of troops on the borders of Turkey, and when her time is come, who can say that Austria will not participate in her final dissolution as an independent empire? A crisis awaits us all, which will not only determine the destinies of Turkey, but the boundaries and landmarks of those countries which occupy the map of Europe.

To conclude. Our continuance in the war (admitting our justification in taking part in it) is indefensible.

The Blue Books will doom us to the condemnation of posterity. No one is more to be pitied than the honest British historian of to-day, for he must tell future generations that our national honour was sacrificed by a ministry more desirous to prolong war than

to conserve the interests of peace. We may cavil at the "wisdom of our ancestors; "in respect to diplomacy, however, we believe that we shall suffer from comparison with them, and more unfortunately so because, though we pride ourselves on our attain

ments in education and refinement, we have made no corresponding progress in diplomacy, except it be to plunge a nation into an inglorious struggle, which will inevitably entail on us irreparable obloquy and disgrace. Manchester. J. G. R.

ALL Englishmen have been accustomed from their earliest youth to consider and value trial by jury as one of the noblest institutions of their country; and, indeed, when we look back to those interesting and important occasions, when not only personal liberty, but some of our dearest political rights, have been asserted and maintained by the decisions of juries appointed to try and decide upon them, it seems something like profanation to consider seriously the question standing at the head of this article. It is true that the objections raised are not against the institution of juries as juries, but against the unanimous decision required from them by the law, and which is the grand essential, giving validity and weight to their verdicts.

That spirit of free investigation now abroad, and which has not spared any of the institutions of the country, has of late years, on many occasions, started the question now under consideration; and it cannot be denied that some of the decisions given by juries within that time have been so opposed to evidence, and even to the plainest dictates of justice, as to afford justification to those who may wish to have the matter fairly debated.

It seems, therefore, not inopportune to hear the arguments for and against unanimity fairly stated in the Controversialist, that so the public may come to a proper understanding of the question.

In the remarks we shall make on the jury system, we shall compare the advantages derivable from unanimity with the proposition to take the verdict by vote, which, so far as we are aware, is the only alteration

suggested by those who object to the present system.

The form of oath taken by each member of a jury is, that "he will give a true verdict according to the evidence," and the practice of the courts is, that every member of the jury shall agree to the verdict given in by the foreman. It seems taken for granted, therefore, by the originators of trial by jury, that evidence in all cases can and ought to be placed before a jury in such a form that they can have no difficulty in coming to a unanimous decision;-it assumes that the links of evidence are so clear and consecutive

the truth so plain and undeniable—that no jury can hesitate to convict, and that unanimously.

Now, in cases where the evidence is such as we have here supposed, there can be no hardship in insisting on a unanimous verdict; and no person will deny that a large number of cases are continually brought forward for trial in which there cannot be the slightest cause for hesitation or difference of opinion amongst the jurors. But there is also a class of cases where the evidence is not of so clear a character, and where the proof of guilt is not so strong and decisive. And it is on these that the advocates of change rest their argument for an alteration of the law. Why, they urge, should men be compelled to agree in a unanimous verdict when the evidence is such as to leave room for an honest difference of opinion, not only, it may be, as to motives, but even as to facts? Why go on the presumption that no difference of opinion can be entertained upon hearing the evidence, when the arguments of counsel,

and perhaps even the summing up of the judge, place before the mind many different ways of accounting for the facts, and of explaining the motives which impelled to the actions? This objection has certainly much weight, and it seems to us can only properly be met by a consideration of the balance of advantages to be derived from unanimity of decision in all cases where it can be arrived at.

1. In all judicial cases it seems extremely desirable that perfect accordance of opinion amongst the jurors should be attained. For such decision, when come to, carries more weight, and is less liable to dispute, than a verdict decided by a small majority can possibly have. A verdict unanimously come to has a tendency to prevent further litigation in those cases where the law allows of an appeal to another tribunal. And in criminal cases such a verdict seems still more important, by carrying to the mind of the criminal a sense of the fairness of his trial, and the justice of his sentence. In cases involving life and death, what would be the feelings of the man who should find himself condemned to death by perhaps the votes of one or two of the jury! How would the friends of the criminal regard the majority in such cases; and how rarely could men of sufficient nerve be found to risk the possibility of voting wrongly in such awful cases, where the evidence was of such a nature as to produce much difference of opinion amongst the jurors.

2. It appears to us that the necessity of coming to a unanimous decision must force every juryman to give a greater degree of attention to the evidence as placed before him, and to endeavour to comprehend more clearly all the bearings of the case, than he otherwise would do, if able to get rid of the trouble and responsibility of deciding justly, by simply giving a vote independently of what his fellows might think of the matter. This we think an object of great importance. Even under the present forms, inattentive jurymen are not uncommon; but, under a change like that supposed, this evil would, we feel convinced, greatly increase; and, when it is considered that the careful and thoughtful attention of the jury is absolutely necessary to the attainment of justice, no inconveniences arising from the present systern can be considered as of much weight

when compared with the importance of securing an attentive jury.

3. The same cause, we believe, operates upon all parties connected with the administration of justice, upon solicitors, advocates, and judges. It compels solicitors to be more careful in getting up their cases,-in ferreting out evidence, placing it in a clear, connected, and logical form; well knowing that no obscurity, misrepresentation, or irrelevance will pass the ordeal of cross-examination in the subsequent trial. Advocates feel also that they have so to state their case, and unfold their evidence, as to produce conviction not merely in a majority of the jury, but in the whole of them; this knowledge will render them more alive to the important and telling points of their own case, and more keen in detecting the weak ones of their opponents. And, no doubt, even the judge upon the bench is influenced in a similar manner by the desire to have his responsibility shared by a unanimous verdict of the men who are appointed, along with himself, to decide the

case.

4. Another great advantage derivable from unanimity, though not felt now so much as it was in former times, is when juries were sometimes called upon to decide in questions affecting the liberties and political rights of the people, and when they were often exposed to the browbeating and intimidation of insolent advocates and venal judges. How often, on such occasions, has the necessity of unanimity given courage to the timid, and firmness to the vacillating, and verdicts have been given which are handed down in history as noble and heroic acts on the part of the juries who had the boldness to deliver them. From the better definition of the laws, and the more accurate boundaries separating the rights of the people from those of the Crown, a recurrence of such cases is not now heard of. sing this question, the possibility of it must not be left out of sight, for human nature is now what it ever was.

But in discus

If it be urged that, owing to the present regulation, many parties placed on juries have much violence done to conscience by being obliged to join in verdicts which they do not entirely approve, or in which they cannot concur, we answer that these cases are of much rarer occurrence than is gene

rally supposed, and that it is owing to the very regulation complained of, that the evidence brought forward on trials is canvassed more carefully, and the different objections weighed and answered by jurors amongst themselves, and ultimately a unanimous decision arrived at. In cases where the evidence is of such a nature as to lead to much difference of opinion, perhaps the enforcement of unanimity may lead to an acquittal, where otherwise a conviction would take place. But even this we consider not an evil, for the English law generously considers that where there is doubt the benefit should be given to the prisoner. And in any case, it seems a much less evil to society that a wrong acquittal should take place than that a doubtful conviction should be made.

On the whole, it appears to us, that the present system of taking verdicts is as wise and as conducive to the ends of justice as it

is possible to attain. Unanimity appears under any circumstances superior to a system of majorities; and we should be sorry to see any change brought about which would lead to doubt and uncertainty. Perfection in the attainment of justice, as in all other matters, is not to be arrived at; but, if we judge from the experience of our own country during a period of several hundred years, we have every reason to be satisfied with trial by jury as at present constituted. No doubt, anomalies may be discovered in the theory, and at times inconsistencies and contrarieties may take place in the practice of juries; but, on the whole, we doubt whether any system can be contrived which would give the confidence and satisfaction, and be so much in accordance with the spirit and feelings of the people, as the present way of taking verdicts by the "unanimous" decision of a jury. Leeds.

THE excellence of the principles of English law is a just boast of the Englishman; but the practice often causes him to blush. In theory it is almost perfect; in practice it is too often disfigured by injustice and oppression. It nobly asserts the equality of all classes, and the right of the meanest to redress; but with this also is coupled the proviso, that he possess money to demand it. In short, though justice is not sold, the law must be bought. It is not, however, with this fruitful subject that we now propose to deal. It is rather with one instance of the absurdities of the law, which affects rich and poor alike; and the instance we select is, "trial by jury."

Trial by jury is regarded with intense veneration as the corner stone of our freedom-the chief bulwark of the liberty of the subject. It provides a safeguard against arbitrary power, star-chamber terrors, and judicial threats. But all evil influence does not come from the powers that be. The ignorance, impatience, dishonesty, or obstinacy of one individual may, and often does, corrupt the verdict of the eleven. And though our veneration is fully justified, when addressed, of the principles of the jury system, we have now to appeal to facts rather than to principles.

The system in England, which requires

BETA.

total unanimity in the jurymen, must be a great nursery of falsehood and perjury— verdicts in opposition to the inward decisions of many must be given among the thousands that are yearly recorded. Even if one individual only acquiesce in a verdict to which he cannot, in obedience to his conscience and his oath before God, wholly agree, it fully shows an imperfection which condemns the whole system. Take any twelve men, selected, as jurymen necessarily are, indiscriminately, and on such evidence as is given in a court of law or of justice, will their opinion be unanimous ? Not in one case out of three. How, then, can the decisions of juries be just? It is impossible but that some must perjure themselves in assenting to verdicts with which they do not conscientiously concur.

The total unanimity peculiar to the English jury system leads also to contradictory and unjust verdicts. When opinions are nearly balanced, or when the opposition of one detains jurymen too long from business or pleasure, in civil causes a compromise is usually effected; in criminal trials, "Wretches must hang, that jurymen may dine:" or verdicts, say, of manslaughter, returned upon evidence which proves either murder or nothing; prisoners acquitted on the ground

It may here be said, It is easy to declaim against the flaws in a magnificent structure, but what can be done to improve it? Might not your project endanger the whole building, or may not the remedy be worse than the disease? No; the remedy is easy, and close at hand. It is only to copy the jury system of the neighbouring country of Scotland, where it is in its most perfect state of operation. The whole system of English Jury Law might be improved by assimilating it, in every point, to the latter. It may, indeed, be said that the whole forms and principle of Scottish law is superior to that of England, being based on the civil, or old Roman laws, while the English is on the ecclesiastical, having, of course, many principles in common. Possessing only that knowledge of either which a citizen may be supposed to have, we will mention the most striking differences between the jury systems of the two countries; expose the defects of the one, and show the improvements which might be derived from the other.

1. Parties called upon to serve as jurymen incur great expense and inconvenience, removed, perhaps, from business or important avocations; but it is a necessary price for the great safeguard we possess in juries, and which in both countries presses on the merchant, the farmer, or the shopkeeper. But in the Sheriff-Courts in Scotland, pri soners are first brought up to plead; when, if they plead "Guilty," the judge, without summoning a jury, delivers the sentence, and the whole labour and expense of a needless call are saved. If they plead "Not guilty," they are, without any delay, tried before a jury.

2. The great and important difference be

tween the two systems is this:-In England, total unanimity is required; in Scotland, the verdict of a majority may be given. It is almost needless to insist on the greater excellence of the latter system. In fact, it is hardly possible to conceive that the unanimity of juries can, at any period of our history, have been established as a principle in our judicial system. A system so repugnant to all experience of human nature must have crept in among our institutions through some deviation from the ancient practice. There is, indeed, a very reasonable conjecture, that the ancient principle of common law, which required the concurring judgment of twelve men before the liberty or property of the subject could be affected, has been perverted to the present absurd practice. In several of the great inquests established by the constitution, this rule prevailed, but subject to the condition, that whatever the number of the jury, twelve, at least, should concur in a verdict of guilty. A Grand Jury may consist of any number, from the magic twelve to twenty-three. Where there is a full complement, the rule above mentioned requires only a bare majority; where there is only a quorum, unanimity is the consequence. It is thus obvious that the unanimity is not the principle of the rule, but only an incident. Majority is the principle; but as the majority is fixed, and the whole number fluctuates, it follows that when the whole number and the majority are the same, unanimity is necessarily produced. Now it happens that, probably with a view to convenience, the whole number of the Common Jury has been fixed at twelve. At the same time, the ancient rule, which requires twelve for a conviction, remains unaltered. And hence we have the unavoidable result, absurd though it be, that a Petty Jury must always be unanimous. This conjecture shows, not, indeed, with demonstrative certainty, but with a very reasonable probability, that neither immemorial usage nor legislative wisdom is the authority to which is to be referred the doctrine of unanimity. Although, according to Blackstone, "the necessity of a total unanimity is peculiar to our own constitution," it is a peculiarity the result rather of accident than design. Now, in Scotland, the number of the jury is fixed at fifteen, and their verdicts are recorded as their unanimous opinion, or as the opinion