have no right to claim exclusive possession," was the verdict which our ambassador declared as being "equitable." The Sultan accordingly issued a firman, sanctioning and confirming this decision. Copies were addressed to the contending parties, and to the governor at Jerusalem, with strict injunctions "to attend scrupulously to the execution of its contents, and to have it duly registered in the records of the court of justice." The Sultan, however, gave M. Titoff a vizierial letter, pledging that the "Latins should not pass through the great door of the church at Bethlehem" (B. B., part i., p. 47). A well-known lecturer thus describes the proceedings relative to the publication of the firman:

"To render the decisions embodied in the firman effectual, it was indispensable that they should be made public at Jerusalem, around which city the holy places are situated, so that the members of the different Christian churches might know how the disputed questions had been settled, and how, for the future, they were to conduct themselves in relation to the sanctuaries and to each other.

"M. Basily, the Russian consul-general, continues Mr. Finn, 'afterwards called on the commissioner at his house, and insisted upon the great firman being read. The commissioner inquired, What firman? That which you yourself drew up with your own hands, as second secretary at Constantinople, declaring that the Latin claims to the sanctuaries are null and void. The Bey explained that he had no directions to read it, and could not go beyond his special instructions.'

"Such was the method adopted by the Ottoman government to realize the just expectations of the Russian minister and the Greek community-expectations founded upon a firman invested with the solemnity of a hatti-sheriff, and which would, if it had been honestly granted and honestly executed, have been a charter of religious rights, which, while confirming the privileges of the Latins, would have secured to the Greeks all which either they or the Czar had ever demanded. We afterwards make the discovery-and it is one which inspires the utmost disgust-that the Porte, while giving the firman to the Greeks, gave at the

"It was contended by the Russian ambassador that if the firman be not read, according to usage at Jerusalem, before the pasha, cadi, members of the council, and patriarchs of the different sects, it will be valueless and a dead letter, and that consequently faith will have been broken with Russia' (B. B., part ii., p. 46).

"Afif Bey, an Ottoman functionary of superior rank, was appointed to convey to the governor and council of Jerusalem the imperial firman, and the supposition was that he was charged to see it published with all due form and solemnity. That this was not done, is proved by a despatch written by Mr. Finn, the British consul at Jerusalem, who was in the city at the time of Afif Bey's arrival, and was a witness of his proceedings. He says:

"Afif Bey then invited all the parties concerned to meet him in the Church of the Virgin, near Gethsemane. There he read an order of the Sultan's for permitting the Latins to celebrate mass once a year.'

"But not a word was heard of the firman which had been specially prepared, with the professed design of settling all disputes.

not be read at Jerusalem (B. B., part i., p. 50), in other words, that it should be practically a dead letter.

"Colonel Rose, Sir Hamilton Seymour, and even the ministers of the Sultan, admit that a breach of faith, altogether indefensible, was committed, and that all principles of honour, as well as all rules of ordinary decency, in the conduct of government affairs, were flagitiously violated."

The next important proceeding was that projected by the Czar, a feature in this controversy undeniably establishing the fact that he was determined to preserve peace at any cost, unless all hope of fair and honourable dealing was at an end. He accordingly despatched Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople on a special mission. On this head a clergyman, partial to the war, thus speaks:-" Mr. John Bright says that he (M. Lavalette, the French ambassador) urged his demands in language more insulting than any which have been shown to have been used by Prince Menschikoff. Of the softness or asperity of diplomatic language I will be no judge, but the demands urged upon the Sultan by the French am

bassador were of a very different nature to those insisted upon by the Russians. The French asked for privileges connected with the holy places, the right for the Latins to enter by the door which was turned in the proper direction of the compass, and for a bunch of keys, but Menschikoff asked the Sultan to recognize his master as the lawful protector of the Greek Christians in Turkey" (the right to which he possessed by "treaty").

The first step taken by the French ambassador on the arrival of the prince at Constantinople (without knowing what were the objects or instructions of Menschikoff) was to order "the French fleet immediately to sail from Toulon to Salamis" (p. 98). Admiral Dundas was also directed to move his fleet from Malta to Vourla," by order of the English ambassador, though that meddling and self-sufficient functionary had been previously admonished by Lord John Russell to "take no part one way or another" (p. 77). The reason for this step was because the Prince did not call upon the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, this being improperly represented as an insult to Turkey. We are told that this was done "in pursuance of the orders of the Emperor of Russia, because His Imperial Majesty was of opinion that the Turkish minister had acted with bad faith to Russia." Menschikoff declared that "he intended no disrespect to the Sultan by the omission of the customary visit to his minister" (B. B., part i., p. 93). The hostile proceedings of the British ambassador referred to was thus censured by Lord Clarendon on the 23rd of March:-"The circumstances reported in your despatch did not, in the opinion of Her Majesty's government, render it necessary for you to request that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they have entirely approved of the conduct of Admiral Dundas in not complying with your request" (p. 112).

Prince Menschikoff was the bearer of two documents-an autograph letter from the Czar to the Sultan, and a note verbale, or a statement of the demands claimed by Russia. Lord Clarendon says of the former that "it was written in a most friendly spirit, and exhibited much respect for the authority of His Highness" (p. 93). Sir H. Seymour, speaking of the latter, says:-"As far as a

hasty perusal enables me to form an opinion, no exception, I should say, can be taken to the language of this document. It is written in language of remonstrance rather than of menace, and contains a temperate, though serious, enunciation of the grievances of which the Emperor has to complain, in consequence of the concessions made to the Latin church at the expense of those interests which the Emperor is especially bound to protect" (B. B., part i., p. 150). Of Menschikoff, M. E. Pisani, the Turkish interpreter, says: "His Highness (the Sultan) told me the language now held by Prince Menschikoff is exceedingly mild and very friendly" (p. 107). The objects for which the prince had set out were, first to secure an amicable settlement respecting the holy places, and to procure that recognition of the rights to be secured to the Greek church should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of an international engagement between Russia and Turkey" (B. B., part i., p. 141).

the

From the last quotation it might be inferred by our readers, as it has been argued by our opponents, that there was no necessity for any interference between the Sultan and the Christians. Let us see. Lord Clarendon, June 24th, 1853, says:-" Your Excellency is instructed to state to the Porte, that it is the deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's government that the only real security for the continued existence of Turkey, as an independent power, is to be sought by enlisting the feelings of its Christian subjects in its preservation; . . . and that it is impossible that any true sympathy for the rulers will be felt by the Christians, so long as they are made to experience, in their daily transactions, the inferiority of their position, compared with that of their Mussulman fellow subjects, because they are deemed a degraded race, unworthy to be put in comparison with the followers of Mahomet. Your Excellency will plainly and authoritatively state to the Porte that this style of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian powers" (p. 294). So much for the country we are fighting for.

At this period of the dispute, there appears on the part of the British government a system of duplicity and double dealing (even according to their own state-

called for moderation and forbearance from the Sultan's allies."

Non-compliance with these instructions has involved us in the bloody strife now raging at Sebastopol; and it is certainly not going too far to say, that such wilful and culpable disregard should have been visited with the immediate recall of our ambassador. Count Nesselrode, writing to Baron Brunow, says of the proceedings of the British ambassador," At the last moment, when Prince Menschikoff had consented to abandon even the modified sened, and to content himself with a note; when Reschid Pacha himself, struck with the danger which the departure of the legation might entail upon the Porte, earnestly conjured the British ambassador not to oppose the acceptance of the note drawn up by Prince Menschikoff, Lord Redcliffe prevented its acceptance, declaring that the note was equivalent to a treaty, and was inadmissible" (p. 243).

Another note was subsequently drawn up by the French ambassador, and agreed to by our government. Lord Clarendon says of Count Buol's note, afterwards the celebrated Vienna Note, "We can give no positive sanction or support to the proposed note until we know in what manner it differs from the French Note, to which we have already agreed" (B. B., part ii., p. 1).

66

Now, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who was the original framer of the note, ought surely to be assumed to know in what sense it was intended to be understood. Well, this minister, in writing to St. Petersburg to urge the acceptance of his note, says: They (the French government) submit it to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, with the hope that it will find that its GENERAL SENSE DIFFERS IN NOTHING FROM THE SENSE OF THE PROPOSITION PRESENTED BY PRINCE MENSCHIKOFF, and that it gives satisfaction on all the essential points of its demands. The slight variation in the form of it will not be observed by the masses of the people, either in Russia or in Turkey. To their eyes, the step taken by the Porte will preserve all the signification which the cabinet of St. Petersburg wishes to give to it; and His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas will appear to them always as the powerful and respected protector of their religious faith."—Cited in Count Nesselrode's Memorandum of March 2,

1854, as published in the Journal des Debats.

Let it be remembered that this note, "although its general sense differs in nothing from the sense of the proposition of Prince Menschikoff," originally excited our indignation, and extorted the threat of bringing up "Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean," a proceeding opposed alike to all principles of common sense. The above note being unsatisfactory, the celebrated Vienna Note was drawn up, and after several alterations proposed and adopted," it was finally agreed to by the Four Powers, and transmitted to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to the French ambassador, "instructing him to use all his influence with the Porte to obtain its assent to the project" (B. B., part ii., p. 39). Of this same note we are told:

"The Earl of Clarendon writes to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe from the 'Foreign Office, August 2nd, 1853. Her Majesty's government have, in preference to all other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle for which throughout we have been contending, and that it may therefore with perfect safety be signed by the Porte; and they further hope that your Excellency, before the receipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in procuring the assent of the Turkish government to a project which the allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recommending for his adoption' (p. 27)." Did Russia accept this note? We shall see:

"Sir G. H. Seymour, in a despatch to the Earl of Clarendon, dated 'St. Petersburg, August 5th, 1853,' says:-'It is my agreeable duty to acquaint your lordship, that upon waiting upon the Chancellor this morning, he stated that he had the satisfaction of informing me that the Emperor had signified his acceptance (acceptation pure et simple) of the projet de note which had been received from Vienna, and a copy of which was despatched on the 24th ultimo from Vienna to Constantinople. Intelligence of the Emperor's decision will be sent off to-morrow to Baron Brunnow, and has already been conveyed by telegraph to Vienna' (p. 43)." How did the Porte act? It did not take

the slightest notice of it, and gave no reply to any of the ambassadors at Constantinople. Lord Clarendon loudly complains of this "neglect." The Czar, previous to leaving Olmütz, and on taking leave of Lord Westmoreland, told that functionary "that he wished to give an additional proof of his desire to meet every legitimate wish which was expressed to him by those powers.

"The following note, 'explaining and restricting' the meaning of the Vienna Note, was accordingly adopted: "

"In recommending unanimously to the Porte to adopt the draft of note drawn up at Vienna, the Courts of Austria, France, England, and Prussia are convinced that that document by no means prejudices the sovereign rights and dignity of His Majesty the Sultan.'

"That conviction is founded on the positive assurances which the cabinet of St. Petersburg has given in regard to the intentions by which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia is animated, in requiring a general guarantee of the religious immunities granted by the Sultans to the Greek Church within their empire."

"It results from these assurances that in requiring, in virtue of the principles laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, that the Greek religion and clergy should continue to enjoy their spiritual privileges under the protection of their sovereign the Sultan, the Emperor demands nothing contrary to the independence and the rights of the Sultan, nothing which implies an intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire."

"What the Emperor of Russia desires is the strict maintenance of the religious status quo of his religion, that is to say, an entire equality of rights and immunities between the Greek church and the other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte; consequently, the enjoyment by the Greek church of the advantages already granted to those communities. He has no intention of resuscitating the privileges of the Greek church which have fallen into disuse by the effect of time or administrative changes, but he requires that the Sultan should allow it to share in all the advantages which he shall hereafter grant to other christian rites' (p. 129)."

In reply to the amended note, the Porte

stated, through Lord Stratford, "that it rejected the note, declaring it to be their firm intention to reject the new proposal, even if amendments were introduced " (p. 71).

"Again, Lord Clarendon writes on October 7th, 1853, to Lord Cowley, to this effect:-'On the 4th instant, Count Walewski informed me that the assurances, as to the intentions of Russia contained in Count Buol's project of note, appeared satisfactory to the French government, who were prepared, with the concurrence of Her Majes ty's government, to agree to the signature of that note by the four representatives in Constantinople, that it should be offered to the Porte in exchange for the note originally sent from Vienna' (p. 140).

"But our government peremptorily rejected the proposal. Lord Clarendon writes to Lord A. Loftus, requesting him to state to Baron Manteuffel, 'that it is quite impossible for Her Majesty's government now, under any circumstances or conditions whatever, to recommend the adoption of the Vienna Note to the Porte' (p. 132)."

Negotiations were still continued; for we are told that "Lord Stratford, writing on November 17th, 1853, after telling Lord Clarendon, that a new proposition,' presented by himself and the French ambassador to the Porte, had no chance of acceptance, 'even in a modified shape,' adds:'I have hitherto exerted my almost solitary efforts in favour of peace under every conceivable disadvantage, including even that which results, in Turkish estimation, from the presence of the allied squadrons in these waters' (p. 271). Writing later on the same day, he says:- Your lordship may be assured that I omitted nothing which my instructions, my recollections, or my reflection could suggest, in order to make an impression on his (Reschid Pacha's) mind. I lament to say that all my efforts were unavailing. . . . I did, however, the only thing which remained for me to do at the moment. I took my leave with evident marks of disappointment and dissatisfaction, expressing in strong terms my apprehension, that the Pacha would one day have reason to look back with painful regret on the issue of our interview' (p. 281)."

To sum up. We are told that "the next communication from Lord Stratford to the Earl of Clarendon, dated 'Therapia, August