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"It is not a very difficult undertaking to class Fielding or Smollett-the one as an observer of the characters of human life, the other as a describer of its various eccentricities."-Hazlitt.

EXERCISE XXIX.-Insert the proper adjective pronouns in the places where dashes indicate their omission in the following extracts:

"As Macaulay.

climate has its peculiar diseases, so walk of life has its peculiar temptations."

"In the

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I heard; here, with him, at — fountain, talked."-Milton.

- [novel, 'Caleb Williams '] Mr. Godwin has hit upon the extreme point of the perfectly natural and perfectly new; in the — [' St. Leon'] he enters into the preternatural world, and comes

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We have now somewhat fully explained and exemplified the essentials in the grammar of Pronouns. Our next paper, on the Verb, will terminate our preliminary instructions on the inflected parts of speech. The uninflected parts will not, of course, detain us so long and we shall shortly be able to give our attention to composition of a higher cast. But we must remind you, that unless this labour is truly and honourably performed, higher teaching will avail nought. The primary processes of labour cannot be dispensed with. Give all heed and diligence, then succeed.

S. N.

Philosophy.

IS REASON CONFINED TO MAN? AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-III.

THE word "Reason" has a higher and more precious meaning than the word "Instinct;" and it is very appositely made to signify that portion of mental superiority which man possesses over and above the aggregate of animals by which he is surrounded. Animals may-indeed, they dopossess much in common with man, analogous to what man possesses in common with angels and the Deity, and to what plants possess in common with animals. But we are not to argue from this that they are, therefore, an inferior species of man, or a race of beings possessing, in some degree, the essential characteristics of man. Such a process of reasoning would lead to disastrous consequences. It is a maxim in philosophy, "that although all the individuals of one kind agree in one specific nature, yet every one has a particular difference, whereby it is distinguished from another." This particular difference," or peculiar mark, is, for want of a better term, called hecciety. Now, every genius and every species of creatures, as well as every species of individual, has its hecciety, or that that makes it what it is. And however much another genus or species may resemble it, it is not exactly like it, nor one with it, simply because it lacks the same essential characteristic.

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The hecciety by which man is distinguished from and rendered superior to the animal tribes is rationality, or mind, with all its intellectual, moral, and religious appurtenances. Were this god-like, heavenborn impression to be effaced in man, could our friend "Clement" restore it from the animal creation? Could he produce a correct likeness of it? Reason answers, No. History and experience echo, No. Were "Clement" to collect all the elephants, monkeys, dogs, cats, beavers, birds, wrens, and bees, of which he speaks, and to which he alludes; were he to have them all at his command, and under his personal control; and were he put in possession of all know ledge, so as to be able to comprehend and understand the essence and organization, the

actual and presumptive doings, of each and all of those various creatures, he would, we hesitate not to say, find them minus of the human hecciety. They do not possess it, consequently they cannot produce it. If reason be not peculiar to man, what is? If reason be not peculiar to man, why make it the chief hecciety of man? If reason be not peculiar to man, to whom and to how many genera and species of beings is it peculiar? To say that animals possess something like reason, or an inferior kind of reason, does not reach the spirit of the question before us. It would be an easy matter to accommodate our ideas of reason in man and instinct in animals to what our opponents call the superior reason of man, and the inferior reason of animals. For what we call the higher order of instinct, they call the lower order of reason; so that, after all, the difference between us is not great.

Again: that man possesses mind is assumed, or tacitly acknowledged, in the ques tion under debate. And what is mind? Mind is that portion of man, that invisible something within us, that thinks, reasons, judges, and prompts us on to acts of rationality. It is sometimes called the heart, the soul, and the spirit of man. It is this, and not an isolated portion thereof, that constitutes man the master of his own actions, the subject of morality and religion, and the only being who is accountable to Heaven for his thoughts, articulations, and actions. This mind is divine in its origin, spiritual in its essence, immaterial in its nature, intellectual in its operations, religious in its aspirations, and immortal in its duration. But, according to "Clement's" own showing, animals have no mind, no "moral sense, are subject to no moral law, and will not exist after death. And why? Simply because they do not possess mind. They have a something about them that is the subject of instinct, sagacity, and animal action; but this something dies with them

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it cannot be called matter.

We will call it an instinctive subject. It is matter imbued with a lower order of properties than those of the mind, but properties which seem to approximate thereto. Locke argued the possibility of the soul's materiality. But is it not probable that the highest state of perfection and refinement, of which the Almighty has made matter capable, is that of its being made instinctive, as in the animal creation? As a rule, every animal seems to be endued with its peculiar kind and share of instinct. There appears to be a difference in quality as well as in quantity; and each one has that, and just enough of it, which is the most suitable for it. The laws of instinct have fewer exceptions than those of reason; they are subject to fewer violations; and by virtue of them, animals can accomplish their ends at less expense, with greater ease, accuracy, and certainty of success, than what man can by virtue of his laws of reason. In migrating from country to country, they need no ships, charts, compasses, knowledge of stars, days, and months. Instinct, or "an agency which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge," supersedes the use of all these things. But would this be the case were the instinctive faculty to become defunct? Would reason, as is the case in man, undertake and accomplish the task? we think not.

The question, moreover, states, as it were, in so many words, that man does possess reason. And what is reason? Reason is an attribute, faculty, or power of the mind. It is peculiar to mind; and where there is no mind, as is the case in animals, there is no reason. Rationality and mentality are inseparably connected. We can no more conceive the existence of one without the other, than we can conceive the existence of an effect without a cause. And what is reason's province or mission? It is to compare realities, to test truths, to estimate actions, to weigh consequences, to plan the execution of rational purposes, and to pilot the soul over the untraversed seas of futurity. By the aid of this faculty, we discover what our other faculties believe to be discoverable; we invent means to accomplish presumptive ends; we improve upon what has been done ages ago; we take the elements into our service, and make nature do

our bidding. The proofs and productions of man's reason are to be seen everywhere-in the ships, bridges, and mansions he has built, in the railroads and machinery he has produced, in the books he has written and printed, and in the various branches of art and science which he discovers and cultivates. Where are the proofs and productions of animal reason? They invent no logarithms, produce no Euclid, go not in search of the north pole, build no schools, publish no Controversialist, leave no "Principia" behind them. They do nought that resembles such things.

Reason, though often very unreasonable, is inherent in every man. It is a common property of our nature. True, it is more cultivated, receives a fuller development, and produces more and better fruit, in some than in others; but you cannot be in the company of a sane man many minutes, without perceiving signs of rationality. Uneducated men, poor men, uncivilized men, evince unmistakable manifestations of reason. From beginning to end, from centre to circumference, men have given proof upon proof of their rational and argumentative endowments. Indeed, the whole history of man is one grand incontrovertible demonstration of his rationality. Now, were reason as inherent in the animal department, or were it inherent at all in any part thereof, would it not be palpably evident and universally acknowledged? But, this is not the case, "Clement" himself being the judge. He cites instances-"few and far between "—in which an individual or two of certain species have manifested signs of reason; but, supposing all to be true that "Clement " states, regarded in the most favourable light, these signs of reason are exceptions to a rule, and such as are essential to prove it.

We place but very little confidence in newspaper authority, when vaguely introduced into the Controversialist, as in the case of the Edinburgh cat affair. This animal may have acted as stated by the "press;" and if so, he was indeed a very cunning creature. But did the "press" say that he had not been "trained" to this work? Did the "press" hold itself in readiness to produce two or three creditable witnesses, to prove, upon their oath, the truth of the story? This is a very fluid premiss

On the Earth.

on which to rest a philosophical argument. But, allowing it all to be verbally true, it is no proof that the cat possessed what is properly called reason. If so, it is a proof equally strong that the rats did not, or they would have argued that the vicinity of their hole was not a proper place for that kind of meat to be in, and that there must be some plot upon their lives in its being placed there. But does "Clement " wish to teach us that cats, and not rats, are the subjects of reason? And then, for "Tom" to pounce upon and kill "two large rats at once is very improbable, and, if true, it was very cruel. He was a murderer. His reason ought to have taught him the lesson, which

In the Empyrean.

our dispassionate friend "Clement" hopes his article will teach us, viz., "to treat with greater kindness the inferior creation."

In conclusion, reason either is or is not confined to man. Either one or the other is a reality-a reality unaltered by all that has been said and written on the subject. We believe it is confined to man; "Clement" believes it is not. Let every man be persuaded in his own mind.

Believing that the annexed 'scale of beings" (the only one we have seen) will be both interesting and useful to the readers of this discussion, we deem it not too much trouble to copy it.

xxvii. Cherubim or seraphim, the living throne of God, the constant attendants of the Divine Majesty-four, Isa. vi. 2; Ezek. i. 5; x. 5, 10; Rev. iv. 6. Thrones: four-and-twenty, Rev. iv. 4.

Dominations,

Thousands of thousands, Rev. v. 11.

26.

25. Archangels:

Princedoms,

Virtues,

24. Angels:

Powers,

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22. The chimpanzee, the ourang-outang, the elephant.
21. Apes, baboons, monkeys, marmosets.
20. Dogs, foxes, wolves, lions, jackalls.
19. Tigers, hyænas, leopards, panthers.

18. Horses, bears, camels, dromedaries.

17. Cats, rats, parrots, singing-birds, birds of passage. 16. Kine, sheep, goats, deer, asses.

15. Vipers, snakes, lizards.

Swine, hares, rabbits, squirrels, mice, poultry.
Birds, not of passage, nor of the singing kind.

14.

13.

12.

Bees, wasps, ants, hornets.

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NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-III.

WE have read with considerable interest the opening negative article on this question by "Clement," and the affirmative one by "Persona" has rather strengthened than otherwise our belief that reason is not confined to man. We agree with him that it is to reason "that man owes his vast practical superiority" over the lower animals; but it is to reason, aided by his other endowments. Without it, we acknowledge, "he would be viler and more helpless than any of the lower animals;" but with it, what would be his present condition, if unendowed with the faculty of speech? This is the great barrier between him and them, and to this is owing his "progressiveness," and not to the possession of reason; for without the means of transmitting thought, of what use could reason be to man in general? It could only benefit the individual, without aiding in the progression of the race. The unprogressiveness of animals is thus accounted for, since the experience gained by one individual cannot be communicated to the rest of the species. Again: with them reason is only a secondary power; they are gifted with instinct to such an extent that improvement on the acts necessary to their existence would be impossible. "Persona," referring to "the ant, the bee, and the beaver," says, that amongst them he cannot "detect any progress whatever." We know it; but does it in any way tend to show that they are not reasoning animals? Can "Persona" inform us in what direction they could progress? The bee builds the waxy cells, intended to contain its store of honey, conformable to the most profound geometrical principles; the hexagonal form, which is invariably adopted, is the best for containing the greatest quantity in the smallest space. When the whole workmanship is perfect in finish and design, how is it possible to improve it?

We deny that the notion that "man is only a superior kind of animal" "is implied in the negation of the present question." The faculty of speech, which is possessed by him alone, constitutes the great difference between him and the animal world, and entirely demolishes, as we have above shown, the theory of the progressive develop ment of the lower animals. It may be

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mental blindness on our part, but we really cannot see the force of "Persona's" argument, when he says, that if the lower animals be gifted like man, with reason," then the rule which pronounces immortality for the one and not for the other must be felt to be arbitrary, and thus the matter of man's immortality is prejudiced." Surely we may do justice to the small amount of understanding possessed by the brutes without prejudicing the immortality of man. What have the faculties given to them to do with the immortality of the SOUL? What knowledge have they of a Creator? Is reason and the SOUL one? If such is "Persona's" belief, it is not ours. Though we do not consider that animals are intended for a future world, yet "Persona' have been determined to set aside all facts when he penned the following astounding passage:-"An almost universal intuition prompts man to reject the idea that creatures whom he slays without compunction for his food, his convenience, or his pleasure, are beings of a like destiny with himself; or rather, the intuitional conviction of their lower and more contracted destiny, disabuses him of any compunction in the matter." Whence does " Persona derive his information? With more truth, I believe, we may say, that since the commencement of the world those nations that were unacquainted with revealed religion had "an almost universal" belief in the immortality of the brutes. Was it not so with the Ancient Britons? Did not the Egyptians worship animals, thus making themselves inferior to them? Even now, do not the North American Indians believe that their faithful hounds will accompany them to the happy hunting grounds of their fathers in a future world?

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Before attempting to substantiate our opinion that the lower animals are endowed with something higher than mere instinct, it will be necessary to define, in a few words, the difference between instinct and reason. Man, when first ushered into the world, is one of the most defenceless of beings in it; and were it not for certain instinctive propensities, urging him to acts necessary to his preservation, he would probably perish as soon as born. This provident law of

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