was threatened, and there can be no doubt that the design of Russia was eventually to become the ruler and possessor of his territory-to secure the Dardanelles-convert the Black Sea into a Russian fish pond. Under cover of protecting the religious welfare of those of a questionable faith, the Czar was plotting for the "sick man's" death. Seeking to relieve him of his suffering, he prescribed for his destruction. England and France, with that discrimination which always marks their conduct in national and important affairs, saw that the balance of European power was placed in jeopardy-that the beam would be induced or seduced to the side of barbarism, despotism, and slavery. Truckling Prussia was ready, as she is now, to second the designs of Russia; and Austria not disposed to thwart them. Neither of these was in close familiarity with Britain;-Austria does not love her; Prussia does not venerate her. Her civil and domestic institutions are at variance with their secluded and tyrannical rule. By opening her shores to the wandering exile-by affording him an asylum, and thus shielding him from persecution and prosecution, she has provoked the ill-will of tyrants, and invoked the displeasure of despotic and arbitrary governments.

The rule which applies in everyday life applies with more than equal force in a national point of view. The principle of intervention adopted by England and her allies, France and Sardinia, is observed, more or less, in civil matters, and if in civil disputes, why not in national ones. If a man commits a trespass upon his neighbour's property, he is amenable to the laws, and punishable accordingly. Why, then, not a Czar? Is he to commit crime with impunity? Is he to invade the territory of a neighbouring sovereign, because his impertinent and impudent claims are not complied with? Surely not. Common sense, the welfare of communities, and the peaceful reign of civilization, forbid it. Justice forbids it, equity forbids it, honesty forbids it. Remember, that the Crimea dates as Russian territory only as far back as 1783; remember, that the characteristics of the Russian throne are, an unsated ambition, a love of conquest, a lust of power; remember, too, her antecedents, and tell us whether, in the face of such startling facts, whether under

the menace of open threats, of hidden dangers, and concealed woes, the arm of England was to remain unnerved and powerless. The experience of the past, the policy of the present, the prospect of the future, alike demanded our interference. To have seen the bear mangle the kid would have been worse than indifference, and more wicked than cupidity. The weak was overawed, but not dismayed, by the strong; the former found practical sympathy in honest England, whose people are ever ready to err rather on the side of pity than on that of severity. Our country, in the step she took, only followed a course which was dictated by wise policy, suggested by careful forethought, and prompted by a generous, noble sympathy, combined with a sincere desire to assist a weaker state, assailed by a powerful and ambitious foe. In doing so, she has tended to perpetuate her prestige. The petty rag of selfishness was cast aside, and, once in the cause, her noble daring has redounded to her own honour and glory. Individually she had nothing to gain; there was no territory to fall beneath her sway, no conquest to commence or complete, no unlawful ambition to satisfy, no shallow pretence for drawing the sword. Justice, right, the blessings of free institutions at home, the value of civil immunities abroad, and every principle which sheds a lustre across the path of the upright and the just, impelled her onwards. The unhappy fate of Poland was pregnant with weighty lessons; the position of Hungary was remembered by her people. Away, then, with the frigid, apathetic, isolating principle, that England was to stand calmly by, and, with a Jesuitical serenity, see yon stripling smitten to the ground, preparatory to immolation. Away with the idea, that because the Turk has been cruel and persecuting, therefore he is not to be the object of commiseration, and is to be led to the slaughter unassisted and unpitied. Away with the theory, that the Crescent is never more to float joyfully on the stream of prosperity, and that it is too effeminate to be again raised to the majesty of manhood. We see in the future the dawn of better days; and, through the present war, we believe civilization will be promoted, barbarism mitigated, the rights of humanity observed, and that each nation so patriotically engaged in assisting a weaker

THIS question shapes itself to my mind in this wise:-What are the general conditions which justify any government in going to war? and, these being settled, Has the English government fulfilled them in the instance of this war with Russia?

I believe this to be the best way of approaching the subject, for two reasons: First, because the majority of us being without reliable and precise information respecting the course of the negotiations which preceded the war, any discussion of it which makes them its most prominent topic, and turns, as it must do, upon the single point as to which was really the diplomatic document that sealed the fate of the war, must appear to us as being superficial and imperfect, and can therefore exert upon us no useful and decisive influence. We see, in fact, that the ablest men in the country, with the best sources of information open to them, take opposite views upon this very point, and we may therefore well despair of arriving at present at any satisfactory conclusion upon it. And, secondly, and especially, because it must bring under review that apprehension of the aggressive spirit of Russia, which is undoubtedly with most people the ground of the favour with which the present war is regarded. As to the reality and extent of this apprehensive feeling there can be no doubt. The fact seems to be, that we cannot speak or think of the aggressive designs of Russia without distressing visions of continental Europe overrun, and of England menaced, by swarms of fierce and dirty Scandinavian savages. Our own decided opinion, however, is, that were Russia in possession of Constantinople tomorrow, the rest of Europe would be less exposed to her aggressions than it is at this

moment.

With regard, then, to the first question, What are the general conditions which justify a government in going to war? Practically, in the present day they are reduced within narrow limits. We have, as we hope, outgrown the fashion and the folly of "dynastic wars," and wars of conquest are plainly immoral and unjustifiable. Con

sidering what a terrible and exhaustive mischief war is, few amongst us, I think, will be found willing to admit that it can lawfully be waged simply as the expression and instrument of a generous sympathy. Our own opinion is strongly in favour of the notion that a government is not justified in going to war except for the defence of the "honour and interests" of the country. We shall take this as the basis of our argument, and we challenge attention to it, as being a fair and common-sense issue, and a good and sufficient test upon which to decide the present question.

Well, then, we commence with granting the supposition that the designs of Russia upon Turkey reach to the extent of its entire and immediate subjugation; and our case is, that, admitting that to be so, to be well known, and to be uncontradicted by Russia, that still "the English government would not be justified in going to war with Russia."

It does not appear very evident, at first sight, how the national honour could have been at all concerned in the business. Not being bound to Turkey by any treaty, we were, previously to this war, at perfect liberty to adopt an independent course, even to the extent of leaving Turkey to her own resources, without covering ourselves with the odium of bad faith, or incurring in any way the charge of breaking through expressed or well-understood obligations. But it may be said that the presence of our ambassador at the Turkish court implies, at the least, a recognition by us of the established boundaries of that empire. This, however, lies very much open to doubt. The mission of our ambassador at any court is to represent and protect British interests, and to facilitate, by becoming the medium of, communications between the two governments. But, supposing the assertion to be entirely true, it does not follow that we thereby contract any obligation to preserve those boundaries intact by an armed assistance. Without appealing to history to prove the entire novelty of such a theory of international intercourse, it is sufficient to say

that such an idea is conclusively refuted by the fact, that although the existence of the Turkish government was at stake, it did not call upon any of the countries which were represented at Turkey to fulfil any such supposed obligation. That she would have done so, had the slightest ground existed upon which to found such a claim, there cannot be a doubt.

Then, as to the supposed insecurity of British interests. These, it is apprehended, would be injured by Russia, in pursuit of a restrictive and exclusive policy, closing the Black Sea to our ships, and by the danger to which our possessions in India would be exposed.

As regards our trade with Turkey, it will be an exceedingly difficult thing for our opponents to prove that the retention of it is, as an object, worthy of a war with Russia. Our exports to Turkey are under £2,000,000, including the really large proportion of them which goes to Persia. As the cost of retaining this, we all have a lively idea of the many millions spent, and of the many more likely to follow them, in the prosecution of this war. But I deny that the occupation of Turkey by Russia would at all diminish the amount of our trade with Turkey and the Black Sea. There is, indeed, reason to believe that it would be greatly increased. According to the best authorities, Turkey in Europe contains tracts of land, the finest and most fertile in Europe. "Mount Hamus," says Malte Brun, "is still covered with verdant forests; the plains of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly yield abundant and easy harvests to the husbandman; a thousand ports and a thousand gulfs are observed on the coasts, peninsulas, and islands. The calm billows of these tranquil seas still bathe the base of mountains covered with vines and olive trees. But the populous and numerous towns mentioned by ancient writers have been changed into deserts beneath a despotic government." "All the authorities upon this country," says "A Manchester Manufacturer," 'assure us that the soil of many parts of Turkey is more fruitful than the richest plains of Sicily. When grazed by the rudest plough, it yields a more abundant harvest than the finest fields between the Eure and the Loire,

*"Russia." By a Manchester Manufacturer.

the granary of France. Mines of silver, copper, and iron are still existing, and salt abounds in the country. Cotton, tobacco, and silk might be made the staple exports of this region, and their culture admits of almost unlimited extension throughout the Turkish territory, whilst some of the native wines are equal to those of Burgundy." "The climate of European Turkey," says Montgomery Martin, "is temperate, naturally well adapted for man, and rendering the rich soil capable of yielding abundantly every vegetable product; but the filthy habits, sensuality, and indolence, invariably resulting from opium smoking, have caused Constantinople and other Moslem cities to be seats of pestilence; and a country that might have been the very garden of Europe, wild and uninhabitable."

We have, then, in these mineral resources, and in this wonderful fertility of soil, the first conditions essential to the existence of vigorous and extensive commercial relations; and the question it concerns us to answer is simply this:-Do the Turks sufficiently develop the resources of their fine country, and foster trade? if not, is it in any way probable that Russia in possession of Turkey would do better? In other words, Would our trade in that quarter suffer or be increased by the changed circumstances of the case?

Well, we assert without hesitation, that the Turks do not cultivate and develop the resources of the country, and that, so long as they possess it, no better result will be realized." The Turks are contemners of trade.

Whether it be owing to natural laziness of disposition; to that precept of the Koran which says, "There is but one law, and that forbids all communications with infidels;" to that which forbids the receiving of interest for money; to the fact that they are taught to despise all learning but such as they find in the Koran; or to the general and notorious insecurity of property;-from one or all of these it results that the Turks are decidedly not a trading people, and "that such an example as a Turkish merchant transacting matters of commerce with a foreign trader was scarcely ever known in that country." "Shopkeepers you will find sitting cross-legged, waiting for their customers, too lazy and indolent to rise for the purpose of taking down an