self into the contest. His ambassador at Stamboul was instructed to claim for him the protectorate over the Latin church in Syria and the Holy Land. This claim, he affirmed, rested on the capitulation of 1804, which secured the Latins permission to reside at Jerusalem, and to officiate at the holy sepulchre; and on a treaty formed with Murad IV., in 1635, by which they obtained the grotto of Bethlehem, the custody of the stone of anointing, the leaden dome of the holy sepulchre, the vaults of Calvary, and the two hills near Bethlehem. These concessions, though confirmed by subsequent treaties, were, however, disputed when the Greek church acquired strength under the protectorate of Russia, and especially when, on the destruction of the holy sepulchre by fire in 1808, it was rebuilt by the Greeks. Heedless of this, the French ambassador demanded eight of the most celebrated shrines in and near Jerusalem, the firstmentioned of these being the tomb of the Virgin, the holy sepulchre,-to which, since its reconstruction by the Greeks, the Latins surely could have no claim whatever, and the church of Bethlehem. All these had, it is true, been granted by Reschid Pasha, then Grand Vizier, to the French, through the intercession of his friend, M. de Lavalette. On the dismissal, however, of Reschid from the viziership, the Greeks obtained from the Sultan a counter firman favourable to their claims. Against this, M. de Lavalette protested, and demanded that the Porte should reconsider the matter. This demand drew forth the Czar, who proclaimed his intention to befriend the Greeks. His success was such that the claims of France were rejected, and things returned to their previous condition.

The calm which ensued was like that which precedes the hurricane. The French President had too much at stake to be easily thwarted. He knew the power he had to deal with, and acted accordingly. He repeated his claims, declaring that, unless they were granted, a French fleet would appear in the Dardanelles to enforce them. Such a threat from such a power, Turkey, unsupported by foreign aid, had not courage to withstand. But a short time only elapsed, therefore, till the French ambassador reported that matters had been satisfactorily adjusted. Satisfactory the adjustment could not fail to

be to France, but to Russia it must have been the very reverse of satisfactory. A protest was accordingly lodged by her with the Sultan against any change in the status quo.

It has been denied that Russia had any right to interfere in the dispute. The claims of France, it is alleged, were based on specific treaties; while those of Russia were without any foundation. This we deny. Let us examine the facts of the case.

There were many adherents of a faith professed by the Czar among a population and under a government essentially hostile to every form of Christianity. However wronged or insulted, they had no hope of redress except through him. Appeal they might to their patriarch, but experience had too often taught them that the patriarch was as impotent to aid them as they were to aid themselves. Here were they arbitrarily deprived of certain privileges without the slightest prospect of having them restored. Could the Czar witness this, and yet look calmly on? Had he done so he would have left unperformed a most sacred duty. He saw the Ottoman government pursuing a policy of the most despicable kind. He saw it yielding up privileges interfering with, and destructive of, the religious services of a body professing the same faith, and at once came to their rescue. His motives for so acting have been impugned. But with these we have nothing to do. All that we have to consider is his actions. These, on the present occasion, judged of by the conduct of those whose proceedings we are accustomed to eulogize under similar circumstances, were, it appears to us, worthy of all commendation. They were, in fact, based on the same principle which induced the greatest sovereign that ever filled the British throne to defend the persecuted Vaudois; and which again, in our own day, led to the remonstrance of the British government with the Duke of Tuscany, regarding the sufferings of the Madiai. In both these cases it was contended that unless justice was awarded to the sufferers resort might be had to the sword. "As this is a matter," says Lord John Russell, writing officially to the Tuscan government, "affecting the Tuscan subject, it may be said that Her Majesty's government have no right to interfere. If this means that interference by force of arms would not be justifiable, I confess at once,

that nothing but the most extreme case would justify such interference." But an extreme case would justify it. In other words, If our demand be rejected, it will be for us to employ that armed force. Is not this a fair corollary from his lordship's despatch? But on what treaty rested the right of Britain to employ such language to an independent government? On none whatever. It had no other foundation than that of sympathy with those whose religious belief had come to be the same as that which we professed. Admit this, as we must, and the right of Russia to interpose in behalf of the Greek communion becomes incontrovertible. But, if we may rely on the testimony of British statesmen, the Czar had other grounds than even this on which to rest his claims. "Your lordship will perceive," said Lord Stratford, in a despatch to the Earl of Clarendon, "that the Russian ambassador does not object by his demands to such privileges as are known to have been obtained latterly by France in favour of the Latins, and that his principal aim is to fix and secure the present state of possession by that kind of formal and elicit agreement which may preclude all further preten ions on the part of France, and make the Porte directly responsible to Russia for any further innovations respecting the holy places. This," he adds, "is fair and reasonable enough in the view of an impartial observer." Lord J. Russell, in a despatch to the British ambassador at the Russian court, is not less to the =point: "The more the Turkish government," he observes, "adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burthensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty." Lord Clarendon, in a despatch to Sir H. Hamilton, writes to the same effect: -"Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe was in=structed to bear in mind," says he, "that Her Majesty's government, without professing to give any opinion on the subject, are not insensible to the superior claims of Russia, both as respects the treaty obligations of -Turkey, and the loss of moral influence that the Emperor would sustain throughout his dominions, if in the position occupied by his Imperial Majesty, with reference to the Greek

church, he was to yield any privileges it had hitherto enjoyed to the Latin church, of which the Emperor of the French claimed to be the protector." Now, unless we say that our statesmen were profoundly ignorant of the matters under discussion, it is impossible to evade the conclusion that the Czar was borne out in his demands, even by treaties.

The Porte, by the intervention of Russia, was placed in a dilemma. She saw, apparently for the first time, the dangerous ground she had been treading. To commit herself further on either side was to plunge into a troubled sea, from which there was little prospect of being extricated. Hoping that time might achieve for her what her statesmen had failed to accomplish, she delayed as long as possible coming to any conclusion on the matter. In this way passed 1851, at the expiration of which things assumed a very threatening aspect. Further delay became impossible. A firman was accordingly issued, by which it was anticipated all parties would be satisfied. And so, perhaps, they might have been, had not the question been reopened by a disgraceful squabble at Jerusalem, in connection with the contest, and by the evasive measures to Ottoman government began to resort.

The question could not be permitted to continue long in this condition. The interests of all concerned demanded that something definite should be speedily adopted. To this end, Prince Menschikoff, instructed by the Czar, repaired to the Ottoman capital. On the 16th of March, 1853, he presented a note to the Sultan, complaining of the violation of the rights of Russia, and requiring, as a means of preventing a repetition of such an injury, a treaty recognizing the rights and privileges of the Greek Christians in the Turkish empire, and empowering the Czar to interpose from time to time as their protector. This demand, slightly varied, he repeated on the 19th of the succeeding month, and again, still farther varied, on the 5th of May. The Sultan began to waver, and endeavoured to compromise matters by two firmans, intended to satisfy both parties. Prince Menschikoff rejected them as incompetent. He had stated his demands so far as to express a willingness to accept a seued or convention. This the Sultan declined. chikoff offered to accept a note or memoran

Mens

dum, specifying what was agreed upon. This also was denied; and then, hopeless of further satisfaction, he quitted the Turkish territory.

Pending these negotiations, what was the policy in reference to them of the British government? That of strict neutrality. In terms impossible to be misunderstood, the British minister at the Porte was instructed to take no part in the quarrel. The wisdom of these instructions is beyond question. Momentous as the dispute was to Turkey, France, and Russia, it in no way affected Britain. All, therefore, that we had to do, was to stand calmly by, and watch its progress, deprecating on all sides those threatening movements of fleets and armies, which it was impossible to make without detriment to a pacific conclusion of affairs. Such, obviously, was the true course for our government to follow. Well would it have been at the present moment, had we never strayed from it.

Scarcely had Prince Menschikoff presented his credentials to the Sultan, than indications appeared that Colonel Rose at least meant to set aside the instructions of his government. In open defiance of them, he, on the 7th of April, despatched a message to our

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པ སPPནv་vམ

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fleet, requiring 20 waits of the East. A measure more impolitic, and more fraught with danger to the peace of our country, could hardly have been adopted. This view of the matter seems to have speedily dawned on the mind of Colonel Rose himself, and induced him to countermand his previous order.

About the same time that the British government was apprised of the proceedings of Colonel Rose, intelligence reached our shores of an alleged attempt on the part of Russia to obtain from the Sultan, by a secret treaty, rights, said to be incompatible with the independence of the Turkish empire. The claim thus referred to was afterwards found to consist in the right of Russia to protect the Greek Christians in Turkey. To defeat this claim, Lord Stratford exerted himself to the utmost. With what consistency the British government could oppose it, after the energetic despatches of Lord John Russell in condemnation of the Duke of Tuscany for enforcing the laws of his country against the Madiai, and, still later, Miss Cunningham, we are at a loss to conceive.

If it was right for the British government to make such a demand upon Tuscany, it could not surely be wrong for Russia to make the demand she did on Turkey. Speaking of the claim of the Czar, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the ablest minister in France, said "it was such that he would not assume the responsibility of advising the Porte to reject it." Turkey herself seemed to see the necessity of conceding it. “I found M. de la Cour," says Lord Stratford, "under an impression that the Turkish minister was disposed to shrink from encountering the consequences of Prince Menschikoff's retirement in displeasure." Why, then, did she reject them? Let Lord Stratford reply. Adverting to his interview with the Sultan, he remarks-" I endeavoured to give him a just idea of the danger to which his empire was exposed;" as if he could not have perceived that himself, had any really existed. "I concluded," he goes on to say, "by apprising His Majesty that, in the event of imminent danger, I was instructed to request the commander of Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness." For this pledge the Moslem had been waiting for months. From that moment he turned a deaf ear to every proposal for peace.

1

The Czar, thus defeated in diplomacy, had recourse to his troops. These, crossing the Pruth, took possession of the principalities. That this act was indefensible and unnecessary, we, with our present views regarding war, cannot deny. How it should be condemned by those, however, who uphold the righteousness of war, is to us inexplicable. It was an act in every respect identical with that which France had threatened, under precisely similar circumstances, to enforce. "It was an act," says Mr. Bright, "at least as justifiable as the conduct of Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston in 1850, when they sent ten or twelve ships of war to the Piræus, menacing the town with bombardment if the dishonest pecuniary claims made by Don Pacifico were not at once satisfied."

Differ, however, as we may regarding the right of Russia to adopt this step, there can be no doubt as to the influence it exerted in inducing the four powers to unite more closely in an endeavour to terminate the contest. While condemning the act