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cannot but raise our arm to ward off the expected blow. By the law of creation, the consciousness of danger is indissolubly connected with the instinct of defence. What, then, says Reason? Does it forbid these instincts, and tell us that life is unworthy of our care? No! it at once sharpens and strengthens the natural tendency to selfdefence: "the prudent man foreseeth the danger and hideth himself." Reason has taught man to raise self-preservation from an instinct to an art; not only to use, but to store up for use all possible means of defence. Reason guides us to seek resistance to physical evils, the prolongation of life, and the security of our possessions, by the arts of medicine, agriculture, and commerce, by sanitary and other sciences, and by ever inventing and improving the securities of person and property. Reason therefore aids and not forbids the instinct of defence; it suggests no solid grounds for refusing to employ the powers entrusted to us in warding off evil; it refuses to credit the deadening dictum of the necessarian; it knows not fatalism, either individual or political.

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Turn we then to scripture. Does it forbid the exercise of those instincts and powers which lead all men to defend their lives, their families, and their just possessions? In the first few pages, we read that "when Abraham heard that his brother was taken captive, he armed his servants," pursued the enemy, smote them," and brought back "his brother Lot, and his goods, and the women also, and the people." Was he then reproved by God? "After his return from the slaughter of Chedor-laomer and the kings," he was met by Melchisedek, "the priest of the most high God. And he blessed him, and said, Blessed be Abram, and blessed be the most high God, which hath delivered thine enemies into thine hand." Here, then, we have a direct sanction, not only for individual, but also for mutual defensive war. Do we worship the God of Abraham, "who changeth not," and who is "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever," or have we another God? But we turn to the pages of the New Testament. The forerunner of the Messiah was asked by the soldiers, "What shall we do?" And he replied, not by bidding them to cast off their allegiance and service, but by urging moderation, truth, and contented subordination

upon them-"Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your wages." Did the disciples renounce selfdefence? No; we find them worshipping in an upper room "for fear of the Jews;" Peter, released from prison by an angel, finds the door of the house where the disciples meet barred against him. The "laying await" of the Jews was known of Saul," and forthwith "the disciples took him by night, and let him down by the wall in a basket." Cornelius, a soldier, is peculiarly favoured and honoured of Heaven; yet we find him not relinquishing his profession as a consequence of his conversion. Paul is rescued from the populace by the Roman soldiers, but he neither rebukes their captain, refuses their protection, nor gives himself up to his enemies; nay, more, he becomes particeps criminis, and openly approves of the conduct of Lysias. All these acts are indefensible, according to the doctrines of the Peace Society.

There is yet another view of the subject, equally proving our position. In the garden of Eden, God proclaimed the fact that man is made for society-that "it is not good that man should be alone." Now, the subsequent fall of man has rendered society impossible, unless cemented by force. Equal, independent, free, and frequently unable or unwilling to view things in the same light and to pursue a common course of conduct, men must be compelled, in order to carry out the schemes of social polity, and render society possible. Society cannot exist without laws, and laws cannot exist unless there be a coercive power to enforce them; is it not, then, absurd for a civilized man to proclaim his antipathy to physical force? What! are we to arm our policemen with the trun. cheon, and bid them arrest and imprison the domestic felon, and yet neither stir hand or foot against a foreign foe? Is the civil sword allowable, and the military sword forbidden? May we bar our doors, and set a watch against the midnight burglar, but not resist the trained legions of an invading despot? Is it lawful to defend our personal property, our trinkets and furniture, but wrong to defend our national possessions, and that dearest treasure of humanity, a people's freedom? Force, physical force, is the condition of society, whether municipal or national. Renounce the employment

civil force, and society must dissolve in anarchy and barbarism; abjure military force, and nations will sink beneath the rod of despotism, or dwindle into petty tribes. Let England throw aside all her national defences, and she will become the prey of the mightiest among her neighbours, unless, in contending for so rich a prize, the despots of the earth, and the peoples over whom they rule, enact the tragedy of the Kilkenny cats, who fought till nothing but their tails were left. "Peace at any price" simply means that we are prepared to sacrifice life, liberty, civilization, and society-to sink into brute beasts.

We have thus briefly noticed the abstract question of the lawfulness of any war because it lies at the bottom of most of the objections raised against the present war. To say that the whole course of negotiations showed no flaw, and admitted of no adverse criticism, would be to preach up the infallibility and perfection of statesmen. There is, and there can be, no human transaction without "touch of weakness or of ill;" hence to prove an objection is no ground for condemnation -a verdict should be founded, not on any but on sufficient evidence. Thus arises the danger of erroneous views on abstract generalities; they become the medium through which we view particulars, and consequently they affect our vision; a gnat wears the aspect of a camel, and anon we strain our throats; a camel appears but as a gnat, and we swallow it forthwith. The lover can see no faults in his mistress, though every one else declare her a termagant; and, on the other hand, hatred and prejudice are ever exclaiming, in bitter scorn, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" Having disposed, therefore, of this preliminary topic, let us now, in a spirit of candour, examine the origin of the present war, with reference especially to the objections most commonly urged against its "justice."

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The first point we shall notice, is the alleged justice of the Russian cause, on account of the preponderance of Greek Christians in Turkey; this appears to be Mr. Cobden's grand cheval de bataille, just as the Czar's acceptance of the original Vienna Note of 1853 is Mr. Bright's peculiar hobby. Now, we readily grant the statistics so often adduced on this subject, but we deny the conclusion drawn from them-non sequitur;

the premise is true, but the logic false, Should we allow the right of any foreign catholic power to interfere in behalf of the Irish Catholics-numerically, a large majority of the population of Ireland? Could such interferences consist with national freedom, if submitted to, or with peace, if resisted? Few, we imagine, will be inclined to answer in the affirmative; and for ourselves, we most emphatically deny the right of any state to interfere, on sectarian grounds, with the internal affairs and administration of another state. But even if this point were conceded in favour of Russia, her conduct is in no ways justified. The existing privileges of the Greek Christians, as citizens of Turkey, had never been attacked; as a body, they had suffered no injuries, and had raised no complaints; the only pretended excuse for Russian interference was a matter connected with the holy shrines at Jerusalem. If the Sultan had infringed upon liberties guaranteed by previous treaty, it would have been right to demand that he should recall those infringements, and abide by his engagements; but beyond this there could be no just claim whatever. The statistics of religion, therefore, have no connection with the character of the Russian demands, the original cause of vexation being one in which the mass of Greek Christians could have no interest beyond a sentimental feeling: a member of the Greek church might desire precedency and power for the pilgrims of his own sect, but unless he visited the shrines himself, he could have no personal interest in the matter. Had Nicholas claimed in behalf of himself and all Greek Christians, of whatever nation, a protectorate over the holy sepulchre and its resident monks, there would have been a plausibility in the claim, even if there had not been fifty Greek Christians in the whole Turkish empire; but when he claimed a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Sultan, the numbers of those subjects, instead of justifying the claim, become damning evidence of his ambitious designs, and prove them to have been utterly incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the Porte.

The second point to which we shall address ourselves, is the endeavour (so frequently made) to justify Russia, and to put England in the wrong, by the argument that

our ally, France, first raised the dispute, and was the real cause of the war. Now, we should think that it would strike everyone that there must be some strange misapprehension here. Did Turkey refuse what France originally demanded? No; we are told she was terrified into submission. How comes it, then, that she was not terrified by the threats of Russia? The reply is evident. Turkey yielded the demands of France, because they touched not the sovereignty of the Porte; she refused those of Russia, because they were subversive of her existence as an independent state. France sought privileges for Latin monks and pilgrims at the shrines of Jerusalem, while Russia demanded to be constituted protector of all Greek Christians living in Turkey, with power to receive their complaints, and to interfere in their behalf-in other words, demanded the rights of sovereignty over a majority of the Sultan's subjects. Our opponents will probably appeal to the "blue books;" we will abide by the same authority. The first notice of the Eastern question appears in a despatch from Constantinople, dated May 20, 1850, in which Lord Stratford writes, that 66 a question, likely to be attended with much discussion and excitement, is on the point of being raised between the conflicting interests of the Greek and Latin churches." Mark the words: it was not a question between the Christian and Mahomedan population of Turkey, nor between a few millions of Latin Christians and a many millions of Greek Christians; but between the rival churches. It was not an international quarrel between the " conflicting interests" of the Sultan and some foreign potentate, nor a civil question between the Porte and certain of its subjects; but an ecclesiastical dispute between Greek and Latin Christendom, about privileges which the Sultan was willing to concede to EITHER party. The question was solely in respect of the holy places; which church should be the titular owners of shrines, to which both had access; which church should hold this or that key; which sect should enter by this gate, and which by that; which should possess the right side of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and which the left side. We admit the French raised this dispute. In 1850, General Aupick, on behalf of the French government, claimed

new arrangements in regard to the holy places in favour of Latin monks and pilgrims. There could be no harm in this, and had the claims simply been urged by argument, there could have been no blame attaching to France. These claims were, however, pressed with great importunity by M. Lavalette, who succeeded General Aupick in 1851; but even here France was not without some excuse; her claims were not mere arbitrary demands, but were based upon the provisions of an old treaty (A.D. 1740) between these two states. M. Lavalette eventually threatened the presence of the French fleet, if his claims were not granted; Nicholas afterwards threatened force if they were. Both France and Russia were here equally to blame in menacing an independent state. What, then, was the conduct of Turkey and of England at this time? The Sultan wavered and vacillated; he of course felt no interest in the matter; a Mahomedan himself, he cared not whether the keys of the holy sepulchre dangled from the waist of a Latin monk or of a Greek patriarch; and consequently he endeavoured, if possible, to satisfy both parties. Turkey, therefore, was blameless. The English ambassador, too, acting under precise instructions from the British government, simply sought to allay the irritation of the contending parties, and to induce them to compromise their differences.

But while comparatively silent at Constantinople, England (as the dispute waxed warmer and threats arose) expressed her views at Paris in language worthy of herself. Lord John Russell (then Foreign Secretary), writing, January 28th, 1853, to our ambassador in Paris, says, with a christian feeling and manly candour, which in ages to come will be recognized as indicative of the true character of this patriotic and distinguished statesman,

"To a government taking an impartial view of these affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to conflict between two of the great powers of Europe; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot in which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men-when we see rival churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ

died for mankind-the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.

"Your excellency will understand, therefore, 1st, that into the merits of this dispute Her Majesty's government will NOT enter; 2ndly, that Her Majesty's government dis approve of every threat, and still more of the actual employment of force; 3rdly, that both parties should be told, that if they are sincere in their professions of a desire to maintain the independence of the Porte, they ought to abstain from the employment of any means calculated to display the weakness of the Ottoman empire. Above all, they ought to refrain from putting armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians."

ing "a guarantee" for the future), the real object of the Czar was not suspected.

The mission of Prince Menschikoff soon appeared at Constantinople. We then began to hear, not simply of a return to the status quo, but also of "reparation," and that, forsooth, not due to Greek monks and pilgrims, but to Nicholas, Czar of all the Russias! As early as the 8th of March, the Grand Vizier of Turkey told Colonel Rose (the acting secretary of the British embassy during the absence of Lord Stratford) that "the Russian government evidently intended to win some important right from Turkey, which would DESTROY HER INDEPENDENCE," and asked him to request the British admiral to bring up his squadron. Colonel Rose did so; but Admiral Dundas refused to comply without the sanction of the home government. Did England rush into war-did she "meet force with force"

Such was England's noble testimony in behalf of peace and justice. Such was the wise reproof she uttered, not in St. Petersburg, but in Paris. France, to her honour-did she even wound the pride of Russia and moral glory be it said, from this time gradually drew back; her demands were withdrawn, the concessions she had obtained were given up, and the arrangement as to the holy places returned to the status quo of 1850. On the 4th of May, 1853, the Sultan issued two firmans, regulating the privileges of the Greek and Latin churches at Jerusalem, in accordance with the views of Russia.

by so simple an act as concentrating her fleet in the neighbourhood of Constantinople? No; she commended the caution of her admiral, and sent not her fleet but her ambassador-a message of peace instead of an armament of war. Before Lord Stratford could reach Constantinople, the designs of Russia had become more evident. On the 24th of March, Colonel Rose was informed that Menschikoff required a treaty, the object of which "would be the exclusive protectorate by Russia of the Greeks and Armenians throughout the Sultan's dominions!” The astounding impudence of this demand, we should think, is unparalleled in the history of civilized humanity. Well might the Grand Vizier (as he communicated the fact to Colonel Rose) add, "that as long as he was at the head of the ministry, no such treaty should be signed, as he considered it ruinous to the country." On the 1st of April, however, the duplicity and audacity of the Czar were still further unveiled by the following declaration:

We now turn to consider the contrast afforded by the course of conduct pursued by Russia. France, it will be observed, never made any hostile demonstrations in acts, but had confined herself to verbal threats; Russia, on the other hand, collected troops on the frontiers of the principalities, and prepared her fleet at Sebastopol before the end of 1852. On the 7th of January, 1853, Sir H. Seymour, our ambassador at St. Petersburg, notified to our government that the fifth army corps of Russia had been ordered to the banks of the Pruth. On the 9th, Count Nesselrode informed Sir H. Seymour, and Baron Brunnow (the Russian "Prince Menschikoff had verbally exambassador) announced to Lord Clarendon, pressed the Emperor's wish to enter into a that the movement of the Russian armies secret treaty with Turkey, putting a fleet was for the purpose of meeting "force by and 400,000 men at her disposal, if she ever force," and of producing a strong "moral needed aid against any Western power effect" on the Sultan; all intentions beyond whatever. That Russia further secretly the restoration of the status quo, however, demanded an addition to the treaty of Kainwere solemnly denied, and, consequently ardji, whereby the Greek church should be (notwithstanding an expression as to requir-placed entirely under Russian protection,

without REFERENCE TO TURKEY, which was to be the equivalent for the proffered aid above mentioned. Prince Menschikoff had stated the greatest secresy must be maintained relative to this proposition, and that should Turkey allow it to be made known to ENGLAND, he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople."

England! my country! free, great, glorious, and moral! how grand a testimony to thy unsullied honour, thy high-souled scorn of baseness! A Bright, a Cobden, and a Thompson may condemn thee, but the conscience-stricken Czar, for whom they plead, dared not confess his schemes, and shrank from thy open eye.

Lord Stratford, on his arrival, laboured hard to settle the original dispute concerning the shrines, and also to induce the Porte to maintain its independence: in both endeavours he was eminently successful. The French government, as we have said, receded from its former demands; the question was entirely settled, and Lord Stratford received the thanks of Prince Menschikoff for his effective mediation. The original quarrel was at an end; the English fleet was at Malta; Turkey was quiet; Russia had not occupied the principalities;-the origin of the war, therefore, is to be sought in another direction. Hence it is wholly beside the mark to drag in the French demands, and the dispute concerning the shrines of Jerusalem, as the causes of the war: they were links in the chain of events which preceded the war, but were no more its actual cause than the death of Christ itself, which, by investing certain spots with sanctity, has led to, but not caused, the contentions of monks and pilgrims. Connection and causation are not the same; and the confusion of the two in the mind of such a man as Mr. Bright is a striking illustration of the power of prejudice.

The original dispute was settled on the 4th of May, 1853. On May 5th, Menschikoff sent in a demand for a treaty, note, or convention, giving to the Emperor of Russia pledges, equivocal to acknowledging him as protector of all Greek subjects of the Porte; to this was added a requirement for an answer within five days, under pain of the departure of the Russian embassy. Lord Stratford reasoned with the haughty Russ, but in vain. His honest view of the Russian

demand is thus worded in a despatch to Lord Clarendon:

"It involves the establishment of a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending, in the interest of absolute power, to exclude all other influences, and to secure the means, if not of hastening the downfall of this empire, at least of obstructing its improvement, and settling its future destinies to the profit of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture shall arrive.”

The supreme council of Turkey, by a majority of forty-two out of forty-five, refused to comply with the demand of Prince Menschikoff, and every ambassador in Constantinople concurred in Lord Stratford's view of its dangerous and unwarrantable character. Would such a concurrence of opinion have been possible, not to say probable, if the demands had had one atom of justice in them? On the 21st of May, Menschikoff quitted Constantinople, and ten days later, our own government (seeing that a rupture had taken place, that the Russian armies were on the Pruth, and that a Russian fleet was ready to weigh anchor from Sebastopol, and pounce upon Constantinople) placed our fleet at the service of the Sultan, but with orders not to pass the Dardanelles without his express demand. We have already replied to the advocates of passive resistance; and to those who admit the duty of self-defence it will at once appear evident that, having honestly advised, we were bound generously to assist the injured Turk. On the same day, May 31, Count Nesselrode demanded that the Menschikoff note should be signed within one week, and forwarded to the Prince at Odessa, or the principalities would be occupied. On the 17th of June, the Porte replied by refusing the demand, at the same time offering to send an ambassador to St. Petersburgh: the answer to this was an act of war-the seizure of the principalities.

We need not detail the subsequent events; we have tracked the origin of the war from its first cause to its first act. France is blameless, England is blameless, Turkey is injured and innocent. The whole and sole cause of the war was a determined attempt by Russia to subvert the Turkish empire. Invaded, insulted, and attacked, Turkey declared war against the aggressor in the autumn of 1853. England interposed her

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