FOOTE, C., concurred.

BELCHER, C. C., took no part in this opinion.

The COURT. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to the court below to sustain the demurrer, with leave to amend.

[No. 20421. Department One.-June 16, 1888.]

EX PARTE CHARLES LANE, ON HABEAS CORPUS. CRIMINAL LAW-UNLAWFUL VISITING OF GAMBLING-HOUSE-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE.-A municipal ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco making it unlawful for any person in said city and county to become a visitor of a place for the practice of gambling is valid, and the police judge's court has jurisdiction of the offense. ID. COMPLAINT.-A complaint charging the violation of a municipal ordinance is sufficiently certain if it refers to the ordinance, and describes the offense prohibited, without pleading the ordinance in full.

APPLICATION for a writ of habeas corpus.

are stated in the opinion of the court.

The facts

Alfred Clark, and J. D. Sullivan, for Petitioner.

Davis Louderback, E. B. Stonehill, and Walker C. Graves, contra.

FOOTE, C.-The prisoner was complained of before the police judge's court of the city and county of San Francisco as having committed a misdemeanor in violation of an ordinance of said city and county, in that he "then and there did unlawfully and willfully become and was a visitor to a certain house and place for the practice of gambling, there situate in said city and county of San Francisco, to wit, at 14 Kearny Street; thereby violating the provisions of sections 1 and 33,

order No. 1587, of the board of supervisors of the said city and county of San Francisco, as amended by order No. 1955 of said board; contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of California. And this complainant upon oath accuses the said Charles Lane of having committed said crime; and this complainant further alleges and deposes that the said accused was then and there arrested therefor in the actual commission of the said offense," etc.

The complaint was duly sworn to by one J. W. Wallace. As we think, it sufficiently charges a criminal offense, and the order of the board is set out and pleaded with sufficient certainty.

The police judge's court has jurisdiction of the offense, and of the person of the defendant. The ordinance, according to the return of the officer having the defendant in custody, seems to be valid, and we perceive no sound reason why the defendant should not be tried for the offense of which he is duly complained of before the proper tribunal.

We therefore advise that the writ be denied, and defendant remanded.

HAYNE, C., concurred.

BELCHER, C. C., took no part in this opinion.

The COURT.-For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the writ is denied, and defendant remanded.

[No. 12622. In Bank.-June 16, 1888.]

MASSAH VAN EMON ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF TULARE COUNTY, RESPOND

ENT.

ESTATE OF DECEDENT-FUNERAL EXPENSES-COST OF MONUMENT.-The cost of the erection of a monument at the grave of a deceased person is a part of the funeral expenses, and is payable as such from the estate of the deceased.

APPLICATION for a writ of review. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Brown & Daggett, for Petitioners.

Frederick S. Stratton, and N. O. Bradley, for Respond

ent.

SHARPSTEIN, J.-This is an application for a writ of review. The respondent in a probate proceeding made an order authorizing Robert Baker, administrator of the estate of John W. Miller, deceased, to cause a monument to be erected at the grave of deceased at an expense not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars. Petitioners, who are heirs of deceased, asked to have said order annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court to make it. The contention of petitioners is, that the jurisdiction of superior courts in matters of probate is defined by statute, and that the statute does not authorize the erection of monuments at the graves of deceased persons at the expense of their estates. It authorizes the payment of funeral expenses, but petitioners insist that the cost of the erection of a monument is not any part of the funeral expenses. The answer to this is that courts and law-writers have so treated it. In case of the appeal of Ann McGlinsey, Administratrix of John McGlinsey, 14 Serg. & R. 64, the orphan's court struck out a credit claimed for funeral expenses of the deceased. The appellate court said: "A handsome tombstone was erected over the vault in which the body was interred, and this

was the principal article of expense.' The court held that that should have been allowed.

In Bendall v. Bendall, 24 Ala. 295, 60 Am. Dec. 469, the court said: "They [the vouchers] all relate to a box tomb of marble, lettered and inscribed, which the administrator caused to be erected over the grave of the deceased. . . . . This may well be classed under the head of funeral expenses."

In Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 325, the court, after saying it was the duty of the executor to pay funeral expenses, added, "and it has been well held that suitable gravestones are a part of such expenses."

In Fairman's Appeal, 30 Conn. 209, the court said that the sums paid for tombstones "should be considered a part of the funeral expenses."

We think the court had jurisdiction to authorize the erection of a monument, and that is the only question which we can consider on the application for a writ of review.

The demurrer to the petition is sustained, and the proceeding dismissed.

SEARLS, C. J., MCFARLAND, J., PATERSON, J., and THORNTON, J., concurred.

[No. 12524. In Bank.-June 16, 1888.]

J. L. REQUA ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. S. P. SNOW, RESPONDENT.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-LACHES.-Specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, at the instance of the vendee, will be refused, when there has been an unexplained delay by him of upwards of three years in performing the conditions of the contract with respect to the payment of the purchase price.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

W. C. Stratton, for Appellants.

B. F. Thomas, for Respondent.

SHARPSTEIN, J.-This action was brought to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. Defendant filed a cross-complaint praying affirmative relief, and judgment was rendered for him for possession of the property and cancellation of the contract. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment, and insist that it is not supported by the findings. The findings are, that on the seventeenth day of July, 1882, the defendant made to plaintiff J. L. Requa an offer in writing in the following words and figures:

"I will take Requa's note for eighteen hundred dollars for one year from the twentieth day of September next for the part of my block 88 on which Judge E. B. Hall now resides, on the corner of Sala and Garden. ..streets, in the city and county of Santa Barbara, California; I to execute a good and sufficient deed for it on the payment of said note; possession August, proximo; the said Requa to pay me for the rent, and the interest on the said note, and house and lot; Requa to have until the 20th instant, all day, to inform acceptance or not of the foregoing proposition, at his office.

(Signed)

"July 17, 1882."

"S. P. SNOW.

The plaintiff J. L. Requa accepted the above offer in the following words and figures :

"I hereby accept the foregoing offer, and execute herewith my promissory note accordingly:

"$1,800.

SANTA BARBARA, September 20, 1882. "One year after date, for value received in house and lot, as aforesaid, I promise to pay $1,800, with interest, -$12 per month for each and every month, in advance. "J. L. REQUa."