invisible heavens, moving with clusters of other suns, and with the aggregation of systems, involved into other systems, in vast and progressive cycles round the Centre of the universe.

NOTES.

[Note A. ]

THE inductive philosophy of the mind is but of yesterday, nor is it likely, as far as present appearances go, to make any rapid progress. Far from being generally followed, it is not even generally comprehended, and the habits of the age are totally averse from severe and patient thought. In Germany, where more pretences are made to the energetic exercise of the intellect, it is the imagination and not the intellect which is called into action, and a number of shadowy abstractions are mistaken for realities. But it is much easier to dispute forever concerning the absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite, than to displace the imagery either of dim abstractions or of more sensible similitudes, (which so readily delude the metaphysician,) and patiently to examine and analyze our complex mental operations. Were the structure of the mind better known, as it is the most wonderful work of God, so it would afford the most striking instances of his skill. Even at present we may see in its peculiar organization, as far as discovered, not only the proofs of Divine wisdom, but the intention of its Maker, manifested from the first of its operations upwards, that the mind of man should know and worship its Creator. This is intended to be shown at length in a future sketch of the philosophy of the mind.

[Note B. ]

All words have originally a reference to sensible objects, as the only objects which, previous to language, there could be any agreement about, or any use of giving names to. It

is evident that the name for the Deity amongst most tribes must be taken from the sun, or from the heavens, and must be equally applicable to the visible residence, or to the presiding genius which was supposed to inhabit it. Hence happens a common mistake amongst those imperfectly acquainted with rude language, that there is no other object of worship than the material element to which the name of deity is most frequently applied. And should there be no outward system of rites, which is often the case, where there is no established order of priesthood, or when that priesthood has been long destroyed, a traveller might, with some apparent reason, conclude that the nation of whose language he knew but little, and of whose turn of thought he was altogether ignorant, were possessed of no notion of any superior power. However, even amidst those tribes, might still be observed customs or opinions which mark that superstition had formerly prevailed among them. Thus, invocations to former deities survive as charms or spells, and the incantations of the rainmaker, though they may not be addressed to any definite object of worship, are derived from former periods, when the ruler of the sky was solemnly invoked to bestow his fertilizing showers. The creed of the Hottentots has left a fragment of its ancient sway over the mind, in the absurd and obscure fable, which they still retain, of the loss of the immortality of the soul. No tribe could be pitched upon that did not show either directly or indirectly that man, like the Athenians, was a worshipper of intelligence superior to his own. And the same tendency is equally visible in the sophist, whose fund of credulity and superstition, no longer directed towards a false Deity, is expended on still more imaginary terrors.

Forms of superstition the most uncouth spring up where an established creed has been swept away, and if we sought for instances of the greatest weakness and credulity, we should find them in the age and country of atheists, rising up amidst the decline of the Roman empire, again amidst the very general disbelief that preceded the reformation in Italy, and lastly, in the writings and credulity of the French, previous to, and during the Revolution, whether we regard the specu

lative opinions of those who endeavored to account for the origin and government of the world without a revelation, or listen to the absurd hopes and terrors of the multitude, who, deprived of religion, created to themselves the most unreal phantoms of good and evil.

[Note C.]

Design in creation has been receiving fresh illustration since the time of Cicero and Galen, and that increase has been rapidly augmenting in latter ages. What a difference between Derham and Paley! and even since the time of Paley, though so short a period has passed since his Natural Theology was written, and though in it he has seized with admirable force on the more prominent proofs for the existence of God, yet what a variety of new instances of Divine skill have been discovered in the remoter walks of knowledge! The arguments now derived from the works of the Creator to prove his existence are very different in their amount and force from what they were in the first ages of the world. The proof of the Divine existence is immense, and can never be exhausted; the generations of mankind, whatever may be the length of their succession, will ever be discovering new foot-prints of the Deity in creation.

་

Some of the higher arguments for the being of God have been well stated by Clarke, in his work on the Divine attributes, though his line of reasoning requires repairs and occasional alteration; for instance, his reasoning in support of the unity of God is decidedly defective. Paley has done ample justice to the lower and more practical course of proof, though, as discoveries advance, portions of his work might require occasionally, to be recast. Paley, however, is as deficient in the higher exercise of reasoning, as Clarke is in facts and popular instances. A work which would come as near to perfection, as the subject, which is boundless, would