ILLUSTRATIONS

JOHN JAY .

Frontispiece

First Chief Justice of the United States. From the
original painting by Chappel.

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS*

No. LXIII.-THE SENATE CONTINUED

Prevents a want of a due sense of national character, of a
due responsibility, and of a defense against temporary errors
and delusions—History shows no long-lived republic without
a senate-Difference between the ancient republics and the
United States - Athens, Carthage, Sparta, Rome, Crete - Ob-
jection that the Senate will acquire a dangerous pre-eminence
considered - Such a result impossible - Senate of Maryland —
British Parliament-Sparta, Rome, Carthage- The controll-
ing influence of the House of Representatives.

No. LXIV. THE POWERS OF THE SENATE

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The treaty-making power-Importance of this power
Property vested in the Senate - A popular body not fit for this
power-Reasons — Objections to this power in the Senate con-
sidered, and reasons for their rejection enumerated-The re-
sponsibility of Senators.

No. LXV. THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED.

The appointment of public officers - The authority to sit as
a court in the trial of impeachments - Difficulty of forming
such a court-The Senate most fit for such a trust - The plan
of delegating this authority to the Supreme Court considered
and rejected-The propriety of uniting the Supreme Court
in this power with the Senate considered and denied - The
propriety of giving this authority to other persons disconnected
with any department of the government considered and denied
-Even if this power in the Senate is not desirable the Con-
stitution should not be rejected.

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No. LXVI. OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO SIT
As a Court FOR IMPEACHMENTS FURTHER CONSIDERED 23
Objection that it unites legislative and judicial functions
-This same provision in constitution of New York which

For Index, see p. 209.

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opposition admire-That it unduly accumulates power in the

Senate, and tends to the establishment of an aristocracy

That the Senate will judge too leniently officers for whose con-

firmation it has voted-That the senators may be called upon

to try themselves for a corrupt use of the treaty-making

power.

No. LXVII. -THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Misrepresentations on this point considered and answered.

No. LXVIII. — THE MODE OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT

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The only part of the Constitution not condemned by its
opponents-It is well guarded- Desirable to have the sense
of the people in the choice-Desirable that the choice should
be made by competent persons, as in the Electoral College:
to avoid tumult and disorder; to avoid intrigue and corrup-
tion; to maintain the President independent of all but the
people-All these advantages here combined - Choice will
seldom fall on one not qualified — The choice of a Vice-
President by the people considered and approved.

No. LXIX.

THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE
A single person-Compared with the king of Great Britain

and the governor of New York - Elected for four years, and

is re-eligible—Further comparison with the same executives

Liable to impeachment, removal from office, and punishment

by civil law - Compared again as above, and also with gov-

ernors of Maryland and Delaware - Veto power-Compared

again as above, and also with governor of Massachusetts-

Commander-in-chief of militia in federal service - Compared

again as above - Commander-in-chief of the army and navy

of the United States-Compared again as above, and also

with governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts - Par-

doning power-Compared as above-Treaty-making power

-Compared as above- General review and comparison of

executive powers.

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No. LXX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CONSIDERED

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A vigorous Executive consistent with republican govern-

ment-What constitutes a proper Executive-Unity - Rea-

sons for this-Vesting executive authority in two or more

magistrates - Restraining the Executive by a council - Ob-

jections to plurality and control by council enumerated.

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No. LXXI.-THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE

It affects his firmness in action- More interest in what
is permanent-The Executive should not be subservient to
popular impulses or to those of the legislature - Independ-
ence of departments of government necessary - Shortness of
term will lessen independence-The proposed term of four
years considered.

No. LXXII.—THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINued, and Re-ELIGIBIL-
ITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

Duration in office affects stability of administration — Heads
of department dependent on Executive and will change with
him-Re-eligibility of Executive-The opposition to it con-
sidered― A limit of a single term would diminish induce-
ments to good behavior, increase temptations to misconduct,
prevent experience in the office, deprive the country in
emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as a
constitutional barrier to stability of administration — The
supposed advantages of a single term considered-The peo-
ple should not be prevented from choosing men of experience.
No. LXXIII. THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE EXECU-
TIVE, AND THE VETO POWER

Without suitable provision the Executive will be at the
mercy of the legislature, and the independence of the Ex-
ecutive should not be impaired - The veto power-Reasons
for and against enumerated and considered — The veto power
not absolute — It already exists in New York and Mas-
sachusetts.

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No. LXXIV.- THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL
FORCES, AND THE PARDONING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 77

No. LXXV.-THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE 80
One of the best features of the Constitution - Objection
that it combines the executive and legislative departments
considered - It is a proper combination-Reasons for this-
House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted —Ob-
jection to requiring only two-thirds of Senators present.
No. LXXVI.-THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE

This an excellent feature-This power cannot be exer-
cised by the people at large-It will cause a livelier sense
of duty in the Executive-Objection to its being intrusted
to the President alone - He may be overruled by Senate —
Concurrence of Senate a check on favoritism - Objection

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