of the district is concerned, their decision is as conclusive as if the proviso had not been inserted.

It is objected to this view, however, that the records simply show what the action of the board was, and do not show the grounds or reasons upon which such action proceeded, or, as counsel put it, that there was any decision of the board upon the question of the application of the system of works to the excluded lands. But the order fixing and establishing certain boundaries excluding certain of the lands included by the petition is certainly a decision as to where the boundaries shall be; and there is nothing in the act which requires the board to state why it fixes the boundaries in any particular place. And we think that it may be safely laid down as a general proposition that the reasons or grounds of the action of any tribunal or body, whether legislative or judicial, need not be stated unless the law expressly so requires. It is to be observed that there is a clear distinction between cases of the statement of the reasons or grounds of the action which a tribunal is authorized to take, and cases where the power to act depends upon the existence of antecedent conditions. We think that this case belongs to the former class.

6. It is objected that the proclamation for the election on the question of the organization of the district was not published as required by the act. The objection is based partly on small inaccuracies in the description, which have been already considered, partly on unimportant mistakes in the spelling of names, and partly on the alleged ground that the proclamation was not published for "three weeks prior to the election." These words, we think, simply indicate the time during which the notice is to be published, and not the manner of the publication. (In re Cunningham, 73 Cal. 558, 559.) And nothing being said about the number of publications, we think that this matter was left to the discretion of the board. The board ordered that the

publication be made in a weekly newspaper" as often (or for four insertions) as the same may be published between this date and the said day of election." This order was made on October 28th. The election was on November 22d, and the proclamation was published on / October 29th, and on the 5th, 12th, and 19th of November. This, we think, was sufficient.

7. It is said that the voting precincts were established less than thirty days before the election. The irrigation act does not say in terms when the voting precincts shall be established. It says, however, that "such election shall be conducted in accordance with the general election laws of the state." And by the general election laws, the vot ing precincts must not be established less than thirty days before the election.

We are inclined to doubt whether the "conducting" of an election necessarily includes something which cannot take place within thirty days before the election day. But assuming that it does, the evident meaning is, that the election shall be conducted in accordance with the general laws except as otherwise provided in the act itself. The act provides that "for the purposes of the election above provided for, the said board of supervisors must establish a convenient number of election precincts in said proposed district, and define the boundaries thereof, which said precincts may thereafter be changed by the board of directors of such district." (Sec. 3.) This provision does not say when the precincts are to be established. But we think it cannot be the meaning that the board is to establish them thirty days before the election. For the notice of election is to be, or at least may be, given at the time the order establishing the boundaries of the district is made (sec. 3); and only three weeks' publication of the same is required. Hence the election may take place within less than thirty days from the time when it is first known where the boundaries of the district are to be. Consequently the argu

ment made would require the voting precincts to be established before it was known where the district was to be or what it was to include. No such absurd construction will be adopted. The time for the establishment of the precincts seems to be left to the discretion of the board. They were established by the election proclamation, which was published for at least three weeks, and this we think was sufficient.

8. It is finally objected that the bonds were not in proper form. The provision of the act is as follows:"Said bonds shall be payable in gold coin of the United States in installments as follows, to wit: At the expiration of eleven years, not less than five per cent of said bonds; at the expiration of twelve years, not less than six per cent; at the expiration of thirteen years, not less than seven per cent; at the expiration of fourteen years, not less than eight per cent; at the expiration of fifteen years, not less than nine per cent; at the expiration of sixteen years, not less than ten per cent; at the expiration of seventeen years, not less than eleven per cent; at the expiration of eighteen years, not less than thirteen per cent; at the expiration of nineteen years, not less than fifteen per cent; and for the twentieth year, a percentage sufficient to pay off said bonds." (Sec. 15.)

drawn so as to make And the objection is,

The bonds here involved were each one payable in installments. that a proper construction of the act requires that a certain number of bonds should be payable in eleven years, a further number in twelve years, and so on. We think, however, that the bonds were in proper form. The phrase, "a bond payable in installments," is clear, and can mean only one thing. Is the meaning changed by putting it in the plural, and making it "bonds payable in installments"? But there are other provisions of the act which make the intention clear. The sixteenth section provides that "the board may sell said

bonds from time to time in such quantities as may be necessary and most advantageous," etc. It may happen, therefore, that only a portion of the bonds are sold. Now, for illustration, we will suppose that the bonds are issued on appellant's theory, and that only those payable at the end of eleven years are sold. In such case the only bonds outstanding would be the eleven-year bonds; for a bond which has not been sold, or in other words, not issued, cannot be said to be "outstanding." The whole amount of the principal of such bonds would be due and payable at the end of eleven years. How would it be paid? The twenty-second section provides, in substance, that at the expiration of the tenth year the board of directors shall make an assessment "in the following percentage of the principal of the whole amount of bonds then outstanding, to wit, for the eleventh year, five per cent," etc. This is the only provision for raising money to pay the principal of said bonds. It would therefore result upon the appellant's theory that although the whole amount of the principal of the eleven-year bonds would be due and payable, only five per cent thereof could be paid. And similar results would follow as to the others. While, as the bonds are drawn, five per cent upon the whole amount of the principal of the bonds "then outstanding" would be sufficient to pay off each installment of the principal as it became due. It may be that the legislature supposed that there was a good reason for making each bond run in part for the whole twenty years. As is well known, a bond for a long term is more salable (other things being equal) than a bond for a short term. And the object may have been to help the sale of the short bonds by incorporating them with the long ones. However this may be, we think that the intention to have the bonds drawn as the respondent has drawn them is suf ficiently expressed.

The other matters do not require special notice.

We therefore advise that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.

FOOTE, C., concurred.

BELCHER, C. C., being disqualified, took no part in this decision.

The COURT.-For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment is affirmed.

[No. 12471. In Bank.-June 1, 1889.]

HENRY BAKER ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. JOHN DUCKER ET AL., APPELLANTS.

CORPORATION-RELIGIOUS SOCIETY-REFORMED CHURCH OF STOCKTONFRAUDULENT CHANGE OF DENOMINATION-ACTION BY MEMBERSPLEADING. In an action to recover for the use of members of the First Reformed Church of the City of Stockton a lot of land with the dwelling-house thereon, which was purchased and formerly used as a parsonage of the church, a complaint stating in substance that the plaintiffs and their associates, for whose benefit the action is also prosecuted, are a religious society in full membership with a national religious society known as the Reformed Church in the United States; that they were organized for the purpose of teaching the gospel according to the particular tenets of that church, as embodied in the Heidelberg Catechism, and were duly incorporated, under the name of the First Reformed Church of the City of Stockton; that the said corporation purchased the property with donated funds for a residence for its pastors, and for no other purpose; and that the defendants had fraudulently conspired to change the name of said corporation to that of the First German Evangelical Lutheran Zion Society of Stockton, for the purpose of repudiating the tenets of said Reformed Church, and of diverting the property from the use to which it was dedicated, for the support of the Lutheran Church, which has a different doctrine, different church government, and different laws from those of the Reformed Church, and that defendants are now holding and using the same, as trustees of said Lutheran Church, as a residence for the pastors of said Lutheran Church,-states a cause of action, and is not indefinite and uncertain in not stating particularly wherein the doctrinal standards of the two churches differ. ID.-PARTIES-SUING FOR BENEFIT OF MANY.-The complaint in such

action averring that plaintiffs, together with a large number of other persons, are associated together for religious purposes, and