Charles was no stranger to this posture of affairs; but, instead of being moved by it to coalesce with either, he was induced to play the same false and subtle game which had always distinguished him. Trusting that, by flattering each by turns, he might raise up such a jealousy between them, as would lead to a bloody contest, wherein each should aim at the other's extermination—when he should recover his power in their confusion-he endeavoured to sooth each, and poison it with inveteracy against the other. "Now, for my own particular resolution," says he, in a letter to Lord Digby, on the 26th March, 1646, "it is this. I am endeavouring to get to London, so that the conditions may be such as a gentleman may own, and that the rebels may acknowledge me king, being not without hope that I shall be able so to draw either the Presbyterians or Independents to side with me for extirpating the one the other, that I shall be really king again *. In the meantime, he was endeavouring to raise an army in Ireland, from amongst the insurgents there, whose acts had been so revolting to humanity, in order that, with their assistance, he should bear down all opposition, after the mutual exter Carte's Ormonde, vol. iii. p. 452. Let any man read this letter, and collate it with those to Glamorgan, and his professions to the parliament, and defend the sincerity of Charles, if he can. The written truth is," says Baillie, in a letter to his brother-in-law, about November, 1645, regarding the king's messages for peace, "the truth is, secret letters written about the last treaty, make them trust him no more, and resolve to treat no more at all with him; only they will send him propositions, and require his positive answer," vol. ii. p. 173. mination of the parties whom he was courting in England. In regard to the Irish transactions, his conduct was still more reprehensible than those with the English and Scots: while he was assuring both Ormonde and Digby, in the most solemn language, that they alone possessed his confidence ; and that Glamorgan had acted with equal want of judgment and honesty, he was secretly encouraging that earl to prosecute his schemes, by the promise of revenge against the two individuals, Ormonde and Digby, who had obstructed them. Glamorgan had even authority to supersede the marquis as lord lieutenant*. Such disingenuous policy, and attempts to overreach all parties, could succeed with none; and while Charles hugged himself upon the notion of deceiving all, he was, in reality, himself the only dupe of his own impos tures. He proposed that the power of the militia should be vested in certain individuals, and asked to be allowed forty days residence at Westminster, for the settlement of affairs, when he alleged that he doubted not to give them satisfaction, provided both houses, the lord mayor, and the common council, Sir Thomas Fairfax, and the commissioners for Scotland, would come under an engagement for his safety, and liberty to return to Oxford. Parliament, however, saw through his designs, and determined to frustrate them by refus See former note. ing such an engagement. They therefore coldly answered, that they were preparing ordinances which, when he should agree to them, might be productive of a lasting peace. These ordinances put the power of the sword entirely into the hands of the parliament; but they gave offence to the Scots by reserving to each country the command of its own militia, while they also displeased the city of London, by withdrawing from it that portion of power which had been intended at the treaty of Uxbridge *. These mutual disgusts kindled additional hope in the royal breast, of stirring up the parties to mutual extermination, while, at the critical moment of their depression, he might, at the head of the Irish army, establish himself in uncontrolled authority. To the Independents, he urged the tyranny of the Presbyterians, and the necessity of combining with him for their own security. To the Presbyterians, he represented that the Independents were averse to monarchical government, and would sacrifice the interest of Scotland to their levelling principles; and that, therefore, their only chance of safety lay in joining with him, in order to subdue the Independents. The negotiation with the Presbyterians, and particularly the Scots, was conducted by Whitelocke, p. 182, *Rush. vol. vi. p. 215, et seq. 249, et seq. et seq. Old Parl. Hist. vol. xiv. p. 159, et seq. p. 404, et seq. Clar. Papers, vol. ii. p. 196, et seq. 745, et seq. Baillie, vol. ii. p. 184, et seq. Hist. vol. iv. P. Montreville, the French ambassador, in his master's name, though it was afterwards alleged that he acted without sufficient authority. In his zeal for the service, he visited Scotland, and afterwards treated with the army. The intrigues with the Independents were managed by Ashburnham, who likewise sounded the English Presbyterians. Out of Montreville's intrigues, arose a strange agreement, in the name of his master and the queen regent, on the one side, and Charles on the other-whereby the latter was promised security in the Scottish camp; and it has been said that, though Charles treated with the ambassador to avoid the disgrace of doing it with a rebellious army, the Scottish commanders had really agreed to the terms. But it is not easy to conceive what the conditions were, other than the personal safe. ty of Charles, since it is established by Montreville's correspondence, subsequent to the agreement, that the Scots steadily adhered to their Presbyterian principles. That they were anxious to have the king with them, fully confiding in their power to persuade him to yield to their conditions, is a fact that rests on sufficient evidence: that Charles, who was now blockaded in Oxford, and terrified at the idea of being taken a prisoner by Fairfax, and led in ignominy to the metropolis, by his victorious army, which rapidly advanced, wished refuge, is no less certain. His hope was to His hope was to engage the Scottish army on his side, and, with his characteristic dissimulation, he affirmed that, could they convince his conscience of the truth of their Presbyterian tenets, he would immediately subscribe to them. The Scots, however, were not to be deceived. They saw through the springs of the royal ecclesiastical policy; and one of their chief divines affirmed that no oaths would convince him that Charles was actuated by conscientious motives. While, therefore, the ecclesiastics were sufficiently ready to enter upon a discussion regarding Presbyterianism, they, as well as the statesmen, rested all their hopes of converting him, on the ground of their being able to satisfy his understandingthat it was for his interest to coalesce with them. Previous to his taking refuge in their camp, they intimated to him, through Montreville, the absurdity of his even wishing them to agree with him, on the principle of supporting the hierarchy, since, by such a proceeding, they would at once forfeit the co-operation of the English Presbyterians, and thus join both parties against themselves, who, in that case, unless they were guided by the chimerical hope of conquering England, could never expect to reinstate him in the throne. He proposed that they should co-operate with Montrose; but though the Scotch army had been as selfish as he wished it, such policy was not reasonably to be an ticipated, since, besides forfeiting the affection of the English, it would have lost the support of the party in Scotland which raised it, and, as the leading men justly argued, put all in the hands of the malignants, against whom they had hitherto |