the Latin-American markets by adopting the Monroe Doctrine that declaration which Bismarck stigmatised as an 'international piece of impertinence.' But Europe offered no resistance and suffered the United States to constitute itself for ever the exponent of that doctrine, and to construe it exclusively in favour of the United States. The doctrine secure, the American Government looked round for the best class of men who could be sent as trade ambassadors to the various Republics concerned, not only charged with the difficult but congenial task of expounding to them the manifold advantages which they would derive from the operations of the doctrine, but instructed to throw upon them, peacefully if possible, forcibly if necessary, the surplus manufactures and shipments of the United States. In vain have cabals, combinations, and conspiracies among the different Latin States been formed to resist United States aggression. Boycotts have been declared, but United States gunboats have broken them up. Concessions to Americans have been cancelled, but United States diplomatic threats have usually served to restore them. Aggressive American citizens have been banished, thrashed, and even murdered; but the United States have exacted prompt and rigorous punishment of the perpetrators, and stupendous damages from the Republican Governments. It has been an allround triumph for the United States, a complete subjugation of Latin America, and a humiliating object-lesson for Great Britain.

While the Monroe Doctrine has protected the LatinAmerican Republics from European intervention, it has practically enslaved those States, whose objections, if not very apparent at the present moment, are nevertheless deep-seated. It may be argued that the North Americans have a right to intervene in these smaller States, firstly, on account of their geographical propinquity; and secondly, because the United States, as is well known, greatly cheered and encouraged the Spanish Colonies to release themselves from the galling yoke under which they suffered. Had that great Power confined itself to these attentions, the smaller Republics would have had cause for little else than gratitude; but history has proved that the good faith of the United States is not always to be relied upon.

Firstly, we have the record left by that country in Mexico, which, at the instigation of a number of landrobbers and swashbucklers, was ravaged and shorn of one-third of its territory in the course of the war of 1848, a war which General Grant himself admitted to have been the most unjust and cruel ever waged by a powerful nation against a weaker one.' We have also, in recent times, the glaring violation by the United States of the treaty of 1846 with the Republic of Colombia, in fostering the revolution of 1902, which resulted in the independence of Panama. Although almost ten years have come and gone since this act was committed, there are some highminded statesmen in North America who are determined that it shall not be forgotten, and, if possible, that it shall be redressed. Mr Henry T. Rainey, Democratic Representative for Illinois, has set in motion an enquiry before the Committee of Foreign Affairs, and has publicly declared that he can and will prove that the United States Government not only countenanced but actively assisted the revolution in Colombia; that it knew of it months before it actually occurred; and that, in sending warships to Panama two weeks prior to the time of the revolution, the Government was aware of the immediate approach of that revolution, and that the warships were despatched to await it.' Mr Rainey adds that he will prove that the announcement of the revolution was made prematurely by the United States, before the people of Panama knew anything about it. It may be borne in mind that Colombia has never acknowledged the independence of Panama. It has always indignantly refused, and still refuses, to accept the paltry money compensation offered by the United States; and its formal complaint still lies before the Powers of Europe for their consideration. The inconsistency of the United States in refusing to consent to Colombia's reasonable request for arbitration is so glaring as to need but little comment. The Americans have repeatedly and in the most solemn manner declared in favour of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes; they have repeatedly submitted their own claims against powerful nations, and have accepted the judgment of the court. But in this quarrel with a small and defenceless State, they refuse to act up to their own standard.

Nor do these examples of American bad faith, eloquent in themselves, complete the list of charges which the Latin-American States have formulated against the powerful neighbour who insists upon playing the part of 'big brother,' entirely against their wishes, and indeed in direct opposition to them. The people of the Central American Republics, who are held in continual subjection by their northern neighbour, have no means of ventilating their grievances, and have learned to regard the whole of Europe as being so completely under the thraldom of the Monroe Doctrine as to render any appeal from aggression useless. Long and frequent travel among the people of the smaller nations has shown the writer that intense hatred and fear of the United States prevail; and, while the lesser Republics quarrel furiously among themselves and often come to blows, they combine without exception in their detestation of the United States. The recent troubles of Nicaragua drew the matter to a head some few months ago, when a meeting of representative statesmen from Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Honduras took place in Mexico City, to protest against United States methods and to condemn the Government of that country for its action in Nicaragua. Nothing concerning this meeting was recorded in the columns of the English press, the reason being, that all Central American intelligence reaches this side from New York, where it is carefully censored when it contains anything likely to prove prejudicial to United States interests; and it is eloquent of the amount of interest which Great Britain feels in these small States that no British newspaper or established news-agency deems it worth while to employ the services of an independent correspondent. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why we remain in ignorance of the most important commercial news as well as of political movements bearing upon trade, and why we only learn of them when such information is too late to be of any practical benefit.

PERCY F. MARTIN.

Art. 8.-SUBMARINES: DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE. 1. The Evolution of the Submarine Boat, Mine and Torpedo. By Commander Murray F. Sueter, R.N. Portsmouth: Griffin, 1907.

2. The Naval Annual. Edited by T. A. Brassey. Portsmouth: Griffin, 1911.

3. Enclyclopædia Britannica.

Ed. xi, vol. xxiv (Art.

'Ship'). Cambridge: University Press, 1910.

THE submarine, if the word be used in its widest sense, to include all vessels which are capable of being navigated beneath the surface of the water, has emerged from the experimental state,* and taken its place permanently in the navies of the world. In size it now compares with the largest above-water torpedo craft; in speed on the surface it is fast, approaching the rate attained by cruisers of a decade ago; it is operated with ease and safety; it can be equipped for wireless telegraphy; and its primary armament, the torpedo, is about to be supplemented by small quick-firing guns so mounted as not to interfere with the submarine's mobility under water.

Eleven years ago, the late Mr Arnold Forster announced in the House of Commons the considered expert opinion of the Board of Admiralty against the construction of submarine vessels. For a long time, in view of the activity in this department of naval science of France and the United States, there had been an active agitation in this country in favour of submarines; and the naval authorities had been charged with hazarding national interests by their refusal to add such craft to the British Navy. The Admiralty,' Mr Forster stated on behalf of the Sea Lords, are not prepared to take any steps in regard to submarines, because this vessel is only the vessel of the weaker nation.' A few months earlier Viscount Goschen, as First Lord, had said that The submarine boat, even if the practical difficulties attending its use can be overcome, would seem, as far as the immediate future is concerned, to be eventually a vessel for maritime Powers on the defensive; and it is natural that those nations which anticipate holding that position should

* Cf. an article on Submarines in the Quarterly Review' for July 1903,

endeavour to develope it.' To-day the British fleet has over 80 of these submersible vessels, built or building, of which 68 will be in commission in the active flotillas by the end of the present financial year. Of these flotillas some are stationed as far away as Hongkong, Malta, and Gibraltar; and Australia and New Zealand will shortly possess groups of boats of the same type. The British fleet, one of the last to adopt this description of ships, now leads the navies of the world.

It might be assumed from this rapid change in the British attitude to the submarine that, because the naval authorities of to-day are devoting so much time, energy, and money to this new type of warship, therefore their predecessors of eleven years ago were wrong. This is not the case. The action of the Admiralty in 1900 and the years immediately preceding 1900 reflected the highest professional wisdom; to it the present strength of the submarine flotillas of useful seaworthy craft is directly traceable. There was no supineness, no stupidity, no dangerous conservatism in the past, but merely a determination to wait and watch the development of the new arm so as to avoid errors and a large expenditure of money without any corresponding addition to the fighting strength of the fleet. As Sir William White, then Director of Naval Construction, remarked,*

'Everything done in France and the United States from 1895 onwards in connexion with submarine construction was thoroughly well known and carefully considered by the Admiralty at the time. There was no difficulty in undertaking here the design or construction of submarines had it been considered desirable to do so, and the work of building could have been done with greater rapidity; but it was decided to await developments elsewhere before making a start.'

The wisdom of the British policy has been proved by subsequent events; it was the practical wisdom of seaofficers fully conversant with British naval history and with the needs of the fleet. As a nation, we had no desire to assist in the introduction of the submarine. So far as could be foreseen, it might become a most powerful arm for a weaker Power, which could utilise it

Engineering Supplement of the 'Times,' March 1, 1905.