Art. 11.-THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

1. Problems of the Middle East. By Angus Hamilton. London; Nash, 1909.

2. Die Bagdadbahn. Von Dr Paul Rohrbach. Mit einer Karte. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben, 1911.

SOME months ago, in consequence of undeniable successes gained in the East by German diplomacy, the enfeeblement and almost the bankruptcy of the Triple Entente were freely proclaimed in various quarters on the Continent. It is interesting to enquire to what extent these criticisms are excessive or correspond with facts. First of all, what is the Triple Entente? It is difficult to give an exact definition of this agreement, since no formal diplomatic compact exists between the Governments of London, Paris, and St Petersburg. It may, however, be replied that, if the Triple Alliance exemplifies the orthodox system of treaties made between sovereigns, the Triple Entente presents this original feature, that it was desired by the peoples before being adopted by the Governments. The very fact of the absence of a definite treaty embodying the Triple Entente clearly proves that it exists by virtue of being in accord with dominant public opinion in England, France, and Russia. The Triple Entente also presents this particular aspect, that it departed from the earlier lines of European diplomacy in a perfectly decisive manner and with extreme suddenness. France and Russia have indeed been for a long time bound by a definite compact. But it is only a few years since France and England were still in a state of acute rivalry; war was even within an ace of breaking out between them at the time of Fashoda; while mutual suspicions of the most inveterate nature had long existed between the Russians and the English. What, then, is the event which has been powerful enough to break down the strong and ancient barriers formed by national preconceptions and prejudices between France and England on the one hand, and between England and Russia on the other? What circumstance has been so far-reaching as to change profoundly the tendency of interests and

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bring about a sincere reconciliation between hearts which only recently were alienated, if not actually hostile?

No doubt can exist in this respect. The Triple Entente is the immediate, direct, and certain consequence of the Russo-Japanese War. The great conflict which for many months bathed the Far East in blood weakened Russia in Europe to such an extent that, to all appearance, she was ceasing to play that part of benevolent counterpoise to the strength of Germany which had long been hers. The Great Powers were thus obliged to face an entirely novel political situation. England, after the exceptionally brilliant reign of Queen Victoria, was still suffering from the effects of the war which darkened the last years of that great sovereign. France experienced a sudden disillusionment on perceiving that her ally Russia, in consequence of premature adventures in the Far East, no longer possessed the same strength in Europe. As for Russia, she was obliged to realise not only that she had lost her traditional position on the shores of the Pacific, but also that, a victim to the suggestions of Germany, she had compromised her traditional policy in the Near East; nor could she fail to notice that Germany had taken advantage of her simplicity to increase her own influence at Constantinople at the expense of the Empire of the Tsar, under cover of the Bagdad Railway scheme. This affair of Bagdad, more than any other, enabled France, England, and Russia to grasp the danger of remaining isolated. After 1903, when the question of the consolidation of the Ottoman Debt was solved in a way which allowed the Germans to feel reassured about the future payment of the kilometric guarantees promised to them for their Bagdad enterprise, it was evident that the chief opportunity of internationalising the Bagdad Railway (by opposing the consolidation of the Ottoman Debt until that internationalisation had been accepted by the Germans) had been lost through the lack of any understanding between the three Powers directly interested.

While these bitter reflections were being made in England, France, and Germany, it was recognised that the power of Germany had benefited by all the prestige and all the strength lost by Russia. Men were compelled to face facts and to see clearly that the power of the

great military State of Central Europe was in this way increased in a ratio so considerable that, if precautions were not taken, Germany would be for the future in a position to exercise a dangerous and intolerable hegemony over the Continent. The predominance of the German forces had become so crushing that one could no longer doubt that, if the great States remained isolated, they would find themselves at the mercy of Berlin. It was, in short, this perception of a fact so fundamental, vital, and self-evident, that in the course of a few months triumphed over the most ancient prejudices and reconciled England, France, and Russia. In a very short time this reconciliation has become really sincere; and this depends on the fact that, so far as the eye can reach, there is at the present moment no essential interest visible on the political horizon that might run counter to the common interests of the three countries. The Triple Entente has thus become a sort of mutual insurance; so evident is it that the destruction or even the weakening of one of the States of the Triple Entente would ipso facto put the two others in a position of obvious inferiority as against Germany.

The policy followed by England in agreeing to this understanding is in no way new. England, in order to defend her position in the world, has been compelled throughout her whole history to act as a counterpoise, with the co-operation of allies, to the Power which exercises the hegemony over the Continent. This was the case against the Spain of Charles V, the France of Louis XIV, and the France of Napoleon; and it is now against Germany that Great Britain is unavoidably compelled to take her precautions. The formation of the Triple Entente, which appears to have owed much to the tact and insight of his late Majesty, Edward VII, was naturally distasteful to the Germans, who called his policy a policy of environment. They insisted on seeing in these precautionary measures an offensive weapon directed against the Fatherland. Such an intention, however, never existed; for the Triple Entente has never had any other object than to guard against the formidable eventuality of an attack by Germany upon one of the three Powers. It has never been an offensive combination; and it can be truly defined as an

agreement intended to safeguard the independence of Europe against any inclination for hegemony on the part of the German Empire.

The fact that the Triple Entente is the result of a simple current of opinion gives it a strong popular basis; but it must be recognised, on the other hand, that the absence of a positive compact between the Governments of London, Paris, and St Petersburg exposes it to vicissitudes which do not affect the Triple Alliance. It is also evident that the disappearance of King Edward has, for the time being, rendered the Triple Entente less efficient

a fact easily explained, for a current of opinion requires, in order to exert its full force, a man to embody and to direct it. The Entente has, in consequence of his death, and perhaps of other reasons, passed through a period of undeniable weakness, while the prestige of Germany and Austria has correspondingly increased. This was the consequence of the success won by Vienna and Berlin in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also clear that, with regard to that event, the Powers of the Triple Entente committed a serious mistake. A very well informed personage, who happened to be in Russia at the beginning of the crisis of annexation, observed that the Russians were deeply offended and much excited. In the course of conversation on the prevailing topic he asked: 'Well, what will you do?' —'We will protest.'-' But how will you protest? '—' Oh, we will make a great outcry.'-' But that is not enough. Are you determined to go as far as war?'-'Oh, no!' they answered. How can you expect us to dream of war so soon after our campaign in the Far East?' This answer said everything. From the moment when Russia made up her mind not to go to war with Austria on account of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would have been much better not to make so much noise; for, in fact, the purely platonic protests which were made at that moment had no other result than to give the Government of Berlin an excellent opportunity of making its value felt at Vienna without running any real risk.

As a natural consequence, the understanding between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary appeared in this crisis infinitely closer, more effective, and better

organised than that between England, France, and Russia. It was at that time that the Triple Entente experienced its principal check; but last November the Potsdam interview once more gave Europe the impression that the enfeeblement of the Triple Entente still continued. The Germans did not, indeed, achieve at Potsdam all that they would have liked. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter bluffed the worthy and too trustful M. Sasonof; and the German press in its turn tried to bluff Europe. Whereas the Government of St Petersburg simply wished, as was quite natural, to re-establish with Berlin relations more friendly than before, the German newspapers tried to represent the matter as a reconciliation so close that it was equivalent to the estrangement of Russia from France. They blustered so loudly as to agitate the more impressionable; but since then the exact truth has become better known. In reality, the negotiations begun at Potsdam are not yet ended; and it would be very strange if they should be definitely concluded on the lines indicated by the German press as being those of Potsdam. For this to be true, it would be necessary to admit that Russia would be duped to the very end; yet this is hardly probable. If there is one railwaysystem that the Empire of the Tsar is interested in not seeing carried out, it is certainly the linking up of the Turkish and Persian railways; since by means of this the Turks would, in a few years, be easily able to mobilise south of the Caucasus the 300,000 or 400,000 men whom they would be in a position to place in the field against Russia in consequence of the re-organisation of the Ottoman army effected under German direction. These are eventualities so obvious and so serious that the Russians, who since Potsdam have had time for reflection, can hardly fail to deduce their consequences.

In any case, however, it is certain that for some weeks the Potsdam interview, as judged by the general public, revived the impression that no real and wellorganised understanding existed between Paris, London, and St Petersburg. The idea of a crisis in the Triple Entente was thus strengthened. But let us not be deceived by appearances; we should rather look below the surface. Let us analyse, if possible, the causes of weakness in the Triple Entente in relation to the Triple