The complaints of the people representing such oppressed interests have been addressed not only to the administrators of Government, but to the people representing the favored interests, whose opinions would be naturally and strongly in support of the measures complained of, and who have invariably coöperated with the Government to sustain and vindicate its policy upon the most plausible pretexts. The Government in these instances has had the numerical and moral strength of a large party of the people deeply interested in the support of its measures. Partizan and local feelings have been strongly enlisted in their favor and added intensity to the discontent, which, when not allayed by a repeal of the obnoxious measures, has invariably resulted in most bitter and sanguinary conflicts.

That measures of government thus generally constitute the primary cause of popular discontents, not only experience, but a knowledge of the nature of mankind furnishes abundant proof. It is difficult to conceive of a discontent pervading large and intelligent classes of people, or entire communities, and resulting in forcible resistance to the authorities, which did not have its origin in the conduct of the Government. The people, unless actuated by the belief that systematic measures of Government are unjust and oppressive of their interests, or subversive of their just securities, can have no adequate motive for making the vast sacrifices, and incurring the tremendous responsibilities, which a resistance to the Government necessarily involves. Every interest of the people is on the side of peace and tranquillity. When the conduct of the Government is substantially just, the tendency in the people is to an affection for it. They have lived under and enjoyed its protection, and have learned to conform their opinions, habits, and modes of thought to its requirements. Even when the form of the Government is arbitrary, the people become accustomed to its rule, and endure occasional oppression not only without complaint, but without alienating their feelings of attachment to it. In the words of the American Declaration of Independence 'All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are

sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.'•

But, while it is true that the primary causes of great popular discontents are to be sought in oppressive or dangerous measures of Government, yet experience has proved that in the progress of the discontents, the people often act without reasonable prudence or discretion. It rarely happens that they are wise in their modes of seeking redress, or judicious in the extent of their demands. They feel that their important interests are disregarded, or their securities imperilled, often without comprehending fully the most expedient remedy. The strongest passions are aroused. The people are inflamed by mutual contact, and not infrequently act with reckless impetuosity, and rush madly into the greatest dangers, from which they cannot reasonably hope for a successful issue.

It is our purpose in this article to make an inquiry into the primary causes of the three great discontents which have existed in this Country since the adoption of the Federal Constitution;- the discontent of New England in the war of 1812; the discontent of South Carolina in 1832; and the discontent which pervaded the Southern States in 1860; and to show the modes of redress, and the nature of the interposition proposed or adopted, in each instance, by the disaffected, against the authorities of the United States.

In this inquiry we propose to confine ourselves principally to the evidence furnished in each instance by the authoritative statements and declarations of the disaffected. This is proposed, not that it is the only evidence upon the subject, or that it is conclusive; but because it is evidence which is important and in its nature unmistakeable, and because it has not generally received that consideration to which we believe it is entitled in discussion of the causes of discontents. The evidence is important. For if grievances exist, those who suffer, or deem their important interests endangered by them, are best capable of judging of their nature, and have the strongest motives for tracing their antecedents. Besides, history teaches that the causes

to which discontented communities have at the time artributed their dissatisfactions, have been generally determined by the calm and dispassionate judgment of posterity to be the correct ones. The importance of this evidence in our own experience will be more manifest, if it shall appear upon investigation, as we think it will, that in the several discontents to which we have referred, occurring at different periods, pervading the people of different sections, and arising under different circumstances, the discontented in each instance attributed their grievances to the same general primary causes; and if it shall also appear that the causes stated have been adequate to produce the results, and that, under our system of Government as organized by the Constitution, there has been opportunity for their operations.

The primary causes of all our discontents, according to the concurrent testimony of the disaffected at the different periods, are to be sought in attempts, or apprehended attempts, by the majority of the aggregate people of the country representing the great interests of a section, or by a combination of the people representing the great interests of different sections, to subordinate to their requirements, through measures of the General Government, the people representing the interests of the weaker sections. It requires no argument to prove that, in a country with such a variety of great interests, geographically separated, as exist in the United States, the danger of such attempts is always imminent, unless such effectual checks are provided in the organism of the Government itself, as to preclude the reasonable probability of their being successful.

In the Constitution careful provisions were made with a view to prevent the exercise of such power. The authority of the Federal Government which it created, was expressly limited, its power distributed among different departments, and in one branch of the Legislative Department, the Senate, an equal representation was given to all the States; so that no law could be enacted without the concurrence of a majority of the States. In addition to the security to minority interests, which these protective provisions in the

organism of the Government would give, it was believed that the fact that the several communities of each great section were to retain their political organizations, through which they could easily combine to resist encroachments upon their rights, or the rights and liberties of their people, would tend strongly to discourage partial legislation by the Federal Government.

These securities were provided in accordance with the requirements which it was supposed the circumstances of the country at the time demanded. The only sections then. peopled were the Eastern and Southern, and between the interests of these sections, the Constitution established a balance of power which it was deemed would afford to each ample protection.

But such was the wonderful development of the country, that within twenty-five years after the adoption of the Constitution, five new States were admitted into the Union, one by the separation of Vermont from New York, and four from the recently settled territories of the West and South-West. The admission of these States, and their consequent representation in the Federal Government, materially changed the balance of power of the different interests, as the interests of a majority of the States and people admitted were largely identified with the interests of the South.

With their admission sprang up jealousies in the Eastern section, as the Southern and Western States had the power to control the legislation of the Federal Government.

Opportunities for the exhibition of this feeling of jealousy were afforded in the circumstances and policies which preceded, and culminated in, the war with England in 1812: The predominant interest of the Eastern States at that time was commerce, and that of the Southern and Western States agriculture. The Embargo Act, which went into operation. in 1808, and the Non-intercourse Act passed in 1809 in re. taliation for the restriction imposed upon our commerce by France, in the adoption of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and by Great Britain in the adoption of the British. Orders in Council, operated most injuriously upon our commerce; and the commercial States looked forward to a war

with England, which it was believed must result, as ruinous to the interests and destructive of the prosperity of their section. So strong was the feeling excited against the re-. strictive policy of the Federal Government, that, although the war with England which followed was declared for the purpose of preventing foreign interference with our commerce, and for the protection of our seamen, yet it met with a spirit of the most determined opposition from the commercial States.

The feeling of opposition to the war in the commercial States increased with the progress of the struggle, and the adoption of the measures which were deemed by the Federal Government necessary for its successful prosecution. In October, 1814, in response to memorials from a large number of towns, a resolution was reported in the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, That twelve persons be appointed as delegates from this Commonwealth to meet and confer with delegates from the other New England States, or any other, upon the subject of their public grievances and concerns,' &c., which was adopted by a vote of 260 to 90. The Senate concurred in the resolution, and on the 18th of October both Houses in convention elected the delegates by a vote of 226 to 67. The Legislature directed that copies of their proceedings be transmitted to the authorities of the several States. The Legislatures of Connecticut and Rhode Island were then in session and immediately passed resolutions in favor of such a convention, and elected delegates. The Legislature of Connecticut designated the 15th day of December following for its convocation. The Legislatures of New Hampshire and Vermont were not in session, but delegates were appointed from one or more counties of each. The convention assembled at the time designated, and continued in secret session for three weeks. The result of its deliberations was embodied in a report which was signed by all the members, copies of which were directed to be transmitted to the Governors of the several New England States.

This report is of great importance as the authoritative statement of the people of New England upon the subject