Henry and Grayson were in the House of Delegates, when these spirited Resolutions were adopted, and, being familiar with the political transactions of the day, lost all confidence in the fairness and justice of a Northern majority in consequence of the manner in which it had dealt with the Mississippi question. In reference to this question, Mr. Madison writes from Congress to Jefferson at Paris, March 19th, 1787: 'I have already made known to you the light in which the subject was taken up by Virginia. Mr. Henry's disgust exceeds all measure, and I am not singular in ascribing his refusal to attend the Convention [of 1787] to the policy of keeping himself free to combat or expose the result of it, according to the result of the Mississippi business, among other circumstances.' Mr. Henry not only refused to attend the, Convention of 1787, to which he had been appointed a delegate, but, in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia, he became the most determined opponent of the proposed Constitution; because he deemed it little short of madness to confide the rights and interests of the South to a Northern majority, armed with the formidable powers of the new Government. And was he not right? Did not his experience of the past justify his fears for the future?

But there is a still darker feature in this Mississippi business. As no Southern State would unite with the North to cede the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi to Spain, so, by the Articles of Confederation, they were deprived of. the power to make the transfer. Two-thirds of the States were necessary for that purpose. 'But Northern Statesmen,' as Barbarossa says, 'true to their national instincts, were nothing dismayed by constitutional obstacles. They sought to obtain that object by a fraudulent device unparallelled for its immorality in the history of American legislation. The plan was this: To obtain from Congress instructions to the Secretary of State, Mr. Jay, to negotiate a treaty with Spain, upon the basis that the claims of the United States to the Mississippi should not be conceded, and then to have that part of the instructions which concerned the condition revoked, which they contended might

be done by a simple vote of the majority in Congress, which was composed of Northern men.'* That is, they could not directly deprive the South and the West of the use of the Mississippi by the vote of a majority, nor by less than twothirds of the States; but then they could do precisely the same thing indirectly by a bare majority of one State! They only had to authorise a treaty to be made, declaring that the use of the Mississippi should not be ceded away, and then, by the vote of a bare majority, repeal that part of the instructions; and the Secretary might then barter away the very right which two-thirds of the States had expressly declared should not be conceded! Is not such a trick unsurpassed, even in the history of Yankee legislation?

Such a statement would indeed seem incredible, if it were not supported by the testimony of Mr. Madison, and by the action of Congress itself. Mr. Madison, in writing from Congress to Mr. Jefferson at Paris, says 'The Spanish project sleeps. A perusal of the attempt of seven States to make a new treaty, by repealing an essential condition of the old, satisfied me that Jay's caution (he does not say his conscience) would revolt at so irregular a proceeding.'† That is to say, the indirect attempt of seven States to make a treaty, under a Constitution which expressly declared that no treaty should be made by less than nine States! and that, too, by simply overruling the authority which it had required nine States to give!

'But the scheme, so cleverly contrived,' says the author above quoted, miscarried in its execution; for when the proposition was made in Congress to repeal that part of the Secretary's instruction which related to the Mississippi, and the Northern members impudently contended that it lay within the power of a mere majority, it raised so great a tempest that the conspirators were frightened from their purpose. There is no doubt that, had they possessed the hardihood to have acted upon their plans, it would have produced a violent dissolution of the Union between the two Sections.' Mr. Madison ascribes the failure of this

The Lost Principle, p. 149.

†The Madison Papers, p. 622.

The Lost Principle, p. 150.

most extraordinary project to the same cause, or rather he supposed its failure would result from that cause. In the letter just quoted, he says: A late accidental conversation with Gardoqui proved to me that the negotiation is arrested. It may appear strange that a member of Congress should be indebted to a foreign minister for such information; yet, such is the footing on which the intemperance. of party (i. e. of sectional strife) has put the matter, that it rests wholly with Jay how far he will communicate with Congress, as well as how far he will negotiate with Gardoqui. But it appears that the intended sacrifice of the Mississippi will not be made; the consequences of the intention and the attempt are likely to be very serious.' No wonder that the mere intention and attempt, on the part of seven States, to perpetrate a violation of the Articles of Confederation by a trick so flagitious, so outrageous, and so mean, should have been attended with very serious consequences. The execution of it would, no doubt, have instantly dissolved the Union between the two great sections, even then jarring and warring in their diverse courses, and in their struggle for power; the one to maintain its independence, and the other its ascendency. How futile, then, the miserable attempt to bind them together forever by a new written compact and the official oaths of faithless demagogues!

Under his authority to negotiate a treaty with Spain, 'upon the basis that the claims of the United States should not be conceded,' Mr. Jay proceeded, as it appears, to concede these very claims. This point is settled by the proceedings of Congress, as disclosed in the letter of Mr. Madison to Jefferson, bearing date April 23, 1787, in which he says: This Spanish negotiation is in a very ticklish situation. You have been already apprised, of the votes of seven States last fall, for ceding the Mississippi for a term of years. From sundry circumstances it was inferred, that Jay was proceeding under the usurped authority. A late instruction to him to lay the state of the negotiation before Congress, has discovered that he has adjusted with Gardoqui an article for suspending the use of the Mississippi by the citizens of the United States.'*

*The Madison Papers, p. 641.

The above letters of Mr. Madison had not been published when, in 1788, the Convention of Virginia met to ratify or to reject the new Constitution of the United States. Otherwise they must have been lions in his path. As it was, his extreme desire to establish a more perfect Union' between the States, and especially between the sections, led him to put the best possible face on the ugly features of this Mississippi business, and to smooth down the angry passions it had so naturally excited in the Southern mind. 'The seven Northern States,' said Mr. Henry in that Convention, are determined to give up the Mississippi.'* Mr. Madison replied, that it was the design to cede it for only thirty-five years, at the expiration of which time Spain would, it. was believed, willingly restore it to the United States. Is it imagined,' rejoined Henry, that Spain will, after a peaceable possession of thirty-five years, give it up to you again? Can credulity itself hope that the Spaniards, who wish to have it for that period, desire to clear the river for you? What is it they wish? To clear the river? For whom? America saw the time when she had the reputation of common sense at least!'

This quarrel between the North, and the South came to an end only a few days before the meeting of the Convention of 1787 to form a new Constitution. It may, perhaps, be more proper to say, that it subsided, than that it was settled, in consequence of the great hopes entertained . of the labors of that Convention, which was expected to provide a remedy for all past and all future causes of quarrel between the different parts of the United States. But when that Convention asssembled on the 15th of May, 1787, the North and the South stood there face to face, fresh in the recollection of the late tremendous conflict, and of the angry tempest which had so recently shaken, and endangered the Union. Each was determined, that if any closer alliance should be formed between, them, its own rights and interests, its own independence and freedom, its own greatness and glory, should be amply protected in the new Union. Let us, then, look into that secret Convention, Elliot's Debates. Vol. III, p. 310.

into that great workshop of constitution-makers, and examine the conduct of the North and the South in their attempts to adjust and settle the deep-seated and inveterate antagonism, which had hitherto so seriously disturbed their peace, and impaired their mutual good-will.

In that Convention, the delegates from both ends of the. Union recognized, as we have seen, a real antagonism of interests between the two sections. We have also seen, that they were familiar with the very just principle, that 'wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defence.' Let us see, then, what constitutional power of defence was established by these celebrated legislators. Let us see how they endeavored to protect the rights and interests of the South against the North, and the rights and interests of the North against the South. This was the great problem which they most distinctly proposed to themselves. Let us examine, then, how it was solyed by their legislation.

As the great difference of interests 'lay between the Northern and Southern States,' so, said Mr. Madison, 'if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to those two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important truth, that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred, was, that instead of proportioning the votes in both branches to their respective number of inhabitants, computing the slaves in the value of five to three, they should be represented in one branch according to the number of free inhabitants; and in the other according to the whole number, counting the slaves as free. By this arrangement, the Southern scale would have had the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the other.'*.

Now this would have been an admirable arrangement, provided only it would last. For as the North would have a majority in one branch of the legislature, and the South in the other; so neither would have possessed the power to oppress its rival. As no bill could become a law Madison Papers, p. 1006.