is admitted by Abélard. The former thereupon rejoin that nought can be prædicated of any thing except what is actually in it, but the multitude of which a species is formed, agreeably to the definition before given, cannot be in Socrates, who is a single essence or individual of that multitude. Abélard rebuts this argument on the ground that humanity is in Socrates, not, however, as to be wholly consumed or exhausted in him, but so that one part of it has received the form of Socrates. "I am said," says Abélard, "to touch a wall, though no other part of my body but the tip of my finger adheres to it. An army also is said to attack a town though all the members which compose it do

not mount the walls."

3. "Item species in quid prædicatur de individuo; prædicari autem in quid, ut aiunt, est prædicari in essentia; prædicari autem in essentia est hoc esse, illud. Cum ergo dicitur: Socrates est homo, cum hic species prædicetur de Socrate in essentia, hic est sensus; Socrates est illæ multæ essentiæ, quod plane falsum est. Et habebimus illud inconveniens quod in aliis sententiis, scilicet: singulare est universale. Nam Socrates homo est illa multitudo, homo autem species; quare singulare est universale. Audi vigilanter. Prædicari, inquiunt, est prædicari in essentia. Hoc consentio prædicari, in essentia dicere, hoc esse illud nego. Nam prædicari in substantia dicit Boethius idem esse cum prædicari de subjecto; prædicari autem de subjecto dici de inferiore cujus sit essentia. Hoc commune est generibus et substantialibus differentiis respectu illorum quibus conferunt essentiam. Nam et homo et rationalitas æque prædicantur de Socrate ut de subjecto et in substantia. Nec tamen dicitur, Socrates est rationalitas, sed Socrates est rationalis, id est res, in qua est rationalitas. Eodem modo homo species prædicatur de: Socrates est rationalis, id est res in qua est rationalitas in substantia. Nec tamen dicitur: Socrates est homo illa species, sed Socrates est unum de his quibus inhæret illa species."*

Here the Realists urge that the species is predicated of the individual according to its fundamental character or essentially, and therefore in their opinion is identical. Accordingly, when it is said, Socrates is a man, i.e. the species is predicated of him, the meaning is, that he is the many essences composing the species, which is

* Euvres inédites, p. 527.

the same absurd contradiction as asserting that the singular is universal. Abélard demolishes the objection by denying, that to be predicated essentially is the same as being identical. Man and rationality are equally predicated of Socrates, as the subject. Yet it is never pretended that Socrates is rationality, but merely that he is rational, i.e. a thing in which rationality is. In the same manner, man the the species is predicated of Socrates, but the meaning is, not that Socrates is man the species, but that he is one of those individuals in whom the species is.

4. "Sed, dicunt, similitudo non procedit. Nam rationale alterius nomen est, pro

impositione scilicet animalis, et aliud est quod principaliter significat, scilicet rationalitas quam prædicat et subjicit; homo vero nihil aliud vel nominat vel significat quam illam speciem. Absit hoc; imo sicut rationale et homo, sic et quod libet aliud universale substantivum alterius nomen est, per impositionem quidem ejus quod principaliter significat. Verbi gratia : rationale vel album impositum fuit Socrati vel alicui sensibilium, ad nominandum propter formas, id est rationalitatem et albedinem, quod principaliter significant. Eodem modo homo impositum cuilibet materialiter constituto ex homine ad nominandum, propter eorum materiam, scilicet speciem quam principaliter significant. Itaque enim dicitur; Socrates est homo, hic est sensus: Socrates est unus de materialiter constitutis ab homine, vel, ut ita dicam, Socrates est unus de humanis. Sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est rationalis, non iste est sensus, res subjecta est res prædicata, sed Socrates est unus de subjectis huic formæ, quæ est rationalitas. Quod autem homo impositum sit his quæ materialiter ab homine id est individuis, et non speciei, dicit Boethius in commentario super categorias, his verbis: qui enim primus hominem dixit non illum qui ex singulis conficitur in mente habuit, sed hunc individuum atque singularem cui nomen hominis imponeret. Et nota quod nomina illa tantum dicuntur substantiva

quæ imponuntur ad nominandum aliquem propter ejus materiam, ut homo et cœtera universalia substantiva, vel propter expressam essentiam, ut Socrates; idem enim nominat et significat scilicet compositum humanitate et socratitate; adjectiva vero illa dicuntur quæ imponuntur alicui propter formam quam principaliter significat ut rationale et album res illas nominat in quibus inveniuntur rationalitas et albedo. Nam quod dici solet adjectivum esse quod significat accidens, secundum quod adjacet

or collection of many individuals, then, so often as that union or collection changes, so does the species also. The collection in fact varies every hour. For example, supposing that mankind consists of ten individuals, and that shortly an eleventh is born, then there is another mankind, for ten individuals and eleven individuals do not constitute the same collection. Again, for the same reasons, mankind is not the same as it was a thousand years ago, or even yesterday. Abélard replies, it is certainly not the same in number, but it is of a similar creation. As animals a man and an ass are the same, though they are not identical in other respects. Socrates, the man, is composed of more atoms than Socrates the child, yet notwithstanding he is the same.

7. "Amplius: species est quæ de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est prædicatur, id est, quæ pluribus inhæret materialiter. Quod si verum est etiam

dicere quod omne quod sic prædicatur, sit species, non una tantum erit species humanitas, sed multæ. Ponamus enim decem tantum essentias esse humanitatis quæ illam speciem conficiunt. Dico quod quinque illarum erunt una species et quinque alia. Nam illud confectum ex quinque prædicatur, hoc est inhæret materialiter pluribus, id est quinque individuis ab eis materialiter constitutis, et eodem modo illud quod ex aliis quinque efficitur. Nosse debes quod nusquam quid est prædicari plane dicit auctoritas. Nam quod solet dici quod prædicari est inhærere, usus est ex nulla auctoritate procedens. Mihi autem videtur quod prædicari est principaliter per vocem prædicatam; subjici vero, significari principaliter per vocem subjectam. * Revertamur ergo et videamus an illud constitutum tantum quinque essentiis, prædicetur in quid de pluribus, ut dictum est. Cum enim dicitur, Socrates est homo, non prædicatur nisi quod ex singulis humanitatis essentiis constituitur. Neque enim principaliter aliud significatur per hoc nomen homo, quod est homo quam tota multitudo, nec aliqua una essentia nec aliquid constitutum ex pluribus essentiis illius multitudinis, juxta illud Boethiiquod dictum est, "humanitas," etc., utique actualiter significatur. Nec ita accipiendum est in diffinitione speciei prædicari actualiter; alioquin omnibus tacentibus nulla species

* * * * *

*

esset; nam

nil significaretur; sed aptum ad prædicandum, id est ad principaliter sig

nificandum per vocem prædicatam quod convenitcollecto ex quinque essentiis. Possent enim duo nomina poni, quorum alterum daret intellectum de uno collecto et alterum de altero, hoc falsum est; per nullum enim nomen talis haberetur intel

lectus, de illo conjuncto discernens ab alio conjuncto. Non enim conciperet vel di. versam materiam vel diversam formam, vel res diversorum effectuum, quod quale sit post dicetur, sed sicut ensis et gladius eundem generant intellectum, ita illa duo nomina facerent. Item opponi potest: illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis aptum est prædicari de pluribus; quare cras forsan prædicabitur per hoc nomen homo. Contingere enim potest ut humanitas quæ hodie ex decem essentiis constat, ex quinque tantum essentiis cras constituatur; falsum est. Illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis, dum sit in constitutione humanitatis constitutæ ex amplioribus, non est aptum ut de ea habeatur intellectus, quamvis paulo post habebitur cum ad numerum quinque essentiarum humanitas redigetur. Sicut enim vox aliqua ante impositionem potest quidem significare, sed tamen non est apta ad significandum, licet post impositionem significat et sicut penna potens est ut per eam scribatur ante incisionem, nec tamen apta est, sic illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis, dum manet pars humanitatis ex pluribus constitutæ, potens quidem est significari, per vocem, sed non est aptum, dum sit pars humanitatis ex pluribus constitutæ. Quod si prædicari quidem pro inhærere accipiatur, quod et nos concedimus, neque enim honum usum, abolere volumus, sic inhæret individuis materialiter, species dicendum est; omnis natura quæ pluribus

est.

The Realists follow up the same turn of thought. They affirm that the species is what is predicated of several things according to their fundamental character, that is, in other words, it is what is materially inherent in several things. This being so, mankind is not a single species, but several. If ten individuals constitute mankind, five of them only, according to the definition above stated, will form a species. Abelard rebuts this consequence thus the name man in its principal or general sense signifies all human beings together. The two collections of five men each could not have two separate names with distinct significations, for it would be impos

* Euvres inédites, pp. 531, 533.

sible to conceive any diversity of matter or form or effect, and the two words would therefore produce only one single conception or idea, like ensis and gladius.

8. "Quod si quis opponat; ergo constitum ex quinque essentiis species est; ipsum enim pluribus inhæret materialiter; responde modo: nil ad rem, quia non est natura; hic autem tantum agitur de naturis. Si autem quæras quid appellem naturam, exaudi: naturam dico quicquid dissimilis creationis est ab omnibus quæ non sunt, vel illud vel de illo, sive una essentia sit sive plures, ut Socrates dissimilis creationis ab omnibus quæ non sunt Socrates. Similiter et homo species

est dissimilis creationis ab omnibus rebus quæ non sunt illa species vel aliqua essentia illius speciei; quod non convenit cuilibet collecto ex aliquot essentiis humanitatis. Nam illud non est dissimilis creationis a reliquis essentiis quæ in illa specie sunt."

The opponents continue the argument; they object that the collection of five individuals must be a species, since it is materially in several. But, says Abelard, a species must be something essentially different from all other things, which are not of that species. And this partial collection of five individuals is not essentially dif ferent from the other individuals comprised in the species.

9." Amplius quæritur utrum omni speciei conveniat prædicari in quid, &c. Quod si concedatur, dicunt quod convenit phoenici quæ ex pluribus essentiis collecta non est, sed una tantum est essentia, sed ista nec pluribus est apta inhærere nec principaliter significari, pluribus existentibus subjectis quorum sit materia, quia cum una indivisibilis essentia sit, pluribus eodem tempore esse non potest. Respondemus. Boethius hanc facit oppositionem, et solvit quia illa diffinitio non convenit omni speciei, sed a majori parte data est. Sed aliter solvit. Multa dicuntur secundum naturam quæ non sunt secundum actum, ita phonix, quamvis actualiter non prædicetur quidem de pluribus, apta est tamen prædicari quod qualiter verum sit non video nisi dicatur illa materia quæ sustinet formam hujus phoenicis illam amittere et alia accepta forma, aliud individuum constituere ; et sic eadem materia quæ specics est, diversis temporibus et non eodem pluribus potest inhærere. Ita ergo intelligenda est diffinitio: species est illa natura quæ de pluribus apta est prædicari, etc. sive eodem

:

* Euvres inédites, p. 533. GENT, MAG, VOL. XXIII,

tempore sive diverso. Forsitan dicetur : cum una tantum essentia sit phoenicis materia, poterit vero dici hæc phoenix sua materia quod non poterit dici inter indi vidua hominis et speciem, hominem scilicet, neque Socrates est illa multæ essentiæ quæ sunt species. Hoc negamus; alioquin haberemus inconveniens, quod singulare est universale, hoc modo; hæc phoenix est phoenix sua materia; sed illa est universale; ergo hæc phoenix est universalis. Generaliter autem dicimus omnem materiam oppositam esse suo materiato, ita scilicet ut hoc non sit illud."+

The Realists inquire if this property of being predicated of several things according to their fundamental character applies to every species. If this be granted they object that it is applicable to the phoenix, which is not the result of a collection of several individuals, but is one single individual only which cannot be inherent in many things, nor have a principal (a general) signification. Abelard responds, Though the word phoenix is actually predicated of one only, yet it is capable of being so affirmed of many, and he illustrates this assertion by a reference to the common history

of that bird's destruction and immortality. Matter which is the subject of the form of the phoenix, may at different times be in several individuals.‡

10. "Amplius opponetur: illa essentia hominis, quæ in me est, aliquid est aut nihil; si aliquid est, aut substantia aut accidens: si substantia, aut prima aut secunda; si prima, individuum est; si secunda, aut genus aut species. Respondemus tali essentiæ nullum nomen esse datum, nec per impositionem nec per translationem. Neque enim auctores dederunt nomina nisi naturis; hanc autem ostensum est non esse naturam. Itaque nec aliquid nec substantia potest appellari proprie. Quod si absurdum videatur, concedimus Sed hoc non

aliquid vel substantiam esse. concedimus: si est substantia vel prima vel secunda, hæc divisio non est facta nisi de naturis. Quam si concederemus, duceremur in arctum, scilicet ut vel individuum esset vel genus vel species. Secundæ enim substantiæ sunt species et earum genera, ut ait Aristoteles. Nec cui mirum videatur nos concedere non esse

omnem substantiam vel primam vel secundam; hoc idem alii faciunt; concedunt enim hominem album esse substantiam nec tamen primam vel secundam."*

The Realists next strive to toss Abelard upon the horns of a dilemma. They say the essence of man which is in me is either something or nothing, a substance or an accident. If it is a substance, it is either an individual or a genus; for into these two have the schools divided all substances.

Abelard replies, that no name, either directly or metaphorically, has been given to this essence,-that names have been given to natures only, but this has been shewn not to be a nature. It therefore cannot properly be called either anything or a substance, unless by those words you understand something distinct from an individual or a genus.

11. Et hæ quidem sunt auctoritates quæ maxime huic sententiæ videntur contrariæ. Illas autem omnes enumerare quæ ipsi firmamentum conferunt, grava remur. Dicamus modo aliquas de multis quæ hanc confirmant. Videamus. Porphyrius dicit, Collectivum in unam naturam species est et magis id quod genus.' Collectionem vero in alia sententia non reperies. Boethius in secundo commentario super Porphyrium: Cum genera et species cogitantur, tunc ex singulis in quibus sunt eorum similitudo colligitur, ut ex singulis hominibus inter se dissimilibus humanitatis similitudo. Quæ similitudo cogitata animo veraciterque perfecta fit species. Quarum specierum diversarum rursus similitudo considerata, quæ nisi in speciebus aut earum individuis esse non potest, efficit genus. Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est, nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilium numero similitudine substantiali. Genus vero collecta cogitatio ex specierum similitudine.' Item in commentario super Categorias: Genera et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt, sed ex omnibus singulis mentis ratione concepta.' Hoc plane est contra sententiam de indifferentia. Item

in eodem: Qui primus hominem dixit, non illum, qui ex singulis conficitur, in mente habuit, sed hunc individuum atque singulum cui nomen hominis imponeret.' Aliquem voluit confici ex singulis. Item in secundo commentario super Peri ermenias: "Cum tale aliquid animo speculamur, non in unam quamque personam mentis cogitatione deducimur per hoc nomen quid est homo, sed in omnes qui

* Œuvres inédites, p. 534.

cumque humanitatis diffinitione participant.' Item in commentario eodem: Humanitas ex singulorum hominum collecta naturis in unam quodam modo reducitur intelligentiam atque naturam.' Vix numero comprehendi poterunt firmamenta sententiæ hujus quæ diligens logicorum scriptorum inquisitor inveniet."+

After thus meeting the objections of his adversaries, Abélard proceeds to examine such ancient authorities on the subject as came within his know. He deals first with those ledge. which appear to shew a discrepancy from his own views, and then triumphantly closes with an array of friendly quotations, and to these, as the most interesting, I have confined the last extract. We now see those peculiar tenets of Abelard which stamped him as the champion of Conceptualism, a theory which maintains that the idea evoked by a general name, is composed of the various circumstances in which all the individuals denoted by that name agree.

I have now concluded my extracts from this remarkable and even entertaining treatise. It presents a mass of medieval thought which can be obtained from no other source. It is in fact unique in its kind, and forms the principal link which connects the schoolmen of the 13th and 14th centuries with the philosophers of antiquity. It cannot be denied that some of the extracts display, instead of metaphysical acumen and research, a certain verbal subtilty which, to modern notions, may approximate to quibbling. But even this feature in the argumentation is curious, as it shews the original treatment of the great problem of universals to have been merely logical, the metaphysical and more profound speculations, agreably to the laws of intellectual developement, being reserved for another age and a more refined contemplation. The fate of the philosophy both of Roscelin and Abélard has many points of resemblance. The former, though apparently quashed, not only by the complete and absolute hostility of the Realists, but also through the partial differences of the Conceptualists, was, in a later age, resuscitated into the fullest life by the exertions of William

† Ibid. pp. 535, 537.