AN injustice has been done to the memory of Peter Abélard. By the common consent of the learned, this celebrated man has been indiscriminately classed amongst the original Nominalists, and therefore in the secondary position of a follower of Roscelin.* The tardy publication, however, of a portion of his writings has shewn the incorrectness of this opinion; and the eminent scholastic now appears not as a mere imitator or expounder of another's theory, but as the founder in Western Europe of the school of philosophy, intermediary between the Nominalistic and Realistic systems to which the name of Conceptualism has been given. Until the publication I have alluded to, the only information regarding the peculiar philosophic tenets of Abélard, was to be found in some obscure and incidental notices of other writers;† for we did not then possess any printed work of Abelard on that subject.

It was reserved for M. Cousin the great Eclectic, to rescue from the worms some original treatises of Abelard of the highest literary interest,

and thus to remove the veil which had so long shrowded the brightest part of his character. To one of these treatises it is my present intention to direct the reader, and by a short series of extracts from it to endeavour to elucidate the particular system which Abélard professed and supported.‡

A preliminary remark or two upon the state of philosophy at the time

*The authorities for this article are the "Euvres inédites d'Abélard," and the Philosophie Scholastique" in the "Fragmens Philosophiques" of Victor Cousin.

66

"Alius

†The words of his contemporary John of Salisbury are sufficient to excite our curiosity, though without gratifying it, but probably the reading is faulty. sermones intuetur, et ad illos detorquet, quicquid alicubi de universalibus meminit scriptura. In hac autem opinione deprehensus est peripateticus Abelardus noster." Metalog. lib. 2, c. 17.

This treatise in its original state forms part of a MS. which formerly belonged to the celebrated Abbey of Saint Germain des Prés. It is without title.

GENT. MAG. VOL. XXIII.

will materially assist both to explain the position, and also evince the merits of Abélard, as an original thinker in an age when that character was necessarily rare.

The Breton Roscelin § (if he did not originate,) was undoubtedly the first who established the new school of Nominalism, which held opinions respecting universals unknown to the philosophers of antiquity. That schoolman had set out with the position that the individual and particular only exist, and that all else are merely abstractions of the mind, and from this position he drew the consequence, that universals, viz. genera and species having thus no objective reality, are pure words, and by the same principle as the parts of a thing exist only in that thing, whenever we separate them, we have in like manner only words.

No writings of Roscelin are now

§ Roscelin's opinions are briefly stated by John of Salisbury in the Polycraticon,

vii. 12.

"Fuerunt et qui voces ipsas genera dicerent et species, sed eorum jam explosa sententia est, et facile cum auctore

suo evanuit." Saint Anselm in his Treatise de Fide Trinitatis, sive Incarnatione Verbi, contra blasphemias Rosceleni, (Edit. Gerberon, p. 41,) says. "Illi utique nostri temporis dialectici, imo dialecticé hæretici, qui non nisi flatum vocis putant esse universales substantias. ***** Denique qui non potest intelligere aliud

esse hominem nisi individuum nullatenus intelliget hominem nisi humanam per

sonam."

Euvres inédites, p. 491. Abélard in one of the treatises published in that collection, says. "Fuit autem memini magistri nostri Rosceleni tam insana sententia, ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat." Also, (ibid.) "Si quis autem rem illam quæ domus est rebus aliis, pariete scilicet et fundamento, constare diceret, tali ipsum argumentatione impugnabat; si res illa quæ est paries, rei illius quæ domus est pars sit, cum ipsa domus nihil aliud sit quam ipse paries, et tectum et fundamentum, profecto paries sui ipsius et cæterorum pars erit. At vero quomodo sui ipsius pars fuerit? Amplius, omnis pars rationaliter prior est suo toto. Quomodo autem paries prius se et aliis dicetur, cum se nullo modo prior sit ?"

2 K

known to exist, and the opinions I have mentioned are derived from the testimony of his opponents, who have thus preserved a theory which they once used their most strenuous endeavours to destroy. At the time in which Abelard made his appearance as a philosopher, the Nominalism of Roscelin had apparently been quashed, first by the realistic arguments of Saint Anselm, though only incidentally to his principal subject, which was a polemical attack upon the heretical theology of Roscelin, and afterwards more directly and scientifically by Guillaume de Champeaux; and Realism as far as the world could judge had achieved a complete and exterminating victory. Nothing could be feared at that time from the enemies of Realism, for they were expelled from the professor's chair, and as a school their very existence was suspended. The small minority which entertained the opinions of Roscelin could only do so in secret, for the same penalties which had crushed their master, inevitably followed every public profession of his doctrines. Guillaume de Champeaux had succeeded Saint Anselm as the exponent of Realism, and under his care the theory had been further developed, and had acquired the fullest systematic vigor. At different periods however of his professorship, he taught two theories regarding the existence of universals. In the first he carried out the views, which Saint Anselm had perhaps scarcely more than sketched, into their greatest extent of developement, and attributed the essence of things to universals or genera, reducing the individual itself to a simple accident.†

*Roscelin was silenced by the Council of Soissons in 1092 or 1093. John of Salisbury declares his philosophy to have been nearly extinct in his time, (Metalog. 2, c. 17,) and that his scholars disavowed or qualified the opinions of their master. (Polycrat. 7. c. 12.)

We have Abélard's own testimony for the definition of this and the other system of Guillaume de Champeaux. (Hist. Calamitatum, Abæl. Opera, pp. 5-6.)

Inter cætera disputationum nostrarum conamina, autiquam ejus, (i. e. of Guillaume de Champeaux,) de universalibus sententiam patentissimis argumentationum disputationibus ipsum commutare, imo

These speculations excited the antagonism of Abélard, who had studied both under Roscelin and Guillaume, and the latter subsequently through the influence of his pupil or his own conviction, modified or lowered the tone of his first views on the subject.

destruere, compuli. Erat autem in ea sententia de communitate universalium, ut eamdem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse adstrueret individuis, quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas. Sic autem istam suam correxit sententiam, ut deinceps rem eamdem non essentialiter, sed indifferenter, diceret." Also, (Euvres Inédites, p. 455.) Quæ (differentiæ) a quibusdam sumi dicuntur in officio specialium nominum, ac pro speciebus designandis usurpari, ut tantumdem rationale valeat quantum rationale animal, et tantumdem animatum quam animatum corpus, ut non solum formæ significatio, verum etiam materiæ teneatur in nominibus differentiarum. Quæ quidem sententia W(ilelmo) magistro nostro prævalere visa est. Volebat enim, memini, tantam abusionem in vocibus fieri ut cum nomen differentiæ in divisione generis pro specie poneretur, non sumptum esset differentia sed substantivum speciei nomen poneretur. Alioquin subjecti in accidentia divisio dici potest secundum ipsius opinionem, qui differentias generis per accidens inesse volebat. Per nomen itaque differentiæ speciem ipsam volebat accipere." These authorities refer to Guillaume expressly, but there are other references to his doctrines equally distinct of his name, to be found in other writings and explicit, though without the mention

a

of Abelard. In the treatise now under consideration, (pp. 513, 518,) are the following descriptions of the two theories, viz. of the first. "Alii vero quasdem essentias universales fingunt quas in singulis individuis totas essentialiter esse credunt. **** Homo quædam species est res una essentialiter, cui adveniunt formæ quædam et efficiunt Socratem: illam eamdem essentialiter eodem modo informant formæ facientes Platonem et cætera individua hominis;" and of the second, 'Nihil omnino est præter individuum, sed et illud aliter et aliter attentum, species et genus et generalissimum. **** Socrates in quantum est Socrates nullum prorsus indifferens habet, quod in alio inveniatur, sed in quantum est homo, plura habet indifferentia quae in Platone et in aliis inveniuntur. Nam et Plato similiter homo est, ut Socrates, quamvis non sit idem homo essentialiter qui est Socrates."

His general theory however still retained its Realistic character. The new doctrine of Guillaume was styled by himself indifference, and by this whilst he affirmed, or rather acquiesced in, the grand principle of the Nominals, that nothing exists but the individual, he asserted that the species, the genus, and the universal were to be found in the individual as different states or modes of being, and as the latter were indifferent or absolutely identical, amidst all the differences of the individual, they are the foundations of the species and genera. This theory may be also more clearly explained in the following manner. The individual contains species, genus, and universal, according to the different points of view under which he is considered; as Socrates he has only elements of difference, but as man he has indifferent elements which are also found in Plato.

It does not appear that Abélard in his opposition to the early theory of Guillaume de Champeaux promulged one of his own also. It is in fact more probable that he did not, but was satisfied with demolishing that system by negative arguments derived from Nominal sources. After the publication however of the second theory, Abelard would appear to have determined upon his own system, to secure the reception of which he had seen that he must first subvert the two preexistent schools. In the latter course, the plan which he adopted, was that which has characterized the via media on all other subjects, but which by multiplying his enemies requires in the disputant a larger share of moral courage. It was by opposing one system with the peculiar argumentation of the other to raise from their ruins a novel and perhaps independent school. To the severities of such a mental warfare, the genius and character of Abélard supplied the requisites to sustain and encourage him, and his intellectual acumen, unmatched at that period, and his extensive learning, were not more necessary than the indomitable self-reliance and pride in his own opinions, which formed one of his most conspicuous moral traits.

listic opinions of Abelard in all their interesting details, and the mode of attack which I have just described against the adverse schools is prominently put forward and well sustained throughout the work. The following is a summary of its contents. Before proceeding to the exposition of his own speculations regarding Universals, he defines and refutes at some length those of his opponents. From Nominalism he borrows its fundamental principle that nothing exists but the particular and the individual, and objects it in all its conclusive force against Realism.* The first doctrine of Guillaume de Champeaux, that genus and species are the matter or essence of the individual, and the individual is the form, the difference being only an accident, he refutes by the principle of Nominalism that the individual is its own matter and form or substance. For, if the genus is entire in each individual, it follows that where Socrates is, there also is the universal man contained in Socrates, for whatever form an universal takes it retains it in its whole quantity. Moreover, when Plato is at Rome and Socrates is at Athens, the substance of both is in two places at once, for, where Socrates is, there is the universal man; and likewise where Plato there is he also; which is an absurdity. The other doctrine of Guillaume is also rebutted by an argument taken from the same storehouse. In this school we have seen that the Realists adopted the thesis that there is nothing except the individual, but they superinduced upon it the foreign principle, that in the individual all is not in

* P. 513.

dividual. To this Abelard objects that there can be no universal elements in any particular thing, for, if as they assert, Socrates, though as Socrates he is an individual, yet as man is a species, it follows thence that he is an universal, and being universal is not singular, and therefore is not Socrates.†

Having by these and similar arguments dispatched these two Realistic theories, he next passes to the Nominals, and keeping up the same method of attack, turns against them the forces of Realism, and by their aid demonstrates that universals are not mere words, inasmuch as words are nothing, and universals are incontestably something. If, therefore, they are neither things nor words they must be conceptions of the mind, and this, in fact, is their reality. For there exist only individuals, and none of these individuals is in itself genus or species, but they have resemblances which the mind can conceive, and these being abstracted from the differences and considered alone, form classes more or less comprehensive called genera or species. They are not words, although words express them, nor are they things in or out of an individual; but they are real products of the mind. The above is

*Euvres inédites, 520-522. "Unum quodque individuum hominis, in quantum est homo, speciem esse hæc sententia asserit. Unde vere posset dici de Socrate : hic homo est species; sed Socrates est hic homo vere dicitur; itaque secundum modum primæ figuræ rationabiliter concluditur; Socrates est species. ***** Si Socrates est species, Socrates est universale; et si est universale, non est singulare; unde sequitur non est Socrates."

Ibid. p. 522-524. "Res quidem genera et species esse auctoritas affirmat. ****** Item voces, nec genera sunt, nec species, nec universales, nec singulare, nec prædictæ, nec subjectæ, quia omnino non sunt. Nam ex his quæ per successionem fiunt, nullum omnino totum constare ipsi qui hanc sententiam tenent, nobiscum credunt. Si ergo non sunt, nec genera, nec species, nec universales, nec singulares, nec prædictæ, nec subjectæ, et in omnibus his dicunt auctoritatem mentitam, sed non deceptam esse," &c.

Vide also the concluding extract, which I shall hereafter make from the same treatise.

an abstract of the entire work, which may be very naturally divided into three sections, the two first being devoted to a searching examination of the adverse schools, and the other to an elucidation of his own notions.

The relative importance of the two schools at the time this treatise was written is strikingly illustrated in their respective treatment by Abélard, in the preliminary portions, where the space which he has given to Nominalism is so small compared with that which he has allotted to Realism, and the attention which he has employed in the refutation of the latter is so minute and scrutinizing that it irresistibly compels the conviction that the adherents of the former philosophy, though still in existence, had lost their influence in the world of letters. As this paper might otherwise run to too great a length, the extracts which it is now my intention to make are exclusively taken from the latter portion of the work, in which Abelard discusses his own philosophic speculations.

The mode of conduct which he employs in the dissertation is to oppose to his own position such objections as would suggest themselves to his antagonist, and finally to confute them. It is to be observed that these objections are all Realistical. more mention of the Nominals, or any allusion to them occurs in the work. The following is the proem :

No

"Quoniam supradictas sententias rationibus et auctoritatibus confutavimus, quid nobis potius tenendum videatur de his, Deo annuente, modo ostendemus. Unumquodque individuum ex materia et forma compositum est, ut Socrates ex homine materia et socratitate forma; sic Plato ex simili materia, scilicet homine et forma diversa, scilicet platonitate, componitur; sic et singuli homines. Et sicut Socratitas, quæ formaliter constituit Socratem, nusquam est extra Socratem, sic illa hominis essentia, quæ Socratitatem sustinet in Socrate, nusquam est nisi in Socrate. Ita de singulis. Speciem igitur dico esse non illam essentiam hominis, quæ est in Socrate vel quæ est in aliquo alio individuorum, sed totam illam collectionem ex singulis aliis hujus naturæ conjunctum. Quæ tota collectio, quamvis essentialiter multa sit, ab auctoritatibus, tamen una species, unum universale, una natura appellatur, sicut populus, quamvis ex multis personis collectus sit, unus dicitur. Item unaquæque essentia hujus collectionis quæ hu

manitas appellatur, ex materia et forma constat, scilicet ex animali materia, forma autem non una, sed pluribus, rationalitate et mortalitate et bipedalitate, et si quæ sunt ei aliæ substantiales. Et sicut de homine dictum est scilicet quod illud hominis, quod sustinet Socratitatem, illud essentialiter non sustinet Platonitatem, ita de animali, nam illud animal quod formam humanitatis quæ in me est, illud essentialiter alibi non est."*

In the opinion of Abélard, therefore, species and genus are a simple collection of individuals resembling each other, and he also maintains that as each individual of the collection is composed of matter and form, the matter and form of one individual cannot be those of any other. Each individual is his own substance. The humanity of Socrates is as individual as his Socratity. After this definition Abelard proceeds to put objections to it in the mouths of his adversaries, and in turn demonstrates their unsoundness by the absurd consequences deduced from them.

1. "Illud tantum humanitatis informatur Socratitate quod in Socrate est. Ipsum autem species non est, sed illud quod ex ipsa et exteris similibus essentiis conficitur. Attende. Materia est omnis species sui individui et ejus fornam suscipit, non ita scilicet quod singulæ essentiæ illius speciei informentur illa forma, sed una tantum, quæ tamen quia similis est compositionis, prorsus cum omnibus aliis ejusdem naturæ essentiis, quod ipsa suscipit compactum, ex ipsa et cæteris suscipere auctores voluerunt. Neque enim diversum judicaverunt unam essentiam illius concollectionis a tota concollectione, sed idem, non quod hoc esset illud, sed quia similis creationis in materia et forma hoc erat cum illo. Sic autem esse et usus loquendi approbat. Nam massam aliquam ferream de qua faciendi sunt cultellus et stylus, videntes dicimus: hoc futurum materia cultelli et styli, cum tamen nunquam tota suscipiat alterutrius, sed pars styli, pars cultelli."+

We have seen that position of the Realists that the species is the matter of individuals, and consequently as matter is that which takes form, it is the species man which takes the form of Socrates, a conclusion which reduces Socrates, as the individual, to

* Œuvres inédites, p. 524. † Ibid. p. 526.

an accident, and gives substance to the species alone. But, says Abélard in our last extract, it is not humanity in itself which takes the form of Socrates, but only a portion of it, and this portion is not the species, for that consists of Socrates and other similar essences. Every species is the matter of its individual, and takes the form of it, say the Realists. True, replies Abelard, but by this it must not be understood that all the individuals of

the species take that form. A single individual only takes that particular form, but it is similar in its composition to all other individuals of the same nature; it is an example of the whole collection which is compounded of this individual and the others, and it is considered the same not as being identical (in number), but because it is of a like creation. This is illustrated by a common façon de parler. When we see a mass of steel from which a knife and a styletto are about to be made, we say it will be the matter or material of a knife and a styletto, although the whole mass will not receive the form of both the one and the other, but one portion of it will take the form of a knife, and the other that of a styletto.

2. "Item species est quæ de pluribus in quid prædicatur. Prædicari autem est inhærere; sed illa multitudo Socrati non inhæret; Socratem enim non tangit nisi una essentia illius multitudinis. Audi et attende; prædicari quidem inhærere dicunt. Usus quidem hoc habet; sed ex auctoritate non inveni; concedo tamen ; inhærere autem dico humanitatem Socrati, non quod tota consumatur in Socrate, sed una tantum ejus pars Socratitate informatur. Hoc enim dicor tangere parietem, non quod singulæ partes mei parieti hæreant, sed forsitan sola summitas digiti, Eodem qua hærente, dicor tangere. quoque modo, exercitus aliquis dicitur hærere muro vel alicui loco, non quod singulæ personæ exercitus illi hæreant sed aliquis de exercitu. Similiter de specie, quamvis major sit identitas alicujus essentiæ illius collectionis ad totam quam alicujus personæ ad exercitum ; illud enim idem est cum suo toto, hoc vero diversum."+

The next objection suggested by the Realists is founded upon the formula, that a species is what is predicated of many according to their common fundamental character (in quid). This +Ibid.