the former, describe the nature of a thing, but present merely some discriminative qualities.

The general rule in describing an object is, strongly to characterize it in those parts which are of the greatest importance to your purpose.

Congreve thus, in part, describes a coquet, in accordance with this rule:

RULES FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A DISCOURSE.

[From Blair and Whateley.]

1. THE introduction should not be planned until the writer has considered the main body or substance of the discourse. Let that suggest the introduction, which will then be appropriate, natural, and easy.

2. Correctness should be carefully studied in the expression, yet too much art must be avoided, because hearers or readers are more disposed to criticise at first than at a subsequent period.

3. Modesty, united with becoming dignity and sense of the importance or interest of the subject, should characterize an introduction. It should not promise more than the body of the discourse will sustain.

4. It should usually be carried on in a calm manner. The exceptions to this rule are, when the subject is such that the very mention of it naturally awakens some passionate emotion; or when the unexpected presence of some person or object, in a popular assembly, inflames the speaker.

5. The introduction should not anticipate any material part of the subject, destroying or impairing the novelty of what follows.

6. It should be proportioned, both in length and in kind. to the discourse that is to follow.

VARIOUS KINDS OF INTRODUCTIONS.

1. Introduction Inquisitive.—The design of this is to show that the subject in question is important, curious, or other wise interesting, and worthy of attention. See the beginning of Paley's Natural Theology.

2. Introduction Paradoxical.-It will frequently happen, when the point to be proved or explained is one which may be very fully established, or on which there is little or no doubt, that it may, nevertheless, be strange, and different from what might have been expected.

In this case, it will often have a good effect in rousing the attention to set forth as strongly as possible this paradoxical character, and dwell on the seeming improbability of that which must, after all, be admitted.-See Paley's Mor. Phil., Book iii., Part i., Chap. ì., ii.

3. Introduction Corrective.-This is employed when you show that the subject has been neglected, misunderstood, or misrepresented by others. This will, in many cases, remove a most formidable obstacle in the hearer's mind, the anticipation of triteness, if the subject be, or may be supposed to be, a hackneyed one; and it may also serve to remove or loosen such prejudices as might be adverse to the favorable reception of our arguments.

4. Introduction Preparatory.-It will often happen, also, that there may be need to explain some peculiarity in the mode of reasoning to be adopted; to guard against some possible mistake as to the object proposed; or to apologize for some deficiency.

5. Introduction Narrative.-There may sometimes be oc casion to put the reader or hearer in possession of the outline of some transaction, or the description of some state of things, to which references and allusions are to be made in the course of the composition.

Sometimes two or more of the introductions may advan tageously be combined.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE DIVISION OF A SUBJECT-RULES.

[Chiefly from Watts's Logic.]

RULE I. Take care that all the members of your division, when taken together, be equal to the whole which you divide, containing neither more nor less.

The ancient division of the earth into Europe, Asia, and Africa, was defective, because these three parts do not make up the world. If, in writing about a tree, you divide it into the trunk and leaves, the division is imperfect, because the root and the branches are needful to make up the whole.

A division may also be erroneous by exhibiting more parts than the object contains.

RULE II. In all divisions, present first the larger and more important parts of the subject.

In speaking of a kingdom, it would not be expedient to consider first the streets, lanes, or fields, but the provinces or counties. The counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c.; the towns into streets and lanes.

RULE III. One part of a division ought not to contain another.

It would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains are contained in the head.

This rule is violated in the following proposition: "William has done harm to the state, not only by his factious discourses, but also by his sowing every where the seeds of disturbance."

Here the error is, that you can not speak factiously without sowing the seeds of disturbance, so that, in fact, you seem to divide without really doing so.

RULE IV. Divisions and subdivisions, instead of being witty and florid, should be obvious and simple, and not too numerous.

They should never fatigue the mind nor confuse the memory; they should draw the subject forth, and not bury it; they should always interest, and never tire the reader or hearer.

Cicero is always clear and simple in his divisions. R. Amerinus is accused of having killed his father. To prove his innocence and the guilt of his accusers, Cicero thus lays out his argument:

"R. Amerinus has not killed his father, because he had no motive to induce him to commit the crime; and beéause, though he had had a reason, the means were not in his power. The accusers themselves are guilty of the deed, because they had motives that urged them on to the perpetration of it, and the means of effecting their bloody purpose."

RULE V. Divide every subject according to the special design you have in view.

A printer, in considering the subject of a book, would divide it into sheets, pages, lines, and letters.

A grammarian would consider the periods, the sentences the words of which the book was composed.

A logician considers a book as divided into chapters, sections, arguments, propositions, ideas.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ARGUMENTATIVE PART OF A DISCOURSE.

[From Whateley and Watts.]

In the invention of arguments art can give but little assistance, though it may aid much in the disposition and conduct of arguments when invented.

There are two methods of reasoning, the analytic and syn thetic.

The analytic is, when the orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove till he has gradually brought his hearers to the designed conclusion. This is about the same as the Socratic method, by which Socrates silenced the sophists of his age. It is a very artful method of reasoning, may be carried on with much beauty, and is proper to be used when readers or hearers are much prejudiced against any truth, and by imperceptible steps must be led to conviction. But there are few subjects that will admit this method, and not many occasions on which it is proper to be employed.

The mode of reasoning more generally used, and more suited to popular effect, is the synthetic; when the point to be proved is fairly laid down, and one argument after another is made to bear upon it, till the hearers are fully convinced.

In arguing, the first business is to choose the best arguments for the cause, the occasion, and the hearers or readers. To do this, imagine yourself to occupy the place of those you are to address, and think how they will be likely to be affected by the arguments you propose to use, and adapt them to each.

Supposing the arguments skillfully chosen, the effect of them will depend not a little upon their right arrangement, so as that they shall not jostle nor embarrass one another, but give mutual aid, and bear most directly on the point in view.

RULES FOR ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS.

1. Avoid blending arguments confusedly together that are of a separate nature.

All arguments whatever are directed to prove one or other of these three things: that something is true; that it is morally right or fit; or that it is profitable and good These make the three great subjects of discussion among mankind truth, duty, and interest. But the arguments directed to either of them are generally distinct; and he who blends them under one topic will render his reasoning indistinct and inelegant.

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2. With regard to the different degrees of strength in arguments, the general rule is to advance in the way of climax, especially when the reasoner has a clear cause, and is confident that he can prove it truly.

If he distrusts his cause, and has but one material argument, it is often proper to place this in front to preoccupy the ground and procure a more favorable regard to the rest of the argument.

3. When our arguments are strong and satisfactory, the more they are distinguished and treated apart from each other the better.

But if our arguments are doubtful and only of the presumptive kind, it is safer to throw them together in a erowd, and run them into one another for mutual support