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he also claimed damages against them for being deprived of the use of his pew. The seatholder alleged that the management had acted maliciously, without any warrant or authority, and for the purpose of injuring him and driving him out of the church. He averred that the management devised a scheme of depriving him of his pew, so that being publicly affronted and privately distressed he might resign his membership. He further alleged that he had sustained a serious wrong through the invasion of his civil rights, and had suffered greatly in his feelings and reputation in consequence of the management's actings-Held that as the seatholder had set forth no right to the pew the averments that the management had acted maliciously and in combination did not disclose any cause of action, and action dismissed as irrelevant. Queree v. Smith.


Reparation-Negligence-Accident on unlighted stairCommon law and statutory duty to light Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. cap. 55), section 104-While a visitor was about to descend the last flight of the common stair of a tenement, he fell down and was injured. In an action by the visitor against the owners for reparation it was averred that the close and common stair were lit by inverted gas-brackets fitted for incandescent burners and mantles, there being one bracket in the close and one on each stair-landing; that the gas in the bracket at the close was not lit on the evening in question, and had not been lit for a period of three or four weeks prior to the date; that during this period there had been no mantle fitted; that the existence of a mantle was necessary to render the gas-bracket capable of use as a means of lighting; that in consequence of the want of a mantle there was no illumination; that if there had been illumination from the gasbracket the accident would not have happened; and that section 104 of the Burgh Police Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. cap. 55), imposed on the defenders an absolute duty towards all persons lawfully using the stair to maintain the gas-bracket in such a condition as to render it capable of use-Held (1) that there was no duty imposed upon the proprietors of the building to light the staircase; and (2) that the proprietors were not bound to take on themselves the business of inspecting the condition of the lighting appliances, and as the averments did not disclose any breach of duty owed by them at common law or by statute, action dismissed as irrelevant.

M'Clymont v. Kingston Investment Company


Reparation-Negligence-Landlord and tenant-Gateways giving access to plantation left open-Poisonous shrubs-Injury to cattle. A farm was bounded partly by a drystone dyke in which were two hunting gates. The dyke separated the farm let to the tenant from a plantation belonging to and remaining in the possession of the landlord. The landlord had power to remove any timber cut in the plantation through the lands let, and the tenant was bound to uphold the whole dykes, etc., in good condition. In the plantation rhododendron bushes were growing, and about the end of December the landlord's workmen commenced felling trees in the plantation and removing the timber through the gates and across the tenant's lands. In the course of the operations the two gates were left open and unguarded. The tenant had his milk cows out on the field adjoining the plantation, and twelve or more of the cows entered the plantation by the said gates. On the following day seven of the cows became ill, and the said illness was caused by their having eaten of the

rhododendron bushes growing in the plantation, and the tenant suffered loss thereby. In an action by the and tenants against the landlord for the loss sustained, held (1) that the landlord in leaving the gates open and unguarded was in breach of a duty which he owed to his tenant; (2) that the injury to the tenant's cows, though a result of the negligence of the landlord, was not a natural or probable consequence of that negligence, in respect (a) that the dangerous properties of rhododendrons are not matters of common knowledge even among persons entrusted with the care and management of cattle and were not known to the landlord, (b) that it is not a natural instinct or propensity of cattle to eat of rhododendron bushes in injurious quantity and that the action of the tenant's cows in so doing was attributable to, and induced by, the special circumstance that for some months they had been in the byre on winter feeding and their natural instincts in the matter of green foods were thereby temporarily vitiated, and (c) that the injury to the tenant's cows was not a contingency which the landlord might reasonably be expected to anticipate as likely to occur in the case of cattle entering the plantation; and (3) that, therefore, the tenant was not entitled to recover damages. Young v. Houston



Reparation-Negligence Property-Defective gas-pipe -Duty of owners- -A gas-pipe leading to a tenement and laid in 1893 had, in 1922, become so corroded that several parts were worn into holes only covered by a thin coating of rust, it belonging to the proprietor of the tenement. Employees of the Corporatian, without notice to the owner, entered upon digging operations in the vicinity of the pipe and the rust was disturbed. An escape of gas followed, causing. injuries to persons in the tenement-Held that the owner of the pipe was liable in damages. Kennedy v. Benson Reparation-Negligence-Street-Running down-Motor car overtaking tramcar on offside-Duty of driver of motor car-Contributory negligence-A pedestrian who was crossing a street passed in front of a tramcar which was sufficiently far away to enable him to do so safely. Immediately after passing in front of the tramcar the pedestrian was run down by a motor car which was overtaking the tramcar on its offside at a distance of about 1 yard from the tramcar-Held (1) that the driver of the motor car was bound in the circumstances to take special precautions; that he was in fault in not sounding his horn, in passing too near the tramcar, and at an excessive speed; and (2) that the pedestrian was not bound to foresee that a motor car was overtaking the tramcar on its offside, and therefore that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

M'Colgan v. Richmond Park Laundry

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Reparation Negligence Vehicle Duty to avoid animal on road—A racing whippet dog was walking from the west to the east of a public road while a motor van was being driven along the road in a northerly direction and more to the right-hand side than to the centre. When the dog had almost reached the east footpath it was run into by the motor van and received injuries which resulted in deathCircumstances in which held that the owner of the motor van was liable in reparation to the owner of the dog. M'Gale v. 112 Reparation-Wrongous use of diligence-Arrestment in execution Seaman's wages arrested in hands of his employers-Arrestment ineffectual by statuteAverments that the arrestment was lodged "with





the wrongful intention of attaching pursuer's wages Ship-Seaman-Wages-Forfeiture-Desertion abroad— as seaman aforesaid, and thereby to coerce the pursuer into payment of their debt, and did act maliciously and with want of probable cause," and averment of special damage in respect of dismissal from employment in consequence of the arrestment in combination with another creditor also using arrestments-Averments held to be insufficient to infer that the arrestment was wrongous. M'Laughlin v. T. Dixon Limited Reparation-Wrongous use of diligence-Arrestment in execution-Seaman's wages arrested in hands of his employers-Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. cap. 60), section 168-Arrestment ineffectual by statute though otherwise regular Held (1) that section 168 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, does not make an arrestment of the wages of a seaman either illegal or incompetent but merely makes such an arrestment ineffectual; (2) that the creditor by exercising his ordinary legal right of arrestment in execution was not liable in damages to the debtor for the consequences of the arrestment. M'Laughlin v. T. Dixon Limited


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Ship-Master-Necessaries-Coal-Authority of master
to pledge owners' credit for supplies A steam
trawler put to sea from Boston at the end of
December 1922. The master's instructions were to
proceed on a fishing voyage and to return in about
twelve days and not to put into any other port unless
absolutely necessary. The trawler proceeded to
St Kilda, remaining in that vicinity for about fourteen
days, and then made for Stornoway Harbour, remain-
ing there for several days. The trawler carried a
sufficient supply of coal for a twelve days' voyage.
On 20th January 1923 the master, without com-
municating with the owners, took on board a supply
of coal, although at that date there was sufficient coal
on board to take the trawler back to Boston. The
suppliers of the coal made no enquiry as to the
master's authority to contract on behalf of the
owners. It was proved that the masters of fishing-
vessels have implied authority to purchase supplies
of coal when necessary-Held that the owners were
liable for the price of the coal, as the supplies had
been ordered by the master from sellers who reason-
ably believed the purchase to be within the authority
of the master for the prosecution of the trade on
which the vessel was engaged, according to the usage
of trade.
Maciver v. Boston Deep-Sea Fishing and Ice


Ship Pilotage dues-Liability of ship's agents-Pilotage Act, 1913 (2 & 3 Geo. V. cap. 31), section 49Pilotage inwards-Held (1) that agents who had paid other charges on account of the ship in the port of her arrival were liable for the total pilotage dues inwards and not merely for those incurred within the pilotage district of the port, and (2) that it was not necessary, in order to entitle the pilot to recover, that he should produce a certificate from the master of the ship.

Ward v. Lawson & Mitchell

Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. cap. 60), sections 221 and 232-A seaman shipped on board the s.s. "Ernmore" as a fireman from the United Kingdom to America and back at a wage of £15 per month. The "Ernmore " sailed on 9th September and arrived at Boston on 22nd September. On 29th September the seaman deserted at Boston, remained ashore for some time, and shipped as fireman on an American ship for a voyage from America to Françe and back at a wage of £20 per month. The wages of the seaman earned to the time of his desertion amounted to £10, but he had received advances leaving a balance due to the seaman of £1, 4s. 1d. For the homeward voyage of the "Ernmore " & substitute was not engaged in place of the seaman, but the owners gave the other firemen who remained an allowance for sailing shorthanded, the result of which was that the aggregate sum paid to the remaining firemen exceeded by £4, 10s. what the firemen's wages would have amounted to if the seaman had remained. In a summary complaint brought by the owners against the seaman-Held (1) that the sum due to him had been forfeited under section 221 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894; and (2) that the employers had no claim against the deserting fireman for excess of wages.

Johnston Line Limited v. Docherty


Act 1579, cap. 80

Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1903
Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1878
Dog Licences Act, 1867



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Factory and Workshop Act, 1901
Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act, 1909
Increase of Rent, etc., Act, 1920
Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1908
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894
Money-lenders Act, 1900
Personal Diligence Act, 1888
Pilotage Act, 1918

Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1907

Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1913
Small Debt (Scotland) Act, 1887
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906

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18, 48, 61, 77, 101




Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (6 Edw. VII. cap. 58), section 1 (1)—Accident arising out of and in the course of the employment-Workman going home from work-Acting in accordance with custom and practice-At meal hour a workman left his work at a shed to go home, and in order to reach the exit from the docks he had to cross railway lines situated between the shed and the exit, this being the most direct and customary route. There were other two means of exit, but in both cases railway lines intervened. The workman waited along with other workmen as a goods train blocked the roadway, and after a period of time the train momentarily ceased shunting operations, and all the workmen attempted to cross the railway lines, which they successfully did save one who was last. While he was crossing, the train again commenced and ran the workman down, sustaining injuries which resulted in deathCircumstances in which it was held that an accident had arisen out of and in course of the employment. M'Ilwaine v. Spencer




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