REPORTS-1924, SCOTS LAW TIMES. 809 Parish time when his wife received parochial relief merely because her husband is able-bodied and 1st Div. in Glasgow, he was incapable of having a because it cannot be said that he deserted herparochial settlement in Scotland; or, alter- the actual fact being that she left the conjugal Council of natively, that his settlement in Rutherglen was home temporarily and with her husband's Glasgow v. suspended," and that it remains ineffective consent. According to the argument addressed Parish unless and until he returns to Scotland and to us on behalf of Rutherglen it is irrelevant Council of 66 becomes chargeable as a pauper. No authority was cited and no legal principle was referred to in support of either of these propositions, and they are both, in my opinion, unsound. It is unnecessary to say more than that quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur. The next point raised by Rutherglen is that the husband, being admittedly able-bodied, his wife cannot be a proper object of parochial Ruther November 20, 1924. to point to the fact that the home in question glen. relief. No one disputes that this contention cannot regard these topics as irrelevant in view President Inglis, p. 437). So far as I am con- CASE B.-Mrs Agnes Stark or Steel. man to support his wife out of his wages 904) seem to be in point. I refer to my opinion CASE C.-Mrs Susanna Jamieson or In regard to this case I concur in what your CASE D.-Mrs Martha Evans or Brown. Parish Council of Ruther 1ST DIV. death of her husband should start her life as a widow with the settlement which belonged to Council of her immediately before her husband's death, Glasgow v. and it is not necessary to justify the rule Parish by an appeal to sentimental reasons which do not apply to a marriage which has been glen. dissolved by divorce. No satisfactory reason occurs to me or was adduced by counsel why, as regards the settlement of a married woman whose marriage has been dissolved, importance should be attached to the cause which brought about the dissolution. The first question of law should be answered in the affirmative and the second in the negative. November 20, 1924. Lord Cullen. — CASE A.-Mrs Hannah Fallon or Dorran. I agree with your Lordships in the view that the husband's change of domicile did not involve the loss or suspension of his birth settlement in the parish of Rutherglen. The other question raised is whether the wife and children of Dorran were proper objects of parochial relief quoad the expenditure of £152, 18s. 9d. mentioned in the case as having been made by the first party. I am of opinion that they were. It appears that the wife returned to this country with her husband's consent, but that after she returned he did nothing (apart from a remittance of six dollars) to support her here; and while he announced himself desirous or willing that she should return to him in Canada, he did not provide or offer to provide the money required to enable her to do so. She was thus abandoned by him along with her children in a state of destitution which forced her to apply for relief. Such abandonment does not seem to me to differ in essence from the ordinary case of desertion where the husband actually goes away from his wife or children leaving them in destitution behind him, and equally carries with it, I think, the right to relief, as the first party contends. دو It is stated in the case that the wife "now refuses to return to her husband. While this is her present attitude of mind she has not, so far, rejected the opportunity to return, for the opportunity has never been offered to her. Should the husband hereafter offer her that opportunity by providing the necessary funds, and should she reject it and decline to return to him, a different question would, I think, arise. CASE B.-Mrs Agnes Stark or Steel. The husband here is able-bodied, and the facts stated in the case do not appear to me to go further than to disclose a de facto state of separation between him and his wife. He has not deserted her in the ordinary sense and it is not said that he has done anything equivalent in the way of abandonment. On the facts stated I do not think it has been shewn that the wife was a proper object of parochial relief. CASE C.-Mrs Susanna Jamieson ci While it was open to the first parties to offer indoor relief to the mother and child together, they appear to me to have acted with a very reasonable discretion in taking in the child alone while the mother remained outside to work; and I do not know of any rule which disabled them from exercising such a discretion in the matter. I am accordingly of opinion that the first party's claim of recourse is well founded. CASE D.-Mrs Martha Evans or Brown. It is well settled that dissolution of a marriage through the death of the husband leaves the surviving wife with the settlement which she acquired through him by the marriage until something happens thereafter to cause her to lose it. In the case of dissolution of a marriage through divorce, while the consequences in various other respects are different from those ensuing on death, it appears to me that in this particular matter of poor law settlement the analogy with the case of death is close enough to make it fitting that the same rule should apply, in accordance with the contention of the first party. Lord Sands. CASE A.-Mrs Hannah Fallon or Dorran. By the law of Scotland a person who is destitute is entitled to poor law relief. An ablebodied person is not entitled to such relief. As it appeared to me in the course of the argument, in this case there was an underlying suggestion that the latter proposition is a qualification of the former. This suggestion is founded upon a misapprehension. The able-bodied person is denied relief, not because being able-bodied is an inherent disqualification, but because, in the eye of the law, an able-bodied man or woman cannot be destitute as being unable to procure the means of subsistence. For reasons of public policy which the history of poor law relief, particularly in England, makes intelligible, a presumption has been established that if a person is able-bodied he or she can earn a livelihood and need not be destitute. Under the conditions of modern life this presumption REPORTS-1924, SCOTS LAW TIMES. may not square with fact. But the law takes no account of this consideration. If a person has hands to work, that person can earn the means of subsistence by working, and he and his dependants are not proper objects of public relief. Having found an able-bodied person, the law postulates a person who is able and has the opportunity to maintain himself and his dependants by working. As regards dependants, however, this presumption is not absolute. Although it has been found expedient for reasons of public policy to make an absolute presumption that an able-bodied person can maintain himself and his dependants, the law has not been constrained to make an absolute presumption that what the able-bodied person is presumed to be able to earn is in all circumstances available to his dependants. This presumption, indeed, appears to be absolute when the dependants are living 811 Council of 1924. of an able-bodied person. But mere abandon- 1st Div. in family with the able-bodied person; but husband was in Glasgow. On the other hand, 66 66 the general case the dependant of an able- ambulatory and it is here that difficulty arises. The difficulty which attaches to this view of The clear case is that of a husband or parent | the matter is that where there is abandonment who has disappeared and whose whereabouts | there is no constraint either of duty or affection is unknown. But there may also be cases to support the dependant if poor law relief be where the presumption that the resources, real or theoretical, of the able-bodied person are inmediately available to his dependants does not apply, although his whereabouts are known. In general, I think, and this is in accordance with the authorities, there must be an element of abandonment in such cases. That is perhaps a more satisfactory expression than "desertion." The latter has a consistorial signification, and under consistorial law a husband may be in desertion though he maintains his wife and not be in desertion though he refuses to do Even the word "abandonment" is not wholly satisfactory if that word be used in a harsh sense. A widower, for example, may be in Australia and his child may be brought up by an aunt in Scotland who maintains it. The so. aunt dies and the child is destitute. It will take months to communicate with Australia. I have little doubt that this child is a proper object of parochial relief, although, until the father is communicated with and declines to support the child, it might be harsh to say that he had abandoned it. Subject, however, to refused, and legal compulsion is slow and un- In the view, however, which I take of the this recognition of a possible suspense period to recognise that when a person has removed or other very exceptional cases, in my view abandonment is an essential condition of a right to poor relief on the part of the dependant himself to a remote part of the world and has 812 REPORTS-1924, SCOTS LAW TIMES. 1st Div. is, in the general case, a suitable object of poor no settlement. Settlement imports simply Parish relief. As regards Case B, it is sufficient that liability of a parish to maintain a person Council of the dependant of an able-bodied person resident if that person falls into destitution. There Glasgow v. in Scotland is not in general entitled to poor can, it is suggested, be no such liability Parish relief. I do not think that upon the facts upon any parish in favour of a wife. If Council of stated there are in either case specialities which the husband is able-bodied there is no obliga Ruther glen. may take the case out of the general rule. I November 20, am accordingly of opinion that in both cases the 1924. questions stated should be answered in the manner proposed by your Lordship in the chair. CASE C.-Mrs Susanna Jamieson or In this case the contention is that the mother of the sick child should have been offered the poorhouse for herself and her child, and that accordingly the parish of settlement cannot recover the expenditure in the maintenance and treatment of the child. If the mother had been offered and had accepted the poorhouse for herself and the child, the cost to the relieving parish would have been in excess of the present claim. But the suggestion is that, with no other alternative but to go into the poorhouse, the mother would have taken away her sick child without obtaining any relief for it. There are rules of our poor law which, though their operation may be harsh in a particular case, are salutary on the whole. But I am glad to be able to agree with your Lordship in the chair that there is no rule which dictates to parochial authorities such a course of action as the contention of the second party seems to require. CASE D.-Mrs Martha Evans or Brown. This case raises a novel point which, as it appears to me, is not altogether free from difficulty. In one view the case is quite simple. The general rule is that where a person has a settlement, that settlement can be lost only by the acquisition of a new settlement; or, in the case of a residential settlement, by non-residence for the statutory period. Accordingly, if the wife had a settlement stante matrimonio she must retain that settlement notwithstanding divorce until she loses it by non-residence or remarriage. That general rule would seem to supply a simple solution of the case. But there are certain special considerations in relation to marriage. When a woman marries she loses her settlement and acquires a derivative settlement instanter by the very fact of marriage. It would be consistent with this and not be unreasonable if, on the dissolution of the marriage, she lost that derivative settlement instanter and reverted to her own settlement as it would be independent of marriage. Further, there is plausibility in the contention that what is termed a derivative settlement is not truly a settlement, and that a married woman has tion to support the wife. If he be not able-bodied, then it is he and not the wife who has a claim for relief for himself and his dependants. The wife is merged in the husband. She may be a persona as one to be counted in the measure of relief to be given to the husband, but she is not a persona as having any independent right to relief. No doubt a widow on the death of her husband retains her husband's settlement; but the somewhat sentimental reasons that have been indicated from the bench in explanation of this rule suggest that the considerations to which I have adverted have a certain logical cogency. As was pointed out, however, in a recent case in this Division, we are dealing here with a somewhat arbitrary branch of positive law. I am therefore of opinion that we must disregard logical subtleties on the one hand and sentimental considerations on the other. So proceeding, I think that we are thrown back upon the simple solution of the case to which I adverted at the outset. Up to the date of divorce the woman was a potential burden upon the parish of her husband's settlement, and that burden can be shifted only in one or other of several ways which the law has long recognised. I agree, therefore, with your Lordship in the chair as to the answer to be given to the questions stated. REPORTS-1924, SCOTS LAW TIMES. 813 outwith the five days allowed by the Act for making land) Act, 1908, the case must be applied for HIGH application-Objection that stated case incompetent Hunter that the Court would not readily entertain such an objection in the circumstances stated, but opinions reserved thereon-Opinion per Lord Anderson that the oral application was bad, in respect that the entry in the minutes of procedure was not -Observed the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lord signed by the accused or by his agent, but that the written application had been timeously made. Robert Smith, merchant, Buckie, was charged in the Police Court of the burgh of Buckie on a complaint at the instance of Malcolm Gray, Burgh Prosecutor, Buckie, under the Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1903, section 96. The magistrates convicted the accused, who obtained a stated case for the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary. The stated case set forth, inter alia : VIII. The order of the Court pronouncing sentence on the accused was dated 28th April 1924. Notice of appeal was intimated in writing by accused's agent to the clerk of Court by crave dated and posted at Banff, 3rd May 1924, which was delivered at Buckie, 5th May 1924. At the time of pronouncing sentence, the accused's agent orally asked the Court to state a case for the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary, and this request is entered in the minutes of procedure at the trial. The Questions submitted for the opinion of the Court were, inter alia: "1. Is this appeal competent in view of the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1908, section 61, and the Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1903, section 102? "2. In view of the fact that the minutes of procedure at the trial bear that the accused then asked the Court to state a case for the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary, is this appeal competent in the circumstances?" The Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. cap. 65), enacts: Section 61. Application to have a case stated shall be made at the time when judgment is given, or at any time within five days thereafter, and such application shall be signed by the appellant or his agent and either written on the complaint or lodged with the clerk of Court, and where the latter course is adopted the clerk of Court shall enter in the proceedings the date when said application is lodged, and shall thereupon intimate the appeal to the respondent. The case was heard before the High Court of Justiciary on 18th and 19th November 1924 when counsel were heard, inter alia, on the competency of the stated case. Argued for the Respondent: The stated case had not been timeously applied for. Under section 61 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scot CIARY, 1924. within five days, and the application either COURT written on the complaint and signed by the OF JUSTI appellant or his agent, or there must be a separate written request signed by the appellant Smith v. or his agent. There must, however, be writing Gray. in either case. The oral request made in the November 19, present case was not a compliance with the statutory terms. The written request made subsequently thereto was not timeously made, because, though posted on the 3rd, it was not received till the 5th May, and it was the latter date that determined whether the five days had expired or not. The present case was different, in the terms of the section founded on, from the similar cases under the Summary Prosecutions Appeals Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. cap. 62), section 3, of Charleson v. Duffes (1881, 4 Coup. 470; 8 R. (J.) 34), and Thom v. Caledonian Railway Co. (1886, 1 White 248). Argued for the Appellant: The stated case was competent. The question had been twice before the Court in the interpretation of an analogous section in the Summary Prosecutions Appeals Act, 1875, in the cases of Charleson v. Duffes and Thom v. Caledonian Railway Co. (cit., sup.), and similar objections had been overruled. Of two equally possible constructions the Court would prefer the one in favour of the accused. The section should read "such latter application," and accordingly signature was only required when a written application was made after the trial. It was a sufficient compliance with the terms of the section to make application within five days, and "lodging" was effected if the letter left the appellant's hands within the five days. On 19th November 1924 the Court affirmed the conviction and found it unnecessary to deal with the objections to the competency of the stated case. The Lord Justice-Clerk (Alness). The appellant in this case, a merchant in Buckie, was convicted in the Police Court there of a breach of section 96 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1903, whereupon this case was stated for the opinion of the High Court, and a number of questions are appended to it. The question of the competency of the stated case has been raised by the respondent, and the merits of the case have also been debated. Speaking for myself, as I have formed a clear opinion that the case fails upon the merits, I deem it unnecessary to express any concluded opinion upon the question of competency which was argued. I am of opinion that, even assuming the competency of this stated case, it fails upon the merits. The principal question on the merits is the 6th: Whether the magistrates, on the facts |