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1ST DIV.

Inland Revenue v.

Captain Michael John Wemyss, of Wemyss Castle, Fife (hereinafter called Captain Wemyss), appealed to the Commissioners for the Special Wemyss. Purposes of the Income Tax Acts against an assessment made upon him to super-tax on the sum of £18,499 for the year ended 5th April 1921, under the provisions of the Income Tax Acts relating to super-tax.

January 26, 1924.

The only questions which arose on this appeal were: (1) Whether Captain Wemyss was bound to include the annual value of Wemyss Castle and grounds in the statement of his income for the year ended 5th April 1920 ? and (2) Whether he was bound, in the circumstances hereinafter appearing, to include in such statement the whole of the income for that year received by the trustees of his marriage settlement from certain shares held under the settlement?

The Commissioners who heard the appeal decided both questions raised in favour of Captain Wemyss, and amended the assessment accordingly to £8760. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue obtained a stated case for the opinion of the Court of Session.

The stated case set forth, inter alia :

I. The following facts were admitted or proved : 1. Under a trust disposition and settlement made on 10th May 1904, the late Randolph Gordon Erskine Wemyss, father of Captain Wemyss, settled and disposed of the whole of his property, as therein directed. The directions with reference to the Wemyss Castle estate were contained in the following clause :

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'In the fourth place I direct my trustees to maintain and keep in good repair the said estates of Wemyss, Little Raith, and Torry, with the buildings, fences, and others thereon, and specially to maintain and keep in good repair my mansion-house of Wemyss Castle, the chapel, and the offices, policies, and grounds connected with the castle. It is my desire that the said mansion-house and policies of Wemyss Castle and the shootings shall not be let unless in the opinion of my trustees this course should become necessary or expedient, and so long as my trustees consider it expedient to retain the said castle, offices, policies, and shootings in their own hands it is my desire that the same shall be occupied by the said Lady Eva Wemyss while she survives as her residence in Scotland, unless and until she shall consider it desirable to relinquish the occupancy thereof as after mentioned, and so long as the said castle, offices, policies, and shootings are occupied by her, I direct my trustees, in addition to any sum which they may pay for the upkeep thereof, to pay to her monthly a sum of £200 for general household and stable expenses, or such other sum as they in their sole discretion may consider necessary. While thus expressing my wish that the said Lady Eva Wemyss shall have the liferent use and enjoyment of the said castle, offices, policies, and shootings, I leave it to her, having full confidence in her discretion and judgment, to decide whether at any time she shall relinquish the occupancy of the said castle, offices, and grounds in favour of my son Michael

John Wemyss; said discretion shall not, however, be exercised before the said Michael John Wemyss shall have attained the age of twenty-five years complete, and it shall not any time be in the power of the said Michael John Wemyss to call upon the said Lady Eva Wemyss to exercise the discretion hereby conferred upon her. Should this discretion be exercised by the said Lady Eva Wemyss, the said Michael John Wemyss shall, during the subsistence of this trust, only be entitled to occupy the said castle, offices, policies, and shootings so long as my said trustees shall find it expedient to retain the same in their own hands unlet. Further, should the said Lady Eva Wemyss relinquish the occupancy of the the subsistence of this trust, I direct my trustees to said castle, offices, policies, and shootings during pay to her the sum of £10,000 sterling to enable her to provide another residence for herself, and should she so relinquish the occupancy after the said estates have been disponed to my said son as after mentioned, then he in like manner shall be bound to pay to her the said sum of £10,000 for the aforesaid purpose."

2. The following direction was also inserted: said wife or after her relinquishment of her occupation "In the fourteenth place, after the death of my of Wemyss Castle, policies, and others mentioned in the fourth purpose hereof, I direct my trustees to hold said castle, policies, and others in trust for the liferent use of my said son Michael John Wemyss, so long as his mother, Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss, shall remain alive.'

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3. In the year ended 5th April 1920, Captain Wemyss was over the age of twenty-five, but Lady Eva Wemyss was still alive and the trust disposition and settlement above referred to was still in operation. By a deed of renunciation, dated 29th January 1919, Lady Eva Wemyss relinquished and renounced her right of occupancy of the mansionhouse of Wemyss Castle, and the offices, policies, and shootings pertaining thereto, in favour of Captain Wemyss. Throughout the financial year ended 5th April 1920, Captain Wemyss was in occupation of Wemyss Castle. The castle was furnished for occupation, and income tax, Schedule A, upon it and income tax, Schedule B, on the grounds were paid by the trustees, who have also paid for the repairs of the castle.

4. By an antenuptial contract of marriage made by Captain Wemyss upon his marriage in the year 1918, he transferred to trustees his whole right, title, and interest in 6000 preferred ordinary shares and 4000 deferred ordinary shares in the Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd (which shares were at the time held by the trustees of an earlier settlement for the purpose of securing a jointure or annuity to Lady Lilian Wemyss) upon trust to pay to himself the income of such shares (after payment of the said jointure), but declaring that "in the event of the interest, dividend, bonus, or other income paid on the said deferred ordinary shares exceeding the rate of 12 per cent. free of income tax in any year the trustees shall retain any income exceeding such rate, and apply it from time to time (subject to a further payment of £500 per annum to the husband during the lifetime of the said Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss) in reducing or discharging, in the first place, the charge on the said shares in favour of the

Royal Bank of Scotland, being No. 4 in the schedule annexed hereto, and in the second place the reserved charge, being No. 5 in the said schedule, if it shall have been exercised, until such charges shall be entirely discharged and extinguished.”

5. In the year ended 5th April 1920 the dividends on the said deferred shares exceeded 12 per cent., and the balance of the income was applied by the trustees, as directed by the above clause, towards discharging the charge on the said shares in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

6. A copy of the trust disposition and settlement and a copy of the antenuptial contract of marriage are attached to and form part of this case.

7. The super-tax assessment appealed against was made in a sum sufficient to include the annual value of Wemyss Castle and grounds as assessed under Schedules A and B of the Income Tax Acts, and the whole of the income derived from the said shares in the Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd., less only the jointure payable to Lady Lilian Wemyss. The said assessments under Schedules A and B had been made in the name of Captain Wemyss.

8. At the hearing of the appeal it was agreed before us that, under the trust disposition and settlement dated 10th May 1904, Captain Wemyss had no power himself to let the castle and grounds.

II. It was contended on behalf of Captain Wemyss: 1. That by reason of the decisions in Tennant v. Smith ([1892] A.C. 150) and Inland Revenue v. Sutherland (1894, 21 R. 753) Captain Wemyss was not bound to include the annual value of the castle grounds in his statement of income, and that the right of occupancy given to him under the trust disposition and settlement was not of such a nature as to make the annual value of the castle and grounds part of his income for the purposes of income tax; and

2. That by the antenuptial contract he had for onerous consideration deprived himself of so much of the income from the shares referred to as the trustees are required to retain and apply in discharging the charge on the said shares in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland, and that the income so retained and applied by the trustees was not his income for the purposes of income tax.

III. On behalf of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue it was contended :

1. That the right conferred on Captain Wemyss by the fourteenth purpose of the said trust disposition and settlement was a right of liferent and not a mere right of occupancy (Johnstone v. Mackenzie's Trs., 1912 S.C. (H.L.) 106; Glover's Trs. v. Glover, 1913 S.C. 115); and that he was therefore bound to include the annual value of Wemyss Castle and grounds as part of his income;

2. That the provision in the marriage contract for payment of the excess income to the Royal Bank, being entirely outside the marriage consideration, was not binding and was revocable (Bell's Prin. (10th ed.), section 1942; Barclay's Trs. v. Watson, 1903, 5 F. 926; Macdonald v. Hall, 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 88, per Lord Watson at pp. 94 and 95);

3. That the said provision was simply a trust for payment of a private debt, and that Captain Wemyss had accordingly not divested himself of the excess income (Byres' Trs. v. Gemmell, 1895, 23 R. 332, per Lord M'Laren at p. 337); and

4. That Captain Wemyss was accordingly bound

to include for the purposes of super-tax the whole of 18T Div. the income received by his marriage-contract trustees from the said shares.

The said antenuptial contract of marriage provided, inter alia:

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And further, considering that by trust assignation the father of the husband on the narrative therein contained, assigned, transferred, and conveyed 10,000 ordinary shares in the Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd., now and then represented by 6000 preferred ordinary shares, and 4000 deferred ordinary shares in the said Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd., to and in favour of trustees for the purposes therein mentioned, but subject primo loco to the payment from the income or capital of the said shares of a jointure or annuity of £3500 in favour of Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss, the mother of the said husband, all as narrated therein. ... And further, considering that the husband having attained the age of twenty-five years has acquired in terms of the said trust assignation a vested right or interest in the said shares, but subject to the jointure or annuity as aforesaid, and that the husband has granted, or joined in granting, certain charges over the said shares by way of additional security for various loans and advances, and hereby reserves to himself power to charge the said shares to the further extent of £8000, all as set forth in the schedule annexed hereto. And further, considering that by indenture, made the 18th July 1913, between the honourable Eva Cecilia Margaret Erskine Wemyss, of Wemyss Castle, in the county of Fife (commonly called Lady Eva Wemyss) of the one part and the husband of the second part, the said Lady Eva Wemyss covenanted with the husband, that if, and so long as (during her life) he should be deprived of any income (which he would otherwise receive from the said shares), under and by virtue of any of the charges 1, 2, and 3 of the schedule annexed hereto, the said Lady Eva Wemyss would pay to the husband such a proportion of the amount by which his income shall be thereby reduced, as the whole income for the time being of the shares in the Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd., to which she is entitled under her marriage settlement, bears to the income which the husband would otherwise receive under the trust assignation. And further, considering that on the treaty for the marriage it was agreed that the husband should settle his whole right, title, and interest under and by virtue of the said trust assignation, and in particular his whole right, title, and interest in the said shares, but subject to the jointure or annuity and to the charges above mentioned: Therefore the husband hereby assigns, conveys, and transfers to .. trustees under these presents (First) His whole right, title, and interest, present and future, under and by virtue of the said trust assignation, and in particular his whole right, title, and interest, present and future, in and to the said 6000 preferred ordinary shares and 4000 deferred ordinary shares

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in the Wemyss Collieries Trust Ltd., and in and to the price and proceeds thereof, if and when sold, but subject always to the aforesaid jointure or annuity and charges; and (Second) His whole right, claim, and interest under the said indenture, made 18th July 1913, between the said Lady Eva Wemyss

Inland Revenue v. Wemyss. January 26, 1924.

1st Div. and him

Inland

1924.

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but in respect the said shares are presently held by the trustees now acting under the settlement in the English form, made the Revenue v. 19th day of December 1899, between the said Wemyss. Randolph Gordon Erskine Wemyss, of the first part, January 26, the said Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss, of the second part, and the trustees named in said settle ment, of the third part it is hereby declared that the said shares shall not be transferred to the names of the trustees under these presents until the death of the said Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss shall happen, but the husband shall grant all necessary writings, so that the income derived from the said shares, but subject as aforesaid, shall be paid to the trustees acting under these presents, which right, title, and interest above conveyed, and the proceeds thereof, and the assets representing the same from time to time, and the income arising therefrom, but subject as aforesaid, shall be held by the trustees in trust always, for the following purposes, viz. (Second) For payment to the husband during his lifetime of the free income (subject to the provisions hereinafter mentioned), including in such income all income accrued but unpaid at the time when the trust estate falls under the operation of these presents, but declaring that, in the event of the interest, dividend, bonus, or other income paid on the said deferred ordinary shares exceeding the rate of 12 per cent., free of income tax, in any year, the trustees shall retain any income exceeding such rate, and apply it from time to time (subject to a further payment of £500 per annum to the husband during the lifetime of the said Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss) in reducing or discharging, in the first place, the charge on the said shares in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland, being No. 4 in the schedule annexed hereto; and, in the second place, the reserved charge, being No. 5 in the said schedule, if it shall have been exercised, until such charges shall be entirely discharged and extinguished: Declaring that if the husband shall not have exercised his reserved power to make the said charge No. 5 in the said schedule by the time the charge in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland shall have been fully discharged and extinguished, he shall forfeit all right to make it, and the power reserved to him as hereinbefore mentioned shall be cancelled. And, after discharging the said charge in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland, and the reserved charge, if it shall have been exercised, the trustees shall pay to the husband the whole free annual income until the income paid on the said deferred ordinary shares shall exceed the rate of 15 per cent. free of income tax in any year, in which event the trustees shall retain any income exceeding the said rate of 15 per cent. free of income tax, and shall accumulate and invest it from time to time until the capital sum of £5000 shall have been so accumulated and invested, declaring that any income derived from such accumulations or investments made therefrom shall be added to the capital or principal sum and invested along therewith until the accumulated fund shall amount to £5000, when the income therefrom shall be paid to the husband. And after the trustees shall have so accumulated and invested the said capital sum of £5000 they shall pay the whole free income of said shares to the husband until the income paid on the said deferred

ordinary shares shall exceed the rate of 17 per cent., free of income tax, in any year, in which event the trustees shall retain any income exceeding the said rate of 17 per cent., free of income tax, and shall accumulate and invest it until they shall have accumulated and invested a further sum of £5000 in the same manner and under the same conditions as are provided for the accumulation of the £5000 first above mentioned. And after the trustees shall have accumulated and invested such further capital sum of £5000 (making £10,000 in all), they shall pay to the husband the whole free income of said shares, as well as the income derived from the said accumulated fund of £10,000. And it is hereby further provided and declared that, in the event of the income paid on the said deferred ordinary shares falling below the rate of 12 per cent., free of income tax, in any year, the trustees shall be entitled to make up such income to the said rate of 12 per cent., free of income tax, from the capital or income of any accumulated fund they may be holding as aforesaid at the time, and pay such sum to the husband in addition to the said sum of £500 per annum if the said Lady Lilian Mary Paulet or Wemyss is then surviving, but this provision shall only apply if the trustees shall at the time when the income on the said deferred ordinary shares shall fall below the said rate of 121 per cent., free of income tax, have accumulated funds in hand, and only to the extent thereof, and in the event of the accumulated fund being so drawn upon, the trustees shall, so soon as the income paid on the said deferred ordinary shares shall again exceed the said rate of 12 per cent., free of income tax, make up out of such excess income the amount so drawn, and continue to accumulate and invest in the terms and on the conditions hereinbefore mentioned. (Third) In the event of the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband the trustees shall thereafter account for and pay over the free income to the wife during all the days of her life after such dissolution. (Fourth) With regard to the capital subject as aforesaid the trustees shall hold the same for behoof of the child or children to be procreated of the marriage, and the issue of such of them as may die before acquiring a vested interest leaving issue. (Fifth) In the event

of the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband and of the children and remoter issue, if any, all dying before acquiring a vested interest, the capital shall (subject however to the liferent of the wife in the event hereinbefore mentioned) be payable and be dealt with as the husband may direct by deed or will, and failing such then the same shall be payable to his executors to be dealt with as part of his personal estate according to the law of Scotland. (Sixth) In the event of the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife and of the children or remoter issue, if any, all dying without acquiring a vested interest, the husband shall be entitled to have the capital made over to himself absolutely and further it is hereby specially provided and declared that the husband shall be entitled, if he so wishes at any time during the subsistence of the marriage, to pay to the trustees the sum of £100,000 sterling, and on his making such payment the trustees shall transfer and make over to him the whole of the right, titles, and interests in and to the said shares conveyed to them by these presents or the

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said shares if they shall have been transferred to them and also any accumulations or funds that may have been invested by the trustees in terms of the foregoing provisions, and such sum of £100,000 sterling, if and when it shall be paid over to the trustees, shall take the place of the said rights, titles, and interests in the said shares or the said

shares if transferred to the trustees and the accumu

lations or invested funds as hereinbefore provided, and said sum of £100,000 shall be invested and held by the trustees for the same purposes as it is hereinbefore provided.

Inland

1924.

the property in the annual value of the subjects 1st Div. in question? An occupier was charged because prima facie he enjoyed the annual value; but Revenue v. where the real owner was not the occupier the Wemyss. latter had a right of relief. The liability was January 26, imposed on the footing that the lands were of a certain annual value (Middleton v. Lord Advocate, 1876, 3 R. 599, per Lord Deas at p. 602). The trust disposition and settlement here in question had already been considered by the Court in Wemyss v. Wemyss's Trs. (1921 S.Č. 30). If it were examined it would be seen that the trustees were in reality holding for the respondent as apparent heir. The respondent must survive his mother before he became fiar. 1. Charge in favour of the Scottish Widows' Fund The trustees, however, were they to let the Life Assurance Society over three-fourths of the shares as additional security for a bond and disposi-dent for the proceeds. The respondent could subjects, would have to account to the respon

The schedule of charges referred to in the said antenuptial contract of marriage was in the following terms:

tion in security over the estates of Wemyss and Torry. The principal sum in the bond has now been reduced to £230,000. The gross annual rental of the estates of Wemyss and Torry amounts to over £25,000.

2. Charge in favour of Sir Michael B. Nairn's trustees as additional security for bonds over the said estates for £62,000.

3. Charge in favour of Lady Cowley's trustees as additional security for bond over the said estates

for £30,000.

4. Charge in favour of the Royal Bank of Scotland

for £18,000.

5. Charge reserved to Michael J. Wemyss to be exercised by him to the extent of £8000.

The Questions of Law for the opinion of the Court were:

"1. Whether the annual value of Wemyss Castle, offices, policies, and shootings forms part of the income of Captain Wemyss for the purposes of supertax? and

"2. Whether the income from the said shares, so far as it exceeds 12 per cent. per annum, forms part of the income of Captain Wemyss for the purposes of super-tax?"

The case was heard before the First Division on 9th, 10th, 11th, and 15th January 1924.

Argued for the Appellants: On the first question. The respondent under the fourteenth purpose of the trust disposition and settlement of his father was a liferenter, and as such properly chargeable with Schedule A assessment. His liferent was burdened, it is true, with a restriction against letting, but that fact did not take from him his liability to charge under the Income Tax Acts. Such liability arose under the Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. V. cap. 40), sections 5 (1), 19, 27 (1). Inland Revenue v. Anderson (1922 S.C. 284) illustrated the meaning of an occupier in the sense of the Income Tax Acts. The test of chargeability under Schedule A was--Who had

not escape chargeability under Schedule A
because the trustees, and not he, were infeft
in the subjects (Johnstone v. Mackenzie's Trs.,
1912 S.C. (H.L.) 106). He was bound to pay
Schedule A tax because he was the person
in occupation. On a true interpretation of the
rules applicable to Schedule A, an occupier
who had properly paid tax and had no right
of relief was to be regarded for income tax
purposes as the owner. In Inland Revenue v.
Fry (1895, 22 R. 422) a parish minister had been
held liable to assessment under Schedule A in
respect of his manse. Tennant v. Smith ([1892]
A.Č. 150; 19 R. (H.L.) 1) was distinguishable
from the present case. It was clear there that
the bank was the person using and occupying
the premises in question. Similarly in Inland
Revenue v. Sutherland (1894, 21 R. 753) the
terms of the trust deed shewed that the occupier
could not be held liable under Schedule A. On
the second question. The surplus income over
12 per cent arising from the shares was still
the income of the respondent even though he
had directed that such surplus was to be used
to pay off his debts. The trust was merely
administrative, and was revocable.
The re-
spondent was not divested of his income
(M'Laren on Wills and Succession (3rd ed.),
Vol. I. p. 424; Ramsay v. Ramsay's Trs., 1871,
10 M. 120; Macdonald v. Hall, 1893, 20 R. 88,
per Lord Watson at pp. 94 and 95; Eliott v.
Eliott's Tr., 1894, 21 R. 955; Byres' Trs. v.
Gemmell, 1895, 23 R. 332; Synnot v. Simpson,
1854, 5 H.L.C. 121, per Lord Cranworth at
p. 133, whose statement was approved by Lord
Dunedin in Carmichael v. Carmichael's Exrx.,
1920 S.C. (H.L.) 195 at p. 201).

Argued for the Respondent: On the first
question. The feudal title to the subjects was
in the trustees. They had the duty of keeping
up the property and they alone had the power
to let. Could it be said, then, that the right
which the respondent enjoyed was a proper

January 26, 1924.

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lør Div. income right? The opening words of the Income Tax Act, 1918, Schedule A, shewed Inland that the tax was a tax on property, but section Revenue v. Wemyss. 19 made it clear that the Act dealt with ownership of land. The whole scheme of the Act shewed that the tax was a tax on the property of the proprietor and on nothing else. The question, then, was to find the owner. The term owner was defined in Erskine (Inst., II. ix. 41). The common law recognised three classes of ownership: (1) the full owner, (2) the heir of entail in possession, and (3) a liferenter in the full sense of the word. Inland Revenue v. Fry (cit.) was an example of the last class. The ordinary liferenter was clothed with every element of true ownership as far as occupation was concerned. But the respondent fell far short of this standard. He could not let, and he was restricted as to those guests whom he might invite to the castle. There was nothing in the Rules to Schedule A which made liable an occupier who had no right of relief. The fact that an occupier had not exercised his right to deduct was not conclusive, and he was not thereby to be considered to be the proprietor unless it could be shewn in fact that he was proprietor (Agnew v. Ferguson, 1903, 5 F. 879). Tennant v. Smith (cit.) and Inland Revenue v. Sutherland (cit.) supported the respondent's contention that he was not liable to bear tax in respect of these subjects. In Johnstone v. Mackenzie's Trs. (cit.) the words were different, as were the whole circumstances of the case. On the second question. The trust was not revocable. What was ingathered by the trustees in the shape of any excess over 12 per cent. was not income of the respondent. The fact that the trust assets would revert to the respondent in a more valuable condition were he to outlive his wife and should no child take a vested right under the marriage contract did not affect the question. Income might have changed its form before it reached the person who had he got it year by year would have had to pay income tax thereon (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Blott, [1921] 2 A.C. 171). Eliott v. Eliott's Tr. (cit.) was in sharp contrast to the present case, and the other cases cited by the appellants did not support the view of revocability.

Avizandum, 15th January 1924.

On 26th January 1924 the Court answered both questions of law in the negative.

The Lord President (Clyde).-The questions in this case relate to the assessment of the respondent's income to super-tax.

By section 5 (1) of the Income Tax Act, 1918, the total income of any individual is to be

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estimated for purposes of super-tax in the same manner as the total income from all sources is estimated for purposes of exemption or abatement of income tax. By section 27 (1) a claimant for exemption or abatement must declare, inter alia,." all the particular sources from which his income arises.' And by section 19 it is provided that for purposes of exemption or abatement and therefore for purposes of super-tax-" income arising from the ownership of lands. . . . shall . . be deemed to be the annual value thereof estimated in accordance with the rules applicable to Schedule A "; and in like manner income arising from the occupation of lands shall be deemed the assessable value thereof estimated in accordance with the rules applicable to Schedule B."

It is maintained on behalf of the Inland Revenue that one of the sources of the respondent's income is the ownership of lands. The lands referred to in this contention consist of the mansion-house and policies of Wemyss Castle and the shootings.

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It is a circumstance apparently unfavourable, at the outset, to the contention of the Inland Revenue that these lands are not in fact owned by the respondent, but by his father's trustees, to whom they were conveyed under and in terms of his father's trust disposition and settlement, and in whose administration they still remain (along with other estate belonging to the respondent's father) for the manifold purposes therein contained. But the Act of 1918 does not define "ownership"; and it is clear from the rules applicable to Schedule A that ownership may consist in something far short of a vested feudal fee. If regard be had to the provisions of the rules which fix who is the person assessable or chargeable under Schedule A-either without relief (1918 Act, Schedule A, No. II., 4, 5, 6, and 7; No. III., 4 and 7 (1)), or with relief or right of recoupment (1918 Act, Schedule A, No. VII., 8, 9 (1), and 13 (1); No. VIII., 1, 4 (1), and 5)— it appears that the Act regards that person as having the ownership of lands whose right thereto or therein immediately entitles him to the receipt of any annual value the lands may possess the "landlord or "immediate lessor to whom the civil fruits of the lands themselves are or would be immediately payable. This is confirmed by the terms in which the rules for estimating annual value (1918 Act, Schedule A, No. IV., 1 and 2) and those which regulate deductions and allowances (1918 Act, Schedule A, No. V., 1 (g) and 8 (1)) are conceived; and it accords with the opinions expressed by Lord Macnaghten and Lord Davey in London County Council v. Attorney-General ([1901] A.C. 26 at pp. 35, 36, and 45), to the effect

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